Network Working Group I. Cooper
Request for Comments: 3040 Equinix, Inc.
Category: Informational I. Melve
UNINETT
G. Tomlinson
CacheFlow Inc.
January 2001
Internet Web Replication and Caching Taxonomy
Status of this Memo
This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This memo specifies standard terminology and the taxonomy of web
replication and caching infrastrUCture as deployed today. It
introduces standard concepts, and protocols used today within this
application domain. Currently deployed solutions employing these
technologies are presented to establish a standard taxonomy. Known
problems with caching proxies are covered in the document titled
"Known HTTP Proxy/Caching Problems", and are not part of this
document. This document presents open protocols and points to
published material for each protocol.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1 Base Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 First order derivative terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Second order derivatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4 Topological terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.5 Automatic use of proxies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. Distributed System Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1 Replication Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.1 Client to Replica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.2 Inter-Replica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2 Proxy Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.1 Client to Non-Interception Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.2 Client to Surrogate to Origin Server . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.3 Inter-Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.3.1 (Caching) Proxy Meshes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.3.2 (Caching) Proxy Arrays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2.4 Network Element to Caching Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. Replica Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1 Navigation Hyperlinks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2 Replica HTTP Redirection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.3 DNS Redirection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. Inter-Replica Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1 Batch Driven Replication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2 Demand Driven Replication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.3 Synchronized Replication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. User Agent to Proxy Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.1 Manual Proxy Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.2 Proxy Auto Configuration (PAC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.3 Cache Array Routing Protocol (CARP) v1.0 . . . . . . . . . 18
6.4 Web Proxy Auto-Discovery Protocol (WPAD) . . . . . . . . . 18
7. Inter-Proxy Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.1 Loosely coupled Inter-Proxy Communication . . . . . . . . 19
7.1.1 Internet Cache Protocol (ICP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.1.2 Hyper Text Caching Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.1.3 Cache Digest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.1.4 Cache Pre-filling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.2 Tightly Coupled Inter-Cache Communication . . . . . . . . 22
7.2.1 Cache Array Routing Protocol (CARP) v1.0 . . . . . . . . . 22
8. Network Element Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.1 Web Cache Control Protocol (WCCP) . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.2 Network Element Control Protocol (NECP) . . . . . . . . . 24
8.3 SOCKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9.1 Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
9.1.1 Man in the middle attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
9.1.2 Trusted third party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
9.1.3 Authentication based on IP number . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
9.2 Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
9.2.1 Trusted third party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
9.2.2 Logs and legal implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
9.3 Service security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
9.3.1 Denial of service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
9.3.2 Replay attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
9.3.3 Stupid configuration of proxies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
9.3.4 Copyrighted transient copies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
9.3.5 Application level Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1. Introduction
Since its introduction in 1990, the World-Wide Web has evolved from a
simple client server model into a complex distributed architecture.
This evolution has been driven largely due to the scaling problems
associated with eXPonential growth. Distinct paradigms and solutions
have emerged to satisfy specific requirements. Two core
infrastructure components being employed to meet the demands of this
growth are replication and caching. In many cases, there is a need
for web caches and replicated services to be able to coexist.
This memo specifies standard terminology and the taxonomy of web
replication and caching infrastructure deployed in the Internet
today. The principal goal of this document is to establish a common
understanding and reference point of this application domain.
It is also expected that this document will be used in the creation
of a standard architectural framework for efficient, reliable, and
predictable service in a web which includes both replicas and caches.
Some of the protocols which this memo examines are specified only by
company technical white papers or work in progress documents. Such
references are included to demonstrate the existence of such
protocols, their experimental deployment in the Internet today, or to
aid the reader in their understanding of this technology area.
There are many protocols, both open and proprietary, employed in web
replication and caching today. A majority of the open protocols
include DNS [8], Cache Digests [21][10], CARP [14], HTTP [1], ICP
[2], PAC [12], SOCKS [7], WPAD [13], and WCCP [18][19]. These
protocols, and their use within the caching and replication
environments, are discussed below.
2. Terminology
The following terminology provides definitions of common terms used
within the web replication and caching community. Base terms are
taken, where possible, from the HTTP/1.1 specification [1] and are
included here for reference. First- and second-order derivatives are
constructed from these base terms to help define the relationships
that exist within this area.
Terms that are in common usage and which are contrary to definitions
in RFC2616 and this document are highlighted.
2.1 Base Terms
The majority of these terms are taken as-is from RFC2616 [1], and
are included here for reference.
client (taken from [1])
A program that establishes connections for the purpose of sending
requests.
server (taken from [1])
An application program that accepts connections in order to
service requests by sending back responses. Any given program may
be capable of being both a client and a server; our use of these
terms refers only to the role being performed by the program for a
particular connection, rather than to the program's capabilities
in general. Likewise, any server may act as an origin server,
proxy, gateway, or tunnel, switching behavior based on the nature
of each request.
proxy (taken from [1])
An intermediary program which acts as both a server and a client
for the purpose of making requests on behalf of other clients.
