RFC4015-The Eifel Response Algorithm for TCP

Network Working Group R. Ludwig

Request for Comments: 4015 EriCsson Research

Category: Standards Track A. Gurtov

HIIT

February 2005

The Eifel Response Algorithm for TCP

Status of This Memo

This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the

Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for

improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet

Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state

and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Abstract

Based on an appropriate detection algorithm, the Eifel response

algorithm provides a way for a TCP sender to respond to a detected

spurious timeout. It adapts the retransmission timer to avoid

further spurious timeouts and (depending on the detection algorithm)

can avoid the often unnecessary go-back-N retransmits that would

otherwise be sent. In addition, the Eifel response algorithm

restores the congestion control state in sUCh a way that packet

bursts are avoided.

1. Introduction

The Eifel response algorithm relies on a detection algorithm such as

the Eifel detection algorithm, defined in [RFC3522]. That document

contains informative background and motivation context that may be

useful for implementers of the Eifel response algorithm, but it is

not necessary to read [RFC3522] in order to implement the Eifel

response algorithm. Note that alternative response algorithms have

been proposed [BA02] that could also rely on the Eifel detection

algorithm, and alternative detection algorithms have been proposed

[RFC3708], [SK04] that could work together with the Eifel response

algorithm.

Based on an appropriate detection algorithm, the Eifel response

algorithm provides a way for a TCP sender to respond to a detected

spurious timeout. It adapts the retransmission timer to avoid

further spurious timeouts and (depending on the detection algorithm)

can avoid the often unnecessary go-back-N retransmits that would

otherwise be sent. In addition, the Eifel response algorithm

restores the congestion control state in such a way that packet

bursts are avoided.

Note: A previous version of the Eifel response algorithm also

included a response to a detected spurious fast retransmit.

However, as a consensus was not reached about how to adapt the

duplicate acknowledgement threshold in that case, that part of the

algorithm was removed for the time being.

1.1. Terminology

The keyWords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD,

SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this

document, are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

We refer to the first-time transmission of an octet as the 'original

transmit'. A subsequent transmission of the same octet is referred

to as a 'retransmit'. In most cases, this terminology can also be

applied to data segments. However, when repacketization occurs, a

segment can contain both first-time transmissions and retransmissions

of octets. In that case, this terminology is only consistent when

applied to octets. For the Eifel detection and response algorithms,

this makes no difference, as they also operate correctly when

repacketization occurs.

We use the term 'acceptable ACK' as defined in [RFC793]. That is an

ACK that acknowledges previously unacknowledged data. We use the

term 'bytes_acked' to refer to the amount (in terms of octets) of

previously unacknowledged data that is acknowledged by the most

recently received acceptable ACK. We use the TCP sender state

variables 'SND.UNA' and 'SND.NXT' as defined in [RFC793]. SND.UNA

holds the segment sequence number of the oldest outstanding segment.

SND.NXT holds the segment sequence number of the next segment the TCP

sender will (re-)transmit. In addition, we define as 'SND.MAX' the

segment sequence number of the next original transmit to be sent.

The definition of SND.MAX is equivalent to the definition of

'snd_max' in [WS95].

We use the TCP sender state variables 'cwnd' (congestion window), and

'ssthresh' (slow-start threshold), and the term 'FlightSize' as

defined in [RFC2581]. FlightSize is the amount (in terms of octets)

of outstanding data at a given point in time. We use the term

'Initial Window' (IW) as defined in [RFC3390]. The IW is the size of

the sender's congestion window after the three-way handshake is

completed. We use the TCP sender state variables 'SRTT' and

'RTTVAR', and the terms 'RTO' and 'G' as defined in [RFC2988]. G is

the clock granularity of the retransmission timer. In addition, we

assume that the TCP sender maintains the value of the latest round-

trip time (RTT) measurement in the (local) variable 'RTT-SAMPLE'.

