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Hying's PeLock v0.7x 外壳完全分析篇

王朝other·作者佚名  2006-01-10
窄屏简体版  字體: |||超大  

Hying's PeLock v0.7x 外壳完全分析篇

前言:以前版分析的一个版本,通过对旧版的了解可以很快的掌握新版的变化的,新版刚看完,谢谢hnhuqiong的帮助,脚本太多了,我自己看不下去:-(,

我还是选择了自己的方法,走了一程。走了后感觉新版变化也不是很大,虽然多

乱序IAT和特殊代码加密转换了一种比较方式,不过去乱序iat感觉就像鸡肋,

特殊代码处理虽然有一定难度,但很可惜,花指令太死了,如果有足够的时间的话,可以完全不用去掉花指令跟踪到特殊代码,也许是Magic esp的烂用吧:-),

没有任何的杀伤力可言。

当然这个壳的精彩代码是非常不错的,也因此非常感谢hexer。这段代码我现在还专门记录下来了:-).这篇文章把Simxx和hexer部分没有分析清楚的,自己补了一下。新版的总体流程还是差不多的。

【目 标】:Delphi

【工 具】:Olydbg1.1(diy版)

【任 务】:分析外壳loader

【操作平台】:Windows XP sp2

【作 者】:LOVEBOOM[DFCG][FCG][US]

【相关链接】:NONE

【简要说明】:Hying的外壳上次没有完全分析完下篇,这回来个全面的,外壳有几个地方很有"意思",新版本的花指令也比较有"意思"的.也随便把Hexer和simonzh2000

文章中没有分析明白的,自己分析了下.文章我大部分地方用了标签来注明,也因此很少额外写注释的.应该直接看下就知道什么意思了,看完后,事理一下可以做出

一个和原版一样的loader来的:-).

【详细过程】:

因为全面分析的文章,所以我也懒得多打几个字.边分析边写吧:-).

用OD载入,下断Bp VirtualAlloc然后执行到返回,之所以这样是因为前面的解压代码很是无聊,也没有什么价值,直接入主题更好:-).

来到这里:

0045A11A 6A 04 PUSH 4

0045A11C 68 00100000 PUSH 1000

0045A121 FF75 10 PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+10]

0045A124 6A 00 PUSH 0

0045A126 FF55 2C CALL DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+2C] ; VirtualAlloc

0045A129 50 PUSH EAX ; 返回这里

0045A12A 8945 0C MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C], EAX

0045A12D 8B5D 08 MOV EBX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]

0045A130 03DD ADD EBX, EBP

0045A132 50 PUSH EAX

0045A133 53 PUSH EBX

0045A134 E8 18000000 CALL <aplib_Unpack> ; 解压代码

0045A139 5A POP EDX ; 0012FFE0

0045A13A 52 PUSH EDX

0045A13B 55 PUSH EBP

0045A13C 8D85 DE000000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+DE]

0045A142 C600 EB MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EAX], 0EB ; 对dll的再次重入进行处理

0045A145 C640 01 10 MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EAX+1], 10

0045A149 8B45 30 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+30]

0045A14C 8945 74 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+74], EAX

0045A14F - FFE2 JMP EDX ; 这里跳去壳的部分

************************************************************************************************************************************************

aplib_Unpack:

0045A151 > 60 PUSHAD ; aplib_Unpack

0045A152 8B7424 24 MOV ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+24] ; aplib解压代码,后面壳里还会用到一次

0045A156 8B7C24 28 MOV EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+28] ; 因此直接抓下来

0045A15A FC CLD

0045A15B B2 80 MOV DL, 80

0045A15D 33DB XOR EBX, EBX

0045A15F A4 MOVS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI], BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