Requests are serviced internally or by passing them on, with
possible translation, to other servers. A proxy MUST implement
both the client and server requirements of this specification. A
"transparent proxy" is a proxy that does not modify the request or
response beyond what is required for proxy authentication and
identification. A "non-transparent proxy" is a proxy that
modifies the request or response in order to provide some added
service to the user agent, such as group annotation services,
media type transformation, protocol reduction, or anonymity
filtering. Except where either transparent or non-transparent
behavior is explicitly stated, the HTTP proxy requirements apply
to both types of proxies.
Note: The term "transparent proxy" refers to a semantically
transparent proxy as described in [1], not what is commonly
understood within the caching community. We recommend that the term
"transparent proxy" is always prefixed to avoid confusion (e.g.,
"network transparent proxy"). However, see definition of
"interception proxy" below.
The above condition requiring implementation of both the server and
client requirements of HTTP/1.1 is only appropriate for a non-network
transparent proxy.
cache (taken from [1])
A program's local store of response messages and the subsystem
that controls its message storage, retrieval, and deletion. A
cache stores cacheable responses in order to reduce the response
time and network bandwidth consumption on future, equivalent
requests. Any client or server may include a cache, though a
cache cannot be used by a server that is acting as a tunnel.
Note: The term "cache" used alone often is meant as "caching proxy".
Note: There are additional motivations for caching, for example
reducing server load (as a further means to reduce response time).
cacheable (taken from [1])
A response is cacheable if a cache is allowed to store a copy of
the response message for use in answering subsequent requests.
The rules for determining the cacheability of HTTP responses are
defined in section 13. Even if a resource is cacheable, there may
be additional constraints on whether a cache can use the cached
copy for a particular request.
gateway (taken from [1])
A server which acts as an intermediary for some other server.
Unlike a proxy, a gateway receives requests as if it were the
origin server for the requested resource; the requesting client
may not be aware that it is communicating with a gateway.
tunnel (taken from [1])
An intermediary program which is acting as a blind relay between
two connections. Once active, a tunnel is not considered a party
to the HTTP communication, though the tunnel may have been
initiated by an HTTP request. The tunnel ceases to exist when
both ends of the relayed connections are closed.
replication
"Creating and maintaining a duplicate copy of a database or file
system on a different computer, typically a server." - Free
Online Dictionary of Computing (FOLDOC)
inbound/outbound (taken from [1])
Inbound and outbound refer to the request and response paths for
messages: "inbound" means "traveling toward the origin server",
and "outbound" means "traveling toward the user agent".
network element
A network device that introduces multiple paths between source and
destination, transparent to HTTP.
2.2 First order derivative terms
The following terms are constructed taking the above base terms as
foundation.
origin server (taken from [1])
The server on which a given resource resides or is to be created.
user agent (taken from [1])
The client which initiates a request. These are often browsers,
editors, spiders (web-traversing robots), or other end user tools.
caching proxy
A proxy with a cache, acting as a server to clients, and a client
to servers.
Caching proxies are often referred to as "proxy caches" or simply
"caches". The term "proxy" is also frequently misused when
referring to caching proxies.
surrogate
A gateway co-located with an origin server, or at a different
point in the network, delegated the authority to operate on behalf
of, and typically working in close co-operation with, one or more
origin servers. Responses are typically delivered from an
internal cache.
Surrogates may derive cache entries from the origin server or from
another of the origin server's delegates. In some cases a
surrogate may tunnel such requests.
Where close co-operation between origin servers and surrogates
exists, this enables modifications of some protocol requirements,
including the Cache-Control directives in [1]. Such modifications
have yet to be fully specified.
Devices commonly known as "reverse proxies" and "(origin) server
accelerators" are both more properly defined as surrogates.
reverse proxy
See "surrogate".
server accelerator
See "surrogate".
2.3 Second order derivatives
The following terms further build on first order derivatives:
master origin server
An origin server on which the definitive version of a resource
resides.
replica origin server
An origin server holding a replica of a resource, but which may
act as an authoritative reference for client requests.
content consumer
The user or system that initiates inbound requests, through use of
a user agent.
browser
A special instance of a user agent that acts as a content
presentation device for content consumers.
2.4 Topological terms
The following definitions are added to describe caching device
topology:
user agent cache
The cache within the user agent program.
local caching proxy
The caching proxy to which a user agent connects.
intermediate caching proxy
Seen from the content consumer's view, all caches participating in
the caching mesh that are not the user agent's local caching
proxy.
cache server
A server to requests made by local and intermediate caching
proxies, but which does not act as a proxy.
cache array
A cluster of caching proxies, acting logically as one service and
partitioning the resource name space across the array. Also known
as "diffused array" or "cache cluster".
caching mesh
a loosely coupled set of co-operating proxy- and (optionally)
caching-servers, or clusters, acting independently but sharing
cacheable content between themselves using inter-cache
communication protocols.
2.5 Automatic use of proxies
Network administrators may wish to force or facilitate the use of
proxies by clients, enabling such configuration within the network
itself or within automatic systems in user agents, such that the
content consumer need not be aware of any such configuration issues.