We use the TCP sender state variable 'T_last', and the term 'tcpnow'

as used in [RFC2861]. T_last holds the system time when the TCP

sender sent the last data segment, whereas tcpnow is the TCP sender's

current system time.

2. Appropriate Detection Algorithms

If the Eifel response algorithm is implemented at the TCP sender, it

MUST be implemented together with a detection algorithm that is

specified in a standards track or eXPerimental RFC.

Designers of detection algorithms who want their algorithms to work

together with the Eifel response algorithm should reuse the variable

"SpuriousRecovery" with the semantics and defined values specified in

[RFC3522]. In addition, we define the constant LATE_SPUR_TO (set

equal to -1) as another possible value of the variable

SpuriousRecovery. Detection algorithms should set the value of

SpuriousRecovery to LATE_SPUR_TO if the detection of a spurious

retransmit is based on the ACK for the retransmit (as opposed to an

ACK for an original transmit). For example, this applies to

detection algorithms that are based on the DSACK option [RFC3708].

3. The Eifel Response Algorithm

The complete algorithm is specified in section 3.1. In sections 3.2

- 3.6, we discuss the different steps of the algorithm.

3.1. The Algorithm

Given that a TCP sender has enabled a detection algorithm that

complies with the requirements set in Section 2, a TCP sender MAY use

the Eifel response algorithm as defined in this subsection.

If the Eifel response algorithm is used, the following steps MUST be

taken by the TCP sender, but only upon initiation of a timeout-based

loss recovery. That is when the first timeout-based retransmit is

sent. The algorithm MUST NOT be reinitiated after a timeout-based

loss recovery has already been started but not completed. In

particular, it may not be reinitiated upon subsequent timeouts for

the same segment, or upon retransmitting segments other than the

oldest outstanding segment.

(0) Before the variables cwnd and ssthresh get updated when

loss recovery is initiated, set a "pipe_prev" variable as

follows:

pipe_prev <- max (FlightSize, ssthresh)

Set a "SRTT_prev" variable and a "RTTVAR_prev" variable as

follows:

SRTT_prev <- SRTT + (2 * G)

RTTVAR_prev <- RTTVAR

(DET) This is a placeholder for a detection algorithm that must

be executed at this point, and that sets the variable

SpuriousRecovery as outlined in Section 2. If

[RFC3522] is used as the detection algorithm, steps (1) -

(6) of that algorithm go here.

(7) If SpuriousRecovery equals SPUR_TO, then

proceed to step (8);

else if SpuriousRecovery equals LATE_SPUR_TO, then

proceed to step (9);

else

proceed to step (DONE).

(8) Resume the transmission with previously unsent data:

Set

SND.NXT <- SND.MAX

(9) Reverse the congestion control state:

If the acceptable ACK has the ECN-Echo flag [RFC3168] set,

then

proceed to step (DONE);

else set

cwnd <- FlightSize + min (bytes_acked, IW)

ssthresh <- pipe_prev

Proceed to step (DONE).

(10) Interworking with Congestion Window Validation:

If congestion window validation is implemented according

to [RFC2861], then set

T_last <- tcpnow

(11) Adapt the conservativeness of the retransmission timer:

Upon the first RTT-SAMPLE taken from new data; i.e., the

first RTT-SAMPLE that can be derived from an acceptable

ACK for data that was previously unsent when the spurious

timeout occurred,

if the retransmission timer is implemented according

to [RFC2988], then set

SRTT <- max (SRTT_prev, RTT-SAMPLE)

RTTVAR <- max (RTTVAR_prev, RTT-SAMPLE/2)

RTO <- SRTT + max (G, 4*RTTVAR)

Run the bounds check on the RTO (rules (2.4) and

(2.5) in [RFC2988]), and restart the

retransmission timer;

else

appropriately adapt the conservativeness of the

retransmission timer that is implemented.

(DONE) No further processing.

