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RFC1234 - Tunneling IPX traffic through IP networks

王朝other·作者佚名  2008-05-31
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Network Working Group D. Provan

Request for Comments: 1234 Novell, Inc.

June 1991

Tunneling IPX Traffic through IP Networks

Status of this Memo

This memo describes a method of encapsulating IPX datagrams within

UDP packets so that IPX traffic can travel across an IP internet.

This RFCspecifies an IAB standards track protocol for the Internet

community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.

Please refer to the current edition of the "IAB Official Protocol

Standards" for the standardization state and status of this protocol.

Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

IntrodUCtion

Internet Packet eXchange protocol (IPX) is the internetwork protocol

used by Novell's NetWare protocol suite. For the purposes of this

paper, IPX is functionally equivalent to the Internet Datagram

Protocol (IDP) from the Xerox Network Systems (XNS) protocol suite

[1]. This memo describes a method of encapsulating IPX datagrams

within UDP packets [2] so that IPX traffic can travel across an IP

internet [3].

This RFCallows an IPX implementation to view an IP internet as a

single IPX network. An implementation of this memo will encapsulate

IPX datagrams in UDP packets in the same way any hardware

implementation might encapsulate IPX datagrams in that hardware's

frames. IPX networks can be connected thusly across internets that

carry only IP traffic.

Packet Format

Each IPX datagram is carried in the data portion of a UDP packet.

All IP and UDP fields are set normally. Both the source and the

destination ports in the UDP packet should be set to the UDP port

value allocated by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority for the

implementation of this encapsulation method.

As with any UDP application, the transmitting party has the option of

avoiding the overhead of the checksum by setting the UDP checksum to

zero. Since IPX implementations never use the IPX checksum to guard

IPX packets from damage, UDP checksumming is highly recommended for

IPX encapsulation.

+---------------------+------------+-------------------------------+

IP Header UDP Header IPX Header IPX packet data

(20 or more octets) (8 octets) (30 octets)

+---------------------+------------+-------------------------------+

Figure 1: An IPX packet carried as data in a UDP packet.

Reserved Packets

The first two octets of the IPX header contain the IPX checksum. IPX

packets are never sent with a checksum, so every IPX header begins

with two octets of FF hex. Implementations of this encapsulation

scheme should ignore packets with any other value in the first two

octets immediately following the UDP header. Other values are

reserved for possible future enhancements to this encapsulation

protocol.

Unicast Address Mappings

IPX addresses consist of a four octet network number and a six octet

host number. IPX uses the network number to route each packet

through the IPX internet to the destination network. Once the packet

arrives at the destination network, IPX uses the six octet host

number as the hardware address on that network.

Host numbers are also exchanged in the IPX headers of packets of

IPX's Routing Information Protocol (RIP). This supplies end nodes

and routers alike with the hardware address information required for

forwarding packets across intermediate networks on the way towards

the destination networks.

For implementations of this memo, the first two octets of the host

number will always be zero and the last four octets will be the

node's four octet IP address. This makes address mapping trivial for

unicast transmissions: the first two octets of the host number are

discarded, leaving the normal four octet IP address. The

encapsulation code should use this IP address as the destination

address of the UDP/IP tunnel packet.

Broadcasts between Peer Servers

IPX requires broadcast facilities so that NetWare servers and IPX

routers sharing a network can find one another. Since internet-wide

IP broadcast is neither appropriate nor available, some other

mechanism is required. For this memo, each server and router should

maintain a list of the IP addresses of the other IPX servers and

routers on the IP internet. I will refer to this list as the "peer

list", to individual members as "peers", and to all the peers taken

together, including the local node, as the "peer group". When IPX

requests a broadcast, the encapsulation implementation simulates the

broadcast by transmitting a separate unicast packet to each peer in

the peer list.

Because each peer list is constructed by hand, several groups of

peers can share the same IP internet without knowing about one

another. This differs from a normal IPX network in which all peers

would find each other automatically by using the hardware's broadcast

facility.

The list of peers at each node should contain all other peers in the

peer group. In most cases, connectivity will suffer if broadcasts

from one peer consistently fail to reach some other peer in the

group.