The terms that describe such configurations are given below.
automatic user-agent proxy configuration
The technique of discovering the availability of one or more
proxies and the automated configuration of the user agent to use
them. The use of a proxy is transparent to the content consumer
but not to the user agent. The term "automatic proxy
configuration" is also used in this sense.
traffic interception
The process of using a network element to examine network traffic
to determine whether it should be redirected.
traffic redirection
Redirection of client requests from a network element performing
traffic interception to a proxy. Used to deploy (caching) proxies
without the need to manually reconfigure individual user agents,
or to force the use of a proxy where such use would not otherwise
occur.
interception proxy (a.k.a. "transparent proxy", "transparent cache")
The term "transparent proxy" has been used within the caching
community to describe proxies used with zero configuration within
the user agent. Such use is somewhat transparent to user agents.
Due to discrepancies with [1] (see definition of "proxy" above),
and objections to the use of the Word "transparent", we introduce
the term "interception proxy" to describe proxies that receive
redirected traffic flows from network elements performing traffic
interception.
Interception proxies receive inbound traffic flows through the
process of traffic redirection. (Such proxies are deployed by
network administrators to facilitate or require the use of
appropriate services offered by the proxy). Problems associated
with the deployment of interception proxies are described in the
document "Known HTTP Proxy/Caching Problems" [23]. The use of
interception proxies requires zero configuration of the user agent
which act as though communicating directly with an origin server.
3. Distributed System Relationships
This section identifies the relationships that exist in a distributed
replication and caching environment. Having defined these
relationships, later sections describe the communication protocols
used in each relationship.
3.1 Replication Relationships
The following sections describe relationships between clients and
replicas and between replicas themselves.
3.1.1 Client to Replica
A client may communicate with one or more replica origin servers, as
well as with master origin servers. (In the absence of replica
servers the client interacts directly with the origin server as is
the normal case.)
------------------ ----------------- ------------------
Replica Origin Master Origin Replica Origin
Server Server Server
------------------ ----------------- ------------------
\ /
\ /
-----------------------------------------
Client to
----------------- Replica Server
Client
-----------------
Protocols used to enable the client to use one of the replicas can be
found in Section 4.
3.1.2 Inter-Replica
This is the relationship between master origin server(s) and replica
origin servers, to replicate data sets that are accessed by clients
in the relationship shown in Section 3.1.1.
------------------ ----------------- ------------------
Replica Origin ----- Master Origin ----- Replica Origin
Server Server Server
------------------ ----------------- ------------------
Protocols used in this relationship can be found in Section 5.
3.2 Proxy Relationships
There are a variety of ways in which (caching) proxies and cache
servers communicate with each other, and with user agents.
3.2.1 Client to Non-Interception Proxy
A client may communicate with zero or more proxies for some or all
requests. Where the result of communication results in no proxy
being used, the relationship is between client and (replica) origin
server (see Section 3.1.1).
----------------- ----------------- -----------------
Local Local Local
Proxy Proxy Proxy
----------------- ----------------- -----------------
\ /
\ /
-----------------------------------------
-----------------
Client
-----------------
In addition, a user agent may interact with an additional server -
operated on behalf of a proxy for the purpose of automatic user agent
proxy configuration.
Schemes and protocols used in these relationships can be found in
Section 6.
3.2.2 Client to Surrogate to Origin Server
A client may communicate with zero or more surrogates for requests
intended for one or more origin servers. Where a surrogate is not
used, the client communicates directly with an origin server. Where
a surrogate is used the client communicates as if with an origin
server. The surrogate fulfills the request from its internal cache,
or acts as a gateway or tunnel to the origin server.
-------------- -------------- --------------
Origin Origin Origin
Server Server Server
-------------- -------------- --------------
\ /
\ /
-----------------
Surrogate
-----------------
------------
Client
------------
3.2.3 Inter-Proxy
Inter-Proxy relationships exist as meshes (loosely coupled) and
clusters (tightly coupled).
3.2.3.1 (Caching) Proxy Meshes
Within a loosely coupled mesh of (caching) proxies, communication can
happen at the same level between peers, and with one or more parents.
--------------------- ---------------------
----------- Intermediate Intermediate
Caching Proxy (D) Caching Proxy (E)
(peer) --------------------- ---------------------
-------------- (parent) / (parent)
Cache ------/
Server (C) /
-------------- /
(peer) ----------------- ---------------------
------------- Local Caching ------- Intermediate
Proxy (A) (peer) Caching Proxy (B)
----------------- ---------------------
----------
Client
----------
Client included for illustration purposes only
An inbound request may be routed to one of a number of intermediate
(caching) proxies based on a determination of whether that parent is
better suited to resolving the request.
For example, in the above figure, Cache Server C and Intermediate
Caching Proxy B are peers of the Local Caching Proxy A, and may only
be used when the resource requested by A already exists on either B
or C. Intermediate Caching Proxies D & E are parents of A, and it is
A's choice of which to use to resolve a particular request.
The relationship between A & B only makes sense in a caching
environment, while the relationships between A & D and A & E are also
appropriate where D or E are non-caching proxies.