3.2. Storing the Current Congestion Control State (Step 0)

The TCP sender stores in pipe_prev what is considered a safe slow-

start threshold (ssthresh) before loss recovery is initiated; i.e.,

before the loss indication is taken into account. This is either the

current FlightSize, if the TCP sender is in congestion avoidance, or

the current ssthresh, if the TCP sender is in slow-start. If the TCP

sender later detects that it has entered loss recovery unnecessarily,

then pipe_prev is used in step (9) to reverse the congestion control

state. Thus, until the loss recovery phase is terminated, pipe_prev

maintains a memory of the congestion control state of the time right

before the loss recovery phase was initiated. A similar approach is

proposed in [RFC2861], where this state is stored in ssthresh

directly after a TCP sender has become idle or application limited.

There had been debates about whether the value of pipe_prev should be

decayed over time; e.g., upon subsequent timeouts for the same

outstanding segment. We do not require decaying pipe_prev for the

Eifel response algorithm and do not believe that such a conservative

approach should be in place. Instead, we follow the idea of

revalidating the congestion window through slow-start, as suggested

in [RFC2861]. That is, in step (9), the cwnd is reset to a value

that avoids large packet bursts, and ssthresh is reset to the value

of pipe_prev. Note that [RFC2581] and [RFC2861] also do not require

a decaying of ssthresh after it has been reset in response to a loss

indication, or after a TCP sender has become idle or application

limited.

3.3. Suppressing the Unnecessary go-back-N Retransmits (Step 8)

Without the use of the TCP timestamps option [RFC1323], the TCP

sender suffers from the retransmission ambiguity problem [Zh86],

[KP87]. Therefore, when the first acceptable ACK arrives after a

spurious timeout, the TCP sender must assume that this ACK was sent

in response to the retransmit when in fact it was sent in response to

an original transmit. Furthermore, the TCP sender must further

assume that all other segments that were outstanding at that point

were lost.

Note: Except for certain cases where original ACKs were lost, the

first acceptable ACK cannot carry a DSACK option [RFC2883].

Consequently, once the TCP sender's state has been updated after the

first acceptable ACK has arrived, SND.NXT equals SND.UNA. This is

what causes the often unnecessary go-back-N retransmits. From that

point on every arriving acceptable ACK that was sent in response to

an original transmit will advance SND.NXT. But as long as SND.NXT is

smaller than the value that SND.MAX had when the timeout occurred,

those ACKs will clock out retransmits, whether or not the

corresponding original transmits were lost.

In fact, during this phase the TCP sender breaks 'packet

conservation' [Jac88]. This is because the go-back-N retransmits are

sent during slow-start. For each original transmit leaving the

network, two retransmits are sent into the network as long as SND.NXT

does not equal SND.MAX (see [LK00] for more detail).

Once a spurious timeout has been detected (upon receipt of an ACK for

an original transmit), it is safe to let the TCP sender resume the

transmission with previously unsent data. Thus, the Eifel response

algorithm changes the TCP sender's state by setting SND.NXT to

SND.MAX. Note that this step is only executed if the variable

SpuriousRecovery equals SPUR_TO, which in turn requires a detection

algorithm such as the Eifel detection algorithm [RFC3522] or the F-

RTO algorithm [SK04] that detects a spurious retransmit based upon

receiving an ACK for an original transmit (as opposed to the ACK for

the retransmit [RFC3708]).

3.4. Reversing the Congestion Control State (Step 9)

When a TCP sender enters loss recovery, it reduces cwnd and ssthresh.

However, once the TCP sender detects that the loss recovery has been

falsely triggered, this reduction proves unnecessary. We therefore

believe that it is safe to revert to the previous congestion control

state, following the approach of revalidating the congestion window

as outlined below. This is unless the acceptable ACK signals

congestion through the ECN-Echo flag [RFC3168]. In that case, the

TCP sender MUST refrain from reversing congestion control state.

If the ECN-Echo flag is not set, cwnd is reset to the sum of the

current FlightSize and the minimum of bytes_acked and IW. In some

cases, this can mean that the first few acceptable ACKs that arrive

will not clock out any data segments. Recall that bytes_acked is the

number of bytes that have been acknowledged by the acceptable ACK.