0045A160 B3 02 MOV BL, 2

0045A162 E8 6D000000 CALL 0045A1D4

0045A167 ^ 73 F6 JNB SHORT 0045A15F

0045A169 33C9 XOR ECX, ECX

0045A16B E8 64000000 CALL 0045A1D4

0045A170 73 1C JNB SHORT 0045A18E

0045A172 33C0 XOR EAX, EAX

0045A174 E8 5B000000 CALL 0045A1D4

0045A179 73 23 JNB SHORT 0045A19E

0045A17B B3 02 MOV BL, 2

0045A17D 41 INC ECX

0045A17E B0 10 MOV AL, 10

0045A180 E8 4F000000 CALL 0045A1D4

0045A185 12C0 ADC AL, AL

0045A187 ^ 73 F7 JNB SHORT 0045A180

0045A189 75 3F JNZ SHORT 0045A1CA

0045A18B AA STOS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI]

0045A18C ^ EB D4 JMP SHORT 0045A162

0045A18E E8 4D000000 CALL 0045A1E0

0045A193 2BCB SUB ECX, EBX

0045A195 75 10 JNZ SHORT 0045A1A7

0045A197 E8 42000000 CALL 0045A1DE

0045A19C EB 28 JMP SHORT 0045A1C6

0045A19E AC LODS BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

0045A19F D1E8 SHR EAX, 1

0045A1A1 74 4D JE SHORT 0045A1F0

0045A1A3 13C9 ADC ECX, ECX

0045A1A5 EB 1C JMP SHORT 0045A1C3

0045A1A7 91 XCHG EAX, ECX

0045A1A8 48 DEC EAX

0045A1A9 C1E0 08 SHL EAX, 8

0045A1AC AC LODS BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

0045A1AD E8 2C000000 CALL 0045A1DE

0045A1B2 3D 007D0000 CMP EAX, 7D00

0045A1B7 73 0A JNB SHORT 0045A1C3

0045A1B9 80FC 05 CMP AH, 5

0045A1BC 73 06 JNB SHORT 0045A1C4

0045A1BE 83F8 7F CMP EAX, 7F

0045A1C1 77 02 JA SHORT 0045A1C5

0045A1C3 41 INC ECX

0045A1C4 41 INC ECX

0045A1C5 95 XCHG EAX, EBP

0045A1C6 8BC5 MOV EAX, EBP

0045A1C8 B3 01 MOV BL, 1

0045A1CA 56 PUSH ESI

0045A1CB 8BF7 MOV ESI, EDI

0045A1CD 2BF0 SUB ESI, EAX

0045A1CF F3:A4 REP MOVS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI], BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

0045A1D1 5E POP ESI ; 0012FFE0

0045A1D2 ^ EB 8E JMP SHORT 0045A162

0045A1D4 02D2 ADD DL, DL

0045A1D6 75 05 JNZ SHORT 0045A1DD

0045A1D8 8A16 MOV DL, BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

0045A1DA 46 INC ESI

0045A1DB 12D2 ADC DL, DL

0045A1DD C3 RETN

0045A1DE 33C9 XOR ECX, ECX

0045A1E0 41 INC ECX

0045A1E1 E8 EEFFFFFF CALL 0045A1D4

0045A1E6 13C9 ADC ECX, ECX

0045A1E8 E8 E7FFFFFF CALL 0045A1D4

0045A1ED ^ 72 F2 JB SHORT 0045A1E1

0045A1EF C3 RETN

0045A1F0 2B7C24 28 SUB EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+28] ; kernel32.7C816D4F

0045A1F4 897C24 1C MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+1C], EDI

0045A1F8 61 POPAD

0045A1F9 C2 0800 RETN 8

************************************************************************************************************************************************

jmp edx,来到这里:

00370000 E8 24000000 CALL 00370029 ; 这里有很多无意义的异常,跳过这一段没用的垃圾代码的说明

00370005 8B4424 04 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+4]

00370009 8B00 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX]

0037000B 3D 04000080 CMP EAX, 80000004

00370010 75 08 JNZ SHORT 0037001A

00370012 8B6424 08 MOV ESP, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+8]

.......