Protocols used in these relationships can be found in Section 7.1.
3.2.3.2 (Caching) Proxy Arrays
Where a user agent may have a relationship with a proxy, it is
possible that it may instead have a relationship with an array of
proxies arranged in a tightly coupled mesh.
----------------------
----------------------
---------------------
(Caching) Proxy -----
Array ----- ^ ^
--------------------- ^ ^
^ ^ ---
-----
--------------------------
Protocols used in this relationship can be found in Section 7.2.
3.2.4 Network Element to Caching Proxy
A network element performing traffic interception may choose to
redirect requests from a client to a specific proxy within an array.
(It may also choose not to redirect the traffic, in which case the
relationship is between client and (replica) origin server, see
Section 3.1.1.)
----------------- ----------------- -----------------
Caching Proxy Caching Proxy Caching Proxy
Array Array Array
----------------- ----------------- -----------------
\ /
-----------------------------------------
--------------
Network
Element
--------------
///
------------
Client
------------
The interception proxy may be directly in-line of the flow of traffic
- in which case the intercepting network element and interception
proxy form parts of the same hardware system - or may be out-of-path,
requiring the intercepting network element to redirect traffic to
another network segment. In this latter case, communication
protocols enable the intercepting network element to stop and start
redirecting traffic when the interception proxy becomes
(un)available. Details of these protocols can be found in Section 8.
4. Replica Selection
This section describes the schemes and protocols used in the
cooperation and communication between client and replica origin web
servers. The ideal situation is to discover an optimal replica
origin server for clients to communicate with. Optimality is a
policy based decision, often based upon proximity, but may be based
on other criteria such as load.
4.1 Navigation Hyperlinks
Best known reference:
This memo.
Description:
The simplest of client to replica communication mechanisms. This
utilizes hyperlink URIs embedded in web pages that point to the
individual replica origin servers. The content consumer manually
selects the link of the replica origin server they wish to use.
Security:
Relies on the protocol security associated with the appropriate
URI scheme.
Deployment:
Probably the most commonly deployed client to replica
communication mechanism. Ubiquitous interoperability with humans.
Submitter:
Document editors.
4.2 Replica HTTP Redirection
Best known reference:
This memo.
Description:
A simple and commonly used mechanism to connect clients with
replica origin servers is to use HTTP redirection. Clients are
redirected to an optimal replica origin server via the use of the
HTTP [1] protocol response codes, e.g., 302 "Found", or 307
"Temporary Redirect". A client establishes HTTP communication
with one of the replica origin servers. The initially contacted
replica origin server can then either choose to accept the service
or redirect the client again. Refer to section 10.3 in HTTP/1.1
[1] for information on HTTP response codes.
Security:
Relies entirely upon HTTP security.
Deployment:
Observed at a number of large web sites. Extent of usage in the
Internet is unknown.
Submitter:
Document editors.
4.3 DNS Redirection
Best known references:
* RFC1794 DNS Support for Load Balancing Proximity [8]
* This memo
Description:
The Domain Name Service (DNS) provides a more sophisticated client
to replica communication mechanism. This is accomplished by DNS
servers that sort resolved IP addresses based upon quality of
service policies. When a client resolves the name of an origin
server, the enhanced DNS server sorts the available IP addresses
of the replica origin servers starting with the most optimal
replica and ending with the least optimal replica.
Security:
Relies entirely upon DNS security, and other protocols that may be
used in determining the sort order.
Deployment:
Observed at a number of large web sites and large ISP web hosted
services. Extent of usage in the Internet is unknown, but is
believed to be increasing.
Submitter:
Document editors.
5. Inter-Replica Communication
This section describes the cooperation and communication between
master- and replica- origin servers. Used in replicating data sets
between origin servers.
5.1 Batch Driven Replication
Best known reference:
This memo.
Description:
The replica origin server to be updated initiates communication
with a master origin server. The communication is established at
intervals based upon queued transactions which are scheduled for
deferred processing. The scheduling mechanism policies vary, but
generally are re-occurring at a specified time. Once
communication is established, data sets are copied to the
initiating replica origin server.
Security:
Relies upon the protocol being used to transfer the data set. FTP
[4] and RDIST are the most common protocols observed.
Deployment:
Very common for synchronization of mirror sites in the Internet.
Submitter:
Document editors.
5.2 Demand Driven Replication
Best known reference:
This memo.
Description:
Replica origin servers acquire content as needed due to client
demand. When a client requests a resource that is not in the data
set of the replica origin server/surrogate, an attempt is made to
resolve the request by acquiring the resource from the master
origin server, returning it to the requesting client.
Security:
Relies upon the protocol being used to transfer the resources. FTP
[4], Gopher [5], HTTP [1] and ICP [2] are the most common
protocols observed.
Deployment:
Observed at several large web sites. Extent of usage in the
Internet is unknown.
Submitter:
Document editors.
5.3 Synchronized Replication
Best known reference:
This memo.