Note that the value of cwnd must not be changed any further for that

ACK, and that the value of FlightSize at this point in time may be

different from the value of FlightSize in step (0). The value of IW

puts a limit on the size of the packet burst that the TCP sender may

send into the network after the Eifel response algorithm has

terminated. The value of IW is considered an acceptable burst size.

It is the amount of data that a TCP sender may send into a yet

"unprobed" network at the beginning of a connection.

Then ssthresh is reset to the value of pipe_prev. As a result, the

TCP sender either immediately resumes probing the network for more

bandwidth in congestion avoidance, or it slow-starts to what is

considered a safe operating point for the congestion window.

3.5. Interworking with the CWV Algorithm (Step 10)

An implementation of the Congestion Window Validation (CWV) algorithm

[RFC2861] could potentially misinterpret a delay spike that caused a

spurious timeout as a phase where the TCP sender had been idle.

Therefore, T_last is reset to prevent the triggering of the CWV

algorithm in this case.

Note: The term 'idle' implies that the TCP sender has no data

outstanding; i.e., all data sent has been acknowledged [Jac88].

According to this definition, a TCP sender is not idle while it is

waiting for an acceptable ACK after a timeout. Unfortunately, the

pseudo-code in [RFC2861] does not include a check for the

condition "idle" (SND.UNA == SND.MAX). We therefore had to add

step (10) to the Eifel response algorithm.

3.6. Adapting the Retransmission Timer (Step 11)

There is currently only one retransmission timer standardized for TCP

[RFC2988]. We therefore only address that timer explicitly. Future

standards that might define alternatives to [RFC2988] should propose

similar measures to adapt the conservativeness of the retransmission

timer.

A spurious timeout often results from a delay spike, which is a

sudden increase of the RTT that usually cannot be predicted. After a

delay spike, the RTT may have changed permanently; e.g., due to a

path change, or because the available bandwidth on a bandwidth-

dominated path has decreased. This may often occur with wide-area

wireless Access links. In this case, the RTT estimators (SRTT and

RTTVAR) should be reinitialized from the first RTT-SAMPLE taken from

new data according to rule (2.2) of [RFC2988]. That is, from the

first RTT-SAMPLE that can be derived from an acceptable ACK for data

that was previously unsent when the spurious timeout occurred.

However, a delay spike may only indicate a transient phase, after

which the RTT returns to its previous range of values, or even to

smaller values. Also, a spurious timeout may occur because the TCP

sender's RTT estimators were only inaccurate enough that the

retransmission timer expires "a tad too early". We believe that two

times the clock granularity of the retransmission timer (2 * G) is a

reasonable upper bound on "a tad too early". Thus, when the new RTO

is calculated in step (11), we ensure that it is at least (2 * G)

greater (see also step (0)) than the RTO was before the spurious

timeout occurred.

Note that other TCP sender processing will usually take place between

steps (10) and (11). During this phase (i.e., before step (11) has

been reached), the RTO is managed according to the rules of

[RFC2988]. We believe that this is sufficiently conservative for the

following reasons. First, the retransmission timer is restarted upon

the acceptable ACK that was used to detect the spurious timeout. As

a result, the delay spike is already implicitly factored in for

segments outstanding at that time. This is discussed in more detail

in [EL04], where this effect is called the "RTO offset".

Furthermore, if timestamps are enabled, a new and valid RTT-SAMPLE

can be derived from that acceptable ACK. This RTT-SAMPLE must be

relatively large, as it includes the delay spike that caused the

spurious timeout. Consequently, the RTT estimators will be updated

rather conservatively. Without timestamps the RTO will stay

conservatively backed-off due to Karn's algorithm [RFC2988] until the

first RTT-SAMPLE can be derived from an acceptable ACK for data that

was previously unsent when the spurious timeout occurred.