经过N个漫长的SEH,飞到下面来:

003731DE 8B06 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[ESI] ; 循环把API搬到壳中,取两次

003731E0 90 NOP

003731E1 90 NOP

003731E2 90 NOP

003731E3 90 NOP

003731E4 90 NOP

003731E5 90 NOP

003731E6 90 NOP

003731E7 8907 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI], EAX ; 从00375A8A开始

003731E9 90 NOP

003731EA 90 NOP

003731EB 90 NOP

003731EC 90 NOP

003731ED 90 NOP

003731EE 90 NOP

003731EF 90 NOP

003731F0 90 NOP

003731F1 90 NOP

003731F2 90 NOP

003731F3 90 NOP

003731F4 83C6 04 ADD ESI, 4

003731F7 90 NOP

003731F8 90 NOP

003731F9 90 NOP

003731FA 90 NOP

003731FB 90 NOP

003731FC 83C7 04 ADD EDI, 4

003731FF 90 NOP

00373200 90 NOP

00373201 90 NOP

00373202 90 NOP

00373203 ^ E2 D9 LOOPD SHORT 003731DE

00373205 90 NOP

00373206 90 NOP

00373207 90 NOP

00373208 90 NOP

00373209 90 NOP

0037320A 8B45 04 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4]

0037320D 90 NOP

0037320E 90 NOP

0037320F 90 NOP

00373210 90 NOP

00373211 90 NOP

00373212 90 NOP

00373213 90 NOP

00373214 90 NOP

00373215 90 NOP

00373216 90 NOP

00373217 90 NOP

00373218 8982 B2434000 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDX+<IMGBASE>], EAX

0037321E 90 NOP

0037321F 90 NOP

00373220 90 NOP

00373221 90 NOP

00373222 90 NOP

00373223 90 NOP

00373224 90 NOP

00373225 8D85 51010000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+151]

0037322B 90 NOP

0037322C 90 NOP

0037322D 90 NOP

0037322E 90 NOP

0037322F 90 NOP

00373230 8982 12444000 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDX+404412], EAX

00373236 90 NOP

00373237 90 NOP

00373238 90 NOP

00373239 90 NOP

0037323A 90 NOP

0037323B 8B45 2C MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+2C]

0037323E 90 NOP

0037323F 90 NOP

00373240 90 NOP

00373241 90 NOP

00373242 90 NOP

00373243 90 NOP

00373244 90 NOP

00373245 90 NOP

00373246 90 NOP

00373247 90 NOP

00373248 90 NOP

00373249 90 NOP

0037324A 90 NOP

0037324B 90 NOP

0037324C 90 NOP

0037324D 90 NOP

0037324E 90 NOP

0037324F 90 NOP

00373250 90 NOP

00373251 90 NOP

00373252 8982 AE434000 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDX+<APIVirtualAlloc>], EAX ; VirtualAlloc

00373258 90 NOP

00373259 90 NOP

......

003732F9 6A 00 PUSH 0 ; 获取 ImageBase

003732FB FF95 A6434000 CALL DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<GetModhandle>] ; kernel32.GetModuleHandleA

00373301 90 NOP

00373302 90 NOP

00373303 90 NOP

00373304 68 C2100000 PUSH 10C2

00373309 E8 01000000 CALL 0037330F

0037330E 90 NOP

0037330F 68 24080E68 PUSH 680E0824

00373314 68 90908344 PUSH 44839090

00373319 - FFE4 JMP ESP ; 呵呵,有个性的花指令这里指令没有起什么作用只是跳去下一步而已

0037331B 90 NOP

0037331C 8985 B2434000 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>], EAX

......

00373339 6A 04 PUSH 4

0037333B 68 00100000 PUSH 1000

00373340 68 00100000 PUSH 1000

00373345 6A 00 PUSH 0

00373347 FF95 AE434000 CALL DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIVirtualAlloc>] ; kernel32.VirtualAlloc

0037334D 8985 E5494000 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<hMEM334d>], EAX ; 申请空间

00373353 5E POP ESI ; 下面就准备开始壳中最为精彩的代码了

00373354 E8 28010000 CALL <Important_SEH> ; 这里开始精彩代码

下面开始引用HEXER那篇文章里讲的,这个目标也是差不多,只是代码不是一开始就解压出来了,每层都是动态解压出来的,我是开两个来记录的.