Description:
Replicated origin servers cooperate using synchronized strategies
and specialized replica protocols to keep the replica data sets
coherent. Synchronization strategies range from tightly coherent
(a few minutes) to loosely coherent (a few or more hours). Updates
occur between replicas based upon the synchronization time
constraints of the coherency model employed and are generally in
the form of deltas only.
Security:
All of the known protocols utilize strong cryptographic key
exchange methods, which are either based upon the Kerberos shared
secret model or the public/private key RSA model.
Deployment:
Observed at a few sites, primarily at university campuses.
Submitter:
Document editors.
Note:
The editors are aware of at least two open source protocols - AFS
and CODA - as well as the proprietary NRS protocol from Novell.
6. User Agent to Proxy Configuration
This section describes the configuration, cooperation and
communication between user agents and proxies.
6.1 Manual Proxy Configuration
Best known reference:
This memo.
Description:
Each user must configure her user agent by supplying information
pertaining to proxied protocols and local policies.
Security:
The potential for doing wrong is high; each user individually sets
preferences.
Deployment:
Widely deployed, used in all current browsers. Most browsers also
support additional options.
Submitter:
Document editors.
6.2 Proxy Auto Configuration (PAC)
Best known reference:
"Navigator Proxy Auto-Config File Format" [12]
Description:
A javascript script retrieved from a web server is executed for
each URL accessed to determine the appropriate proxy (if any) to
be used to access the resource. User agents must be configured to
request this script upon startup. There is no bootstrap
mechanism, manual configuration is necessary.
Despite manual configuration, the process of proxy configuration
is simplified by centralizing it within a script at a single
location.
Security:
Common policy per organization possible but still requires initial
manual configuration. PAC is better than "manual proxy
configuration" since PAC administrators may update the proxy
configuration without further user intervention.
Interoperability of PAC files is not high, since different
browsers have slightly different interpretations of the same
script, possibly leading to undesired effects.
Deployment:
Implemented in Netscape Navigator and Microsoft Internet Explorer.
Submitter:
Document editors.
6.3 Cache Array Routing Protocol (CARP) v1.0
Best known references:
* "Cache Array Routing Protocol" [14] (work in progress)
* "Cache Array Routing Protocol (CARP) v1.0 Specifications" [15]
* "Cache Array Routing Protocol and Microsoft Proxy Server 2.0"
[16]
Description:
User agents may use CARP directly as a hash function based proxy
selection mechanism. They need to be configured with the location
of the cluster information.
Security:
Security considerations are not covered in the specification works
in progress.
Deployment:
Implemented in Microsoft Proxy Server, Squid. Implemented in user
agents via PAC scripts.
Submitter:
Document editors.
6.4 Web Proxy Auto-Discovery Protocol (WPAD)
Best known reference:
"The Web Proxy Auto-Discovery Protocol" [13] (work in progress)
Description:
WPAD uses a collection of pre-existing Internet resource discovery
mechanisms to perform web proxy auto-discovery.
The only goal of WPAD is to locate the PAC URL [12]. WPAD does
not specify which proxies will be used. WPAD supplies the PAC
URL, and the PAC script then operates as defined above to choose
proxies per resource request.
The WPAD protocol specifies the following:
* how to use each mechanism for the specific purpose of web proxy
auto-discovery
* the order in which the mechanisms should be performed
* the minimal set of mechanisms which must be attempted by a WPAD
compliant user agent
The resource discovery mechanisms utilized by WPAD are as follows:
* Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol DHCP
* Service Location Protocol SLP
* "Well Known Aliases" using DNS A records
* DNS SRV records
* "service: URLs" in DNS TXT records
Security:
Relies upon DNS and HTTP security.
Deployment:
Implemented in some user agents and caching proxy servers. More
than two independent implementations.
Submitter:
Josh Cohen
7. Inter-Proxy Communication
7.1 Loosely coupled Inter-Proxy Communication
This section describes the cooperation and communication between
caching proxies.
7.1.1 Internet Cache Protocol (ICP)
Best known reference:
RFC2186 Internet Cache Protocol (ICP), version 2 [2]
Description:
ICP is used by proxies to query other (caching) proxies about web
resources, to see if the requested resource is present on the
other system.
ICP uses UDP. Since UDP is an uncorrected network transport
protocol, an estimate of network congestion and availability may
be calculated by ICP loss. This rudimentary loss measurement
provides, together with round trip times, a load balancing method
for caches.
Security:
See RFC2187 [3]
ICP does not convey information about HTTP headers associated with
resources. HTTP headers may include access control and cache
directives. Since proxies ask for the availability of resources,
and subsequently retrieve them using HTTP, false cache hits may
occur (object present in cache, but not accessible to a sibling is
one example).
ICP suffers from all the security problems of UDP.
Deployment:
Widely deployed. Most current caching proxy implementations
support ICP in some form.
Submitter:
Document editors.
See also:
"Internet Cache Protocol Extension" [17] (work in progress)
7.1.2 Hyper Text Caching Protocol
Best known reference:
RFC2756 Hyper Text Caching Protocol (HTCP/0.0) [9]
Description:
HTCP is a protocol for discovering HTTP caching proxies and cached
data, managing sets of HTTP caching proxies, and monitoring cache
activity.