For the new RTO to become effective, the retransmission timer has to

be restarted. This is consistent with [RFC2988], which recommends

restarting the retransmission timer with the arrival of an acceptable

ACK.

4. Advanced Loss Recovery is Crucial for the Eifel Response Algorithm

We have studied environments where spurious timeouts and multiple

losses from the same flight of packets often coincide [GL02], [GL03].

In such a case, the oldest outstanding segment arrives at the TCP

receiver, but one or more packets from the remaining outstanding

flight are lost. In those environments, end-to-end performance

suffers if the Eifel response algorithm is operated without an

advanced loss recovery scheme such as a SACK-based scheme [RFC3517]

or NewReno [RFC3782]. The reason is TCP-Reno's aggressiveness after

a spurious timeout. Even though TCP-Reno breaks 'packet

conservation' (see Section 3.3) when blindly retransmitting all

outstanding segments, it usually recovers all packets lost from that

flight within a single round-trip time. On the contrary, the more

conservative TCP-Reno-with-Eifel is often forced into another

timeout. Thus, we recommend that the Eifel response algorithm always

be operated in combination with [RFC3517] or [RFC3782]. Additional

robustness is achieved with the Limited Transmit and Early Retransmit

algorithms [RFC3042], [AAAB04].

Note: The SACK-based scheme we used for our simulations in [GL02]

and [GL03] is different from the SACK-based scheme that later got

standardized [RFC3517]. The key difference is that [RFC3517] is

more robust to multiple losses from the same flight. It is less

conservative in declaring that a packet has left the network, and

is therefore less dependent on timeouts to recover genuine packet

losses.

If the NewReno algorithm [RFC3782] is used in combination with the

Eifel response algorithm, step (1) of the NewReno algorithm SHOULD be

modified as follows, but only if SpuriousRecovery equals SPUR_TO:

(1) Three duplicate ACKs:

When the third duplicate ACK is received and the sender is

not already in the Fast Recovery procedure, go to step 1A.

That is, the entire step 1B of the NewReno algorithm is obsolete

because step (8) of the Eifel response algorithm avoids the case

where three duplicate ACKs result from unnecessary go-back-N

retransmits after a timeout. Step (8) of the Eifel response

algorithm avoids such unnecessary go-back-N retransmits in the first

place. However, recall that step (8) is only executed if the

variable SpuriousRecovery equals SPUR_TO, which in turn requires a

detection algorithm, such as the Eifel detection algorithm [RFC3522]

or the F-RTO algorithm [SK04], that detects a spurious retransmit

based upon receiving an ACK for an original transmit (as opposed to

the ACK for the retransmit [RFC3708]).

5. Security Considerations

There is a risk that a detection algorithm is fooled by spoofed ACKs

that make genuine retransmits appear to the TCP sender as spurious

retransmits. When such a detection algorithm is run together with

the Eifel response algorithm, this could effectively disable

congestion control at the TCP sender. Should this become a concern,

the Eifel response algorithm SHOULD only be run together with

detection algorithms that are known to be safe against such "ACK

spoofing attacks".

For example, the safe variant of the Eifel detection algorithm

[RFC3522], is a reliable method to protect against this risk.

6. Acknowledgements

Many thanks to Keith Sklower, Randy Katz, Michael Meyer, Stephan

Baucke, Sally Floyd, Vern Paxson, Mark Allman, Ethan Blanton, Pasi

Sarolahti, Alexey Kuznetsov, and Yogesh Swami for many discussions

that contributed to this work.

7. References

7.1. Normative References

[RFC2581] Allman, M., Paxson, V., and W. Stevens, "TCP Congestion

Control", RFC 2581, April 1999.

[RFC3390] Allman, M., Floyd, S., and C. Partridge, "Increasing TCP's

Initial Window", RFC 3390, October 2002.

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate

Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFC3782] Floyd, S., Henderson, T., and A. Gurtov, "The NewReno

Modification to TCP's Fast Recovery Algorithm", RFC 3782,

April 2004.