嗯看精彩代码:

;********************************************************************************************************

;=====注意看精彩片段开始了==================================================================================

TELOCK中有一段曾经被称为非常精彩的代码,下面这一段是青处于蓝而胜于蓝,精彩倍增:

00373359 E8 04000000 CALL <SEH_Disposal>

0037335E 90 NOP

0037335F 90 NOP

00373360 90 NOP

00373361 90 NOP

00373362 > 5A POP EDX ; SEH_Disposal

00373363 8B4424 04 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+4]

00373367 8B00 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX] ; EXCEPTION REASON

00373369 8B4C24 0C MOV ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+C] ; pContext

0037336D C701 17000100 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ECX], 10017

00373373 FF81 B8000000 INC DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+B8] ; regEIP+1

00373379 3D 03000080 CMP EAX, 80000003 ; 判断是否为断点异常int 3

0037337E 75 51 JNZ SHORT <SINGLE STEP BREAKPIONT >

00373380 8B81 B4000000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+B4] ; 第一次断点异常后,壳开始设置硬件断点实现DEBUG他自己

00373386 8D80 F41D4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+<Dr0:003734D8>]

0037338C 8941 04 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+4], EAX ; 设置Dr0

0037338F 8B81 B4000000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+B4]

00373395 8D80 221E4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+<Dr1:00373506>]

0037339B 8941 08 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+8], EAX ; 设置Dr1

0037339E 8B81 B4000000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+B4]

003733A4 8D80 4F1E4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+<Dr2:00373533>]

003733AA 8941 0C MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+C], EAX ; 设置Dr2

003733AD 8B81 B4000000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+B4]

003733B3 8D80 821E4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+<Dr3:00373566>]

003733B9 8941 10 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+10], EAX ; 设置Dr3

003733BC 33C0 XOR EAX, EAX

003733BE 8161 14 F00FFFF>AND DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+14], FFFF0FF0 ; 设置Dr6,dr6所有是1的位都是保留为1的,初始化调试状态寄存器

003733C5 C741 18 5501000>MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+18], 155 ; 设置DR7,设置调试控制寄存器,允许4个当前任务的执行断点

003733CC E9 AF000000 JMP <Return_System>

003733D1 > 3D 04000080 CMP EAX, 80000004 ; SINGLE STEP BREAKPIONT

003733D6 75 64 JNZ SHORT <DIVIDE BY ZERO > ; 这里是解密整个壳的关键

003733D8 FF02 INC DWORD PTR DS:[EDX] ; 因为前面设置了四个硬件断点,因此,正常运行的话,肯定会要经过这里的

003733DA 8B02 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EDX]

003733DC 83F8 01 CMP EAX, 1 ; Dr0:003734D8异常

003733DF 75 08 JNZ SHORT 003733E9

003733E1 F791 B0000000 NOT DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+B0] ; 第一次异常发生在3734d8处时,执行操作not regEAX

003733E7 EB 4F JMP SHORT 00373438

003733E9 83F8 02 CMP EAX, 2 ; Dr1:00373506异常

003733EC 75 11 JNZ SHORT 003733FF

003733EE 8B81 B0000000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+B0] ; 第二次异常发生在00373506处时,ROL regEAX,13h

003733F4 C1C0 13 ROL EAX, 13

003733F7 8981 B0000000 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+B0], EAX ; 写回regEAX

003733FD EB 39 JMP SHORT 00373438

003733FF 83F8 03 CMP EAX, 3 ; Dr2:00373533异常

00373402 75 2B JNZ SHORT <Exception Dr3>

00373404 53 PUSH EBX

00373405 8181 B0000000 2>ADD DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+B0], 4B23526 ; 第三次单步异常发生在373533处时,执行add regEAX,4b23526