HTCP requests include HTTP header material, while ICPv2 does not,
enabling HTCP replies to more accurately describe the behaviour
that would occur as a result of a subsequent HTTP request for the
same resource.
Security:
Optionally uses HMAC-MD5 [11] shared secret authentication.
Protocol is subject to attack if authentication is not used.
Deployment:
HTCP is implemented in Squid and the "Web Gateway Interceptor".
Submitter:
Document editors.
7.1.3 Cache Digest
Best known references:
* "Cache Digest Specification - version 5" [21]
* "Summary Cache: A Scalable Wide-Area Web Cache Sharing
Protocol" [10] (see note)
Description:
Cache Digests are a response to the problems of latency and
congestion associated with previous inter-cache communication
mechanisms such as the Internet Cache Protocol (ICP) [2] and the
Hyper Text Cache Protocol [9]. Unlike these protocols, Cache
Digests support peering between caching proxies and cache servers
without a request-response exchange taking place for each inbound
request. Instead, a summary of the contents in cache (the Digest)
is fetched by other systems that peer with it. Using Cache
Digests it is possible to determine with a relatively high degree
of accuracy whether a given resource is cached by a particular
system.
Cache Digests are both an exchange protocol and a data format.
Security:
If the contents of a Digest are sensitive, they should be
protected. Any methods which would normally be applied to secure
an HTTP connection can be applied to Cache Digests.
A 'Trojan horse' attack is currently possible in a mesh: System A
A can build a fake peer Digest for system B and serve it to B's
peers if requested. This way A can direct traffic toward/from B.
The impact of this problem is minimized by the 'pull' model of
transferring Cache Digests from one system to another.
Cache Digests provide knowledge about peer cache content on a URL
level. Hence, they do not dictate a particular level of policy
management and can be used to implement various policies on any
level (user, organization, etc.).
Deployment:
Cache Digests are supported in Squid.
Cache Meshes: NLANR Mesh; TF-CACHE Mesh (European Academic
networks
Submitter:
Alex Rousskov for [21], Pei Cao for [10].
Note: The technology of Summary Cache [10] is patent pending by the
University of Wisconsin-Madison.
7.1.4 Cache Pre-filling
Best known reference:
"Pre-filling a cache - A satellite overview" [20] (work in
progress)
Description:
Cache pre-filling is a push-caching implementation. It is
particularly well adapted to IP-multicast networks because it
allows preselected resources to be simultaneously inserted into
caches within the targeted multicast group. Different
implementations of cache pre-filling already exist, especially in
satellite contexts. However, there is still no standard for this
kind of push-caching and vendors propose solutions either based on
dedicated equipment or public domain caches extended with a pre-
filling module.
Security:
Relies on the inter-cache protocols being employed.
Deployment:
Observed in two commercial content distribution service providers.
Submitter:
Ivan Lovric
7.2 Tightly Coupled Inter-Cache Communication
7.2.1 Cache Array Routing Protocol (CARP) v1.0
Also see Section 6.3
Best known references:
* "Cache Array Routing Protocol" [14] (work in progress)
* "Cache Array Routing Protocol (CARP) v1.0 Specifications" [15]
* "Cache Array Routing Protocol and Microsoft Proxy Server 2.0"
[16]
Description:
CARP is a hashing function for dividing URL-space among a cluster
of proxies. Included in CARP is the definition of a Proxy Array
Membership Table, and ways to download this information.
A user agent which implements CARP v1.0 can allocate and
intelligently route requests for the URLs to any member of the
Proxy Array. Due to the resulting sorting of requests through
these proxies, duplication of cache contents is eliminated and
global cache hit rates may be improved.
Security:
Security considerations are not covered in the specification works
in progress.
Deployment:
Implemented in caching proxy servers. More than two independent
implementations.
Submitter:
Document editors.
8. Network Element Communication
This section describes the cooperation and communication between
proxies and network elements. Examples of such network elements
include routers and switches. Generally used for deploying
interception proxies and/or diffused arrays.
8.1 Web Cache Control Protocol (WCCP)
Best known references:
"Web Cache Control Protocol" [18][19] (work in progress)
Note: The name used for this protocol varies, sometimes referred
to as the "Web Cache Coordination Protocol", but frequently just
"WCCP" to avoid confusion
Description:
WCCP V1 runs between a router functioning as a redirecting network
element and out-of-path interception proxies. The protocol allows
one or more proxies to register with a single router to receive
redirected traffic. It also allows one of the proxies, the
designated proxy, to dictate to the router how redirected traffic
is distributed across the array.
WCCP V2 additionally runs between multiple routers and the
proxies.
Security:
WCCP V1 has no security features.
WCCP V2 provides optional authentication of protocol packets.
Deployment:
Network elements: WCCP is deployed on a wide range of Cisco
routers.
Caching proxies: WCCP is deployed on a number of vendors' caching
proxies.
Submitter:
David Forster
Document editors.