[RFC2861] Handley, M., Padhye, J., and S. Floyd, "TCP Congestion

Window Validation", RFC 2861, June 2000.

[RFC3522] Ludwig, R. and M. Meyer, "The Eifel Detection Algorithm for

TCP", RFC 3522, April 2003.

[RFC2988] Paxson, V. and M. Allman, "Computing TCP's Retransmission

Timer", RFC 2988, November 2000.

[RFC793] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7, RFC

793, September 1981.

[RFC3168] Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The Addition of

Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP", RFC 3168,

September 2001.

7.2. Informative References

[RFC3042] Allman, M., Balakrishnan, H., and S. Floyd, "Enhancing

TCP's Loss Recovery Using Limited Transmit", RFC 3042,

January 2001.

[AAAB04] Allman, M., Avrachenkov, K., Ayesta, U., and J. Blanton,

Early Retransmit for TCP and SCTP, Work in Progress, July

2004.

[BA02] Blanton, E. and M. Allman, On Making TCP More Robust to

Packet Reordering, ACM Computer Communication Review, Vol.

32, No. 1, January 2002.

[RFC3708] Blanton, E. and M. Allman, "Using TCP Duplicate Selective

Acknowledgement (DSACKs) and Stream Control Transmission

Protocol (SCTP) Duplicate Transmission Sequence Numbers

(TSNs) to Detect Spurious Retransmissions", RFC 3708,

February 2004.

[RFC3517] Blanton, E., Allman, M., Fall, K., and L. Wang, "A

Conservative Selective Acknowledgment (SACK)-based Loss

Recovery Algorithm for TCP", RFC 3517, April 2003.

[EL04] Ekstrom, H. and R. Ludwig, The Peak-Hopper: A New End-to-

End Retransmission Timer for Reliable Unicast Transport, In

Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM 04, March 2004.

[RFC2883] Floyd, S., Mahdavi, J., Mathis, M., and M. Podolsky, "An

Extension to the Selective Acknowledgement (SACK) Option

for TCP", RFC 2883, July 2000.

[GL02] Gurtov, A. and R. Ludwig, Evaluating the Eifel Algorithm

for TCP in a GPRS Network, In Proceedings of the European

Wireless Conference, February 2002.

[GL03] Gurtov, A. and R. Ludwig, Responding to Spurious Timeouts

in TCP, In Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM 03, April 2003.

[Jac88] Jacobson, V., Congestion Avoidance and Control, In

Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM 88.

[RFC1323] Jacobson, V., Braden, R., and D. Borman, "TCP Extensions

for High Performance", RFC 1323, May 1992.

[KP87] Karn, P. and C. Partridge, Improving Round-Trip Time

Estimates in Reliable Transport Protocols, In Proceedings

of ACM SIGCOMM 87.

[LK00] Ludwig, R. and R. H. Katz, The Eifel Algorithm: Making TCP

Robust Against Spurious Retransmissions, ACM Computer

Communication Review, Vol. 30, No. 1, January 2000.

[SK04] Sarolahti, P. and M. Kojo, F-RTO: An Algorithm for

Detecting Spurious Retransmission Timeouts with TCP and

SCTP, Work in Progress, November 2004.

[WS95] Wright, G. R. and W. R. Stevens, TCP/IP Illustrated, Volume

2 (The Implementation), Addison Wesley, January 1995.

[Zh86] Zhang, L., Why TCP Timers Don't Work Well, In Proceedings

of ACM SIGCOMM 88.

Authors' Addresses

Reiner Ludwig

Ericsson Research (EDD)

Ericsson Allee 1

52134 Herzogenrath, Germany

EMail: Reiner.Ludwig@ericsson.com

Andrei Gurtov

Helsinki Institute for Information Technology (HIIT)

P.O. Box 9800, FIN-02015

HUT, Finland

EMail: andrei.gurtov@cs.helsinki.fi

Homepage: http://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/gurtov

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