0037340F 8B81 B0000000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+B0] ; regEAX

00373415 8B99 A4000000 MOV EBX, DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+A4] ; regEBX

0037341B 66:93 XCHG AX, BX ; 相加后 ax和bx交换再加上bx

0037341D 66:03C3 ADD AX, BX

00373420 8981 B0000000 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+B0], EAX ; 写回eax

00373426 8999 A4000000 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+A4], EBX ; 写回regEBX

0037342C 5B POP EBX ; 0012FFE0

0037342D EB 09 JMP SHORT 00373438

0037342F > 8B81 A0000000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+A0]

00373435 8030 55 XOR BYTE PTR DS:[EAX], 55 ; Dr3:00373566异常

00373438 33C0 XOR EAX, EAX ; 第四次异常发生时,xor [regESI],55h

0037343A EB 44 JMP SHORT <Return_System>

0037343C > 3D 940000C0 CMP EAX, C0000094 ; DIVIDE BY ZERO

00373441 75 3A JNZ SHORT 0037347D

00373443 C702 00000000 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDX], 0

00373449 FF81 B8000000 INC DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+B8] ; inc regEIP

0037344F 33C0 XOR EAX, EAX ; 最后一次除0异常后,写入值到Drx中, 后面要参与计算关键值的

00373451 C741 04 2301FF0>MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+4], 0FFF0123 ; 设置Dr0

00373458 C741 08 6745FF0>MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+8], 0FFF4567 ; 设置Dr1

0037345F C741 0C AB89FF0>MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+C], 0FFF89AB ; 设置Dr2

00373466 C741 10 EFCDFF0>MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+10], 0FFFCDEF ; 设置Dr3

0037346D 8161 14 F00FFFF>AND DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+14], FFFF0FF0 ; 设置Dr6

00373474 C741 18 5501000>MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+18], 155 ; 设置Dr7

0037347B EB 03 JMP SHORT <Return_System>

0037347D 33C0 XOR EAX, EAX

0037347F 40 INC EAX

00373480 > C3 RETN ; Return_System

00373481 > 56 PUSH ESI ; Important_SEH

00373482 8DB5 951C4000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+401C95] ; 进入int3异常之前解压出处理int3的代码

00373488 8BFE MOV EDI, ESI

0037348A B9 55000000 MOV ECX, 55

0037348F AC LODS BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

00373490 32C1 XOR AL, CL

00373492 C0C0 04 ROL AL, 4

00373495 AA STOS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI]

00373496 ^ E2 F7 LOOPD SHORT 0037348F

00373498 5E POP ESI ; 一层一层的解开,真是"浪费"时间:-)

00373499 33C0 XOR EAX, EAX

0037349B 64:FF35 0000000>PUSH DWORD PTR FS:[0]

003734A2 64:8925 0000000>MOV DWORD PTR FS:[0], ESP

003734A9 CC INT3

003734AA 90 NOP

003734AB 56 PUSH ESI

003734AC 8DB5 ED1C4000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+401CED] ; 循环解压出处理四个单步异常的代码

003734B2 8BFE MOV EDI, ESI

003734B4 B9 6B000000 MOV ECX, 6B

003734B9 AC LODS BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

003734BA 32C1 XOR AL, CL

003734BC 04 4D ADD AL, 4D

003734BE C0C0 03 ROL AL, 3

003734C1 AA STOS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI]

003734C2 ^ E2 F5 LOOPD SHORT 003734B9

003734C4 5E POP ESI ; 0012FFE0

003734C5 8D8D A01A4000 LEA ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<Crc_Start_addr>] ; 解压出处理四个单步异常的代码后,开始检测是代码是否被修改过

003734CB 2BCE SUB ECX, ESI ; 这一招有够利害,直接下CC断点,crc检测通不过

003734CD 33DB XOR EBX, EBX ; 下硬件断点的话,原来的硬件断点就破坏了.