8.2 Network Element Control Protocol (NECP)
Best known reference:
"NECP: The Network Element Control Protocol" [22] (work in
progress)
Description:
NECP provides methods for network elements to learn about server
capabilities, availability, and hints as to which flows can and
cannot be serviced. This allows network elements to perform load
balancing across a farm of servers, redirection to interception
proxies, and cut-through of flows that cannot be served by the
farm.
Security:
Optionally uses HMAC-SHA-1 [11] shared secret authentication along
with complex sequence numbers to provide moderately strong
security. Protocol is subject to attack if authentication is not
used.
Deployment:
Unknown at present; several network element and caching proxy
vendors have expressed intent to implement the protocol.
Submitter:
Gary Tomlinson
8.3 SOCKS
Best known reference:
RFC1928 SOCKS Protocol Version 5 [7]
Description:
SOCKS is primarily used as a caching proxy to firewall protocol.
Although firewalls don't conform to the narrowly defined network
element definition above, they are a integral part of the network
infrastructure. When used in conjunction with a firewall, SOCKS
provides a authenticated tunnel between the caching proxy and the
firewall.
Security:
An extensive framework provides for multiple authentication
methods. Currently, SSL, CHAP, DES, 3DES are known to be
available.
Deployment:
SOCKS is widely deployed in the Internet.
Submitter:
Document editors.
9. Security Considerations
This document provides a taxonomy for web caching and replication.
Recommended practice, architecture and protocols are not described in
detail.
By definition, replication and caching involve the copying of
resources. There are legal implications of making and keeping
transient or permanent copies; these are not covered here.
Information on security of each protocol referred to by this memo is
provided in the preceding sections, and in their accompanying
documentation. HTTP security is discussed in section 15 of RFC2616
[1], the HTTP/1.1 specification, and to a lesser extent in RFC1945
[6], the HTTP/1.0 specification. RFC2616 contains security
considerations for HTTP proxies.
Caching proxies have the same security issues as other application
level proxies. Application level proxies are not covered in these
security considerations. IP number based authentication is
problematic when a proxy is involved in the communications. Details
are not discussed here.
9.1 Authentication
Requests for web resources, and responses to such requests, may be
directed to replicas and/or may flow through intermediate proxies.
The integrity of communication needs to be preserved to ensure
protection from both loss of access and from unintended change.
9.1.1 Man in the middle attacks
HTTP proxies are men-in-the-middle, the perfect place for a man-in-
the-middle-attack. A discussion of this is found in section 15 of
RFC2616 [1].
9.1.2 Trusted third party
A proxy must either be trusted to act on behalf of the origin server
and/or client, or it must act as a tunnel. When presenting cached
objects to clients, the clients need to trust the caching proxy to
act on behalf on the origin server.
A replica may get accreditation from the origin server.
9.1.3 Authentication based on IP number
Authentication based on the client's IP number is problematic when
connecting through a proxy, since the authenticating device only has
access to the proxy's IP number. One (problematic) solution to this
is for the proxy to spoof the client's IP number for inbound
requests.
Authentication based on IP number assumes that the end-to-end
properties of the Internet are preserved. This is typically not the
case for environments containing interception proxies.
9.2 Privacy
9.2.1 Trusted third party
When using a replication service, one must trust both the replica
origin server and the replica selection system.
Redirection of traffic - either by automated replica selection
methods, or within proxies - may introduce third parties the end user
and/or origin server must to trust. In the case of interception
proxies, such third parties are often unknown to both end points of
the communication. Unknown third parties may have security
implications.
Both proxies and replica selection services may have access to
aggregated access information. A proxy typically knows about
accesses by each client using it, information that is more sensitive
than the information held by a single origin server.
9.2.2 Logs and legal implications
Logs from proxies should be kept secure, since they provide
information about users and their patterns of behaviour. A proxy's
log is even more sensitive than a web server log, as every request
from the user population goes through the proxy. Logs from replica
origin servers may need to be amalgamated to get aggregated
statistics from a service, and transporting logs across borders may
have legal implications. Log handling is restricted by law in some
countries.
Requirements for object security and privacy are the same in a web
replication and caching system as it is in the Internet at large. The
only reliable solution is strong cryptography. End-to-end encryption
frequently makes resources uncacheable, as in the case of SSL
encrypted web sessions.
9.3 Service security
9.3.1 Denial of service
Any redirection of traffic is susceptible to denial of service
attacks at the redirect point, and both proxies and replica selection
services may redirect traffic.
By attacking a proxy, access to all servers may be denied for a large
set of clients.
It has been argued that introduction of an interception proxy is a
denial of service attack, since the end-to-end nature of the Internet
is destroyed without the content consumer's knowledge.
9.3.2 Replay attack
A caching proxy is by definition a replay attack.
9.3.3 Stupid configuration of proxies
It is quite easy to have a stupid configuration which will harm
service for content consumers. This is the most common security
problem with proxies.
9.3.4 Copyrighted transient copies
The legislative forces of the world are considering the question of
transient copies, like those kept in replication and caching system,
being legal. The legal implications of replication and caching are
subject to local law.