The peer list could be implemented using IP multicast [4], but since

multicast facilities are not widely available at this time, no well-

known multicast address has been assigned and no implementations

using multicast exist. As IP multicast is deployed in IP

implementations, it can be used by simply including in the peer list

an IP multicast address for IPX servers and routers. The IP

multicast address would replace the IP addresses of all peers which

will receive IP multicast packets sent from this peer.

Broadcasts by Clients

Typically, NetWare client nodes do not need to receive broadcasts, so

normally NetWare client nodes on the IP internet would not need to be

included in the peer lists at the servers.

On the other hand, clients on an IPX network need to send broadcasts

in order to locate servers and to discover routes. A client

implementation of UDP encapsulation can handle this by having a

configured list of the IP addresses of all servers and routers in the

peer group running on the IP internetwork. As with the peer list on

a server, the client implementation would simulate the broadcast by

sending a copy of the packet to each IP address in its list of IPX

servers and routers. One of the IP addresses in the list, perhaps

the only one, could be a broadcast address or, when available, a

multicast address. This allows the client to communicate with

members of the peer group without knowing their specific IP

addresses.

It's important to realize that broadcast packets sent from an IPX

client must be able to reach all servers and routers in the server

peer group. Unlike IP, which has a unicast redirect mechanism, IPX

end systems are responsible for discovering routing information by

broadcasting a packet requesting a router that can forward packets to

the desired destination. If such packets do not tend to reach the

entire server peer group, resources in the IPX internet may be

visible to an end system, yet unreachable by it.

Maximum Transmission Unit

Although larger IPX packets are possible, the standard maximum

transmission unit for IPX is 576 octets. Consequently, 576 octets is

the recommended default maximum transmission unit for IPX packets

being sent with this encapsulation technique. With the eight octet

UDP header and the 20 octet IP header, the resulting IP packets will

be 604 octets long. Note that this is larger than the 576 octet

maximum size IP implementations are required to accept [3]. Any IP

implementation supporting this encapsulation technique must be

capable of receiving 604 octet IP packets.

As improvements in protocols and hardware allow for larger,

unfragmented IP transmission units, the 576 octet maximum IPX packet

size may become a liability. For this reason, it is recommended that

the IPX maximum transmission unit size be configurable in

implementations of this memo.

Security Issues

Using a wide-area, general purpose network such as an IP internet in

a position normally occupied by physical cabling introduces some

security problems not normally encountered in IPX internetworks.

Normal media are typically protected physically from outside Access;

IP internets typically invite outside access.

The general effect is that the security of the entire IPX

internetwork is only as good as the security of the entire IP

internet through which it tunnels. The following broad classes of

attacks are possible:

1) Unauthorized IPX clients can gain access to resources through

normal access control attacks such as passWord cracking.

2) Unauthorized IPX gateways can divert IPX traffic to unintended

routes.

3) Unauthorized agents can monitor and manipulate IPX traffic

flowing over physical media used by the IP internet and under

control of the agent.

To a large extent, these security risks are typical of the risks

facing any other application using an IP internet. They are

mentioned here only because IPX is not normally suspicious of its

media. IPX network administrators will need to be aware of these

additional security risks.

Assigned Numbers

The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority assigns well-known UDP port

numbers. It has assigned port number 213 decimal to the IPX

encapsulation technique described in this memo [5].

Acknowledgements

This encapsulation technique was developed independently by Schneider

& Koch and by Novell. I'd like to thank Thomas Ruf of Schneider &

Koch for reviewing this memo to confirm its agreement with the

Schneider & Koch implementation and also for his other valuable

suggestions.

References

[1] Xerox, Corp., "Internet Transport Protocols", XSIS 028112, Xerox

Corporation, December 1981.

[2] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", RFC768, USC/Information

Sciences Institute, August 1980.

[3] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", RFC791, DARPA, September 1981.

[4] Deering, S., "Host Extensions for IP Multicasting", RFC1112,

Stanford University, August 1989.

[5] Reynolds, J., and J. Postel, "Assigned Numbers", RFC-1060,

USC/Information Sciences Institute, March 1990.

Security Considerations

See the "Security Issues" section above.

Author's Address

Don Provan

Novell, Inc.

2180 Fortune Drive

San Jose, California, 95131

Phone: (408)473-8440

EMail: donp@Novell.Com

 
 
 
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