Caching proxies need to preserve the protocol output, including
headers. Replication services need to preserve the source of the
objects.
9.3.5 Application level access
Caching proxies are application level components in the traffic flow
path, and may give intruders access to information that was
previously only available at the network level in a proxy-free world.
Some network level equipment may have required physical access to get
sensitive information. Introduction of application level components
may require additional system security.
10. Acknowledgements
The editors would like to thank the following for their assistance:
David Forster, Alex Rousskov, Josh Cohen, John Martin, John Dilley,
Ivan Lovric, Joe Touch, Henrik Nordstrom, Patrick McManus, Duane
Wessels, Wojtek Sylwestrzak, Ted Hardie, Misha Rabinovich, Larry
Masinter, Keith Moore, Roy Fielding, Patrik Faltstrom, Hilarie Orman,
Mark Nottingham and Oskar Batuner.
References
[1] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., Masinter, L.,
Leach, P. and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol --
HTTP/1.1", RFC2616, June 1999.
[2] Wessels, D. and K. Claffy, "Internet Cache Protocol (ICP),
Version 2", RFC2186, September 1997.
[3] Wessels, D. and K. Claffy, "Application of Internet Cache
Protocol (ICP), Version 2", RFC2187, September 1997.
[4] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol (FTP)", STD
9, RFC959, October 1985.
[5] Anklesaria, F., McCahill, M., Lindner, P., Johnson, D., Torrey,
D. and B. Alberti, "The Internet Gopher Protocol", RFC1436,
March 1993.
[6] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R. and H. Frystyk, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.0", RFC1945, May 1996.
[7] Leech, M., Ganis, M., Lee, Y., Kuris, R., Koblas, D. and L.
Jones, "SOCKS Protocol Version 5", RFC1928, March 1996.
[8] Brisco, T., "DNS Support for Load Balancing", RFC1794, April
1995.
[9] Vixie, P. and D. Wessels, "Hyper Text Caching Protocol
(HTCP/0.0)", RFC2756, January 2000.
[10] Fan, L., Cao, P., Almeida, J. and A. Broder, "Summary Cache: A
Scalable Wide-Area Web Cache Sharing Protocol", Proceedings of
ACM SIGCOMM'98 pp. 254-265, September 1998.
[11] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M. and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing
for Message Authentication", RFC2104, February 1997.
[12] Netscape, Inc., "Navigator Proxy Auto-Config File Format",
March 1996,
<URL:http://www.netscape.com/eng/mozilla/2.0/relnotes/demo/proxy-
live.Html>.
[13] Gauthier, P., Cohen, J., Dunsmuir, M. and C. Perkins, "The Web
Proxy Auto-Discovery Protocol", Work in Progress.
[14] Valloppillil, V. and K. Ross, "Cache Array Routing Protocol",
Work in Progress.
[15] Microsoft Corporation, "Cache Array Routing Protocol (CARP)
v1.0 Specifications, Technical Whitepaper", August 1999,
<URL:http://www.microsoft.com/Proxy/Guide/carpspec.ASP>.
[16] Microsoft Corporation, "Cache Array Routing Protocol and
Microsoft Proxy Server 2.0, Technical White Paper", August
1998,
<URL:http://www.microsoft.com/proxy/documents/CarpWP.exe>.
[17] Lovric, I., "Internet Cache Protocol Extension", Work in
Progress.
[18] Cieslak, M. and D. Forster, "Cisco Web Cache Coordination
Protocol V1.0", Work in Progress.
[19] Cieslak, M., Forster, D., Tiwana, G. and R. Wilson, "Cisco Web
Cache Coordination Protocol V2.0", Work in Progress.
[20] Goutard, C., Lovric, I. and E. Maschio-Esposito, "Pre-filling a
cache - A satellite overview", Work in Progress.
[21] Hamilton, M., Rousskov, A. and D. Wessels, "Cache Digest
specification - version 5", December 1998,
<URL:http://www.squid-cache.org/CacheDigest/cache-digest-
v5.txt>.
[22] Cerpa, A., Elson, J., Beheshti, H., Chankhunthod, A., Danzig,
P., Jalan, R., Neerdaels, C., Shroeder, T. and G. Tomlinson,
"NECP: The Network Element Control Protocol", Work in Progress.
[23] Cooper, I. and J. Dilley, "Known HTTP Proxy/Caching Problems",
Work in Progress.
Authors' Addresses
Ian Cooper
Equinix, Inc.
2450 Bayshore Parkway
Mountain View, CA 94043
USA
Phone: +1 650 316 6065
EMail: icooper@equinix.com
Ingrid Melve
UNINETT
Tempeveien 22
Trondheim N-7465
Norway
Phone: +47 73 55 79 07
EMail: Ingrid.Melve@uninett.no
Gary Tomlinson
CacheFlow Inc.
12034 134th Ct. NE, Suite 201
Redmond, WA 98052
USA
Phone: +1 425 820 3009
EMail: gary.tomlinson@cacheflow.com
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