003734CF 33C0 XOR EAX, EAX

003734D1 AC LODS BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

003734D2 03D8 ADD EBX, EAX ; 计算校验值

003734D4 ^ E2 FB LOOPD SHORT 003734D1

003734D6 8BC3 MOV EAX, EBX

003734D8 F8 CLC ; 第一次异常处,not eax

003734D9 90 NOP

003734DA 8DB5 0D1E4000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<De1>] ; 异常后开始解压出下面将要执行的代码

003734E0 B9 91250000 MOV ECX, 2591

003734E5 F7E1 MUL ECX

003734E7 D3C8 ROR EAX, CL

003734E9 3006 XOR BYTE PTR DS:[ESI], AL

003734EB 46 INC ESI

003734EC 40 INC EAX

003734ED D40A AAM

003734EF ^ E2 F4 LOOPD SHORT 003734E5

003734F1 B9 D5010000 MOV ECX, 1D5 ; De1

003734F6 8DB5 A01A4000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<Crc_Start_addr>] ; 刚解压出来代码再次检测内存代码,把计算出的值作为解密KEY

003734FC 33C0 XOR EAX, EAX

003734FE 3206 XOR AL, BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

00373500 C1C8 08 ROR EAX, 8

00373503 46 INC ESI

00373504 ^ E2 F8 LOOPD SHORT 003734FE

00373506 FC CLD ; 第二次异常处

00373507 90 NOP

00373508 B9 64250000 MOV ECX, 2564 ; rol eax,13

0037350D 8DB5 3A1E4000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+401E3A]

00373513 8D4481 43 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+EAX*4+43]

00373517 3006 XOR BYTE PTR DS:[ESI], AL

00373519 D40A AAM

0037351B 46 INC ESI

0037351C ^ E2 F5 LOOPD SHORT 00373513 ; 再次把通过异常中断处理来计算eax的值

0037351E B9 B2000000 MOV ECX, 0B2 ; 通过eax的值来解密出37351e处的代码

00373523 C1E9 02 SHR ECX, 2

00373526 8DB5 9D1D4000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+401D9D] ; 这里从开始解密处的代码处开始计算检测值

0037352C 33DB XOR EBX, EBX

0037352E AD LODS DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]

0037352F 33D8 XOR EBX, EAX

00373531 ^ E2 FB LOOPD SHORT 0037352E ; 这样在这段范围内的代码又不可以被修改又不可以被下断点

00373533 F9 STC ; 第三次异常处

00373534 90 NOP ; 执行add regEAX,4b23526

00373535 B9 2A250000 MOV ECX, 252A ; xchg ax,bx

0037353A C1E9 02 SHR ECX, 2 ; add ax,bx

0037353D 8DB5 741E4000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+401E74]

00373543 33D2 XOR EDX, EDX

00373545 F7E3 MUL EBX

00373547 81C2 2635B204 ADD EDX, 4B23526

0037354D 3116 XOR DWORD PTR DS:[ESI], EDX

0037354F 8BC3 MOV EAX, EBX

00373551 8BDA MOV EBX, EDX

00373553 83C6 04 ADD ESI, 4

00373556 ^ E2 EB LOOPD SHORT 00373543 ; 通过SEH来计算出EAX和ebx的值,用于解出00373558处的代码

00373558 8DB5 8E1E4000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+401E8E]

0037355E B9 C0060000 MOV ECX, 6C0

00373563 C1E9 02 SHR ECX, 2

00373566 90 NOP ; 这里第四次异常,其实也就是把Dr3夹在里面

00373567 90 NOP ; 执行xor [esi],55

00373568 802E 13 SUB BYTE PTR DS:[ESI], 13

0037356B F616 NOT BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

0037356D 83C6 04 ADD ESI, 4

00373570 ^ E2 F4 LOOPD SHORT 00373566 ; 通过SEH处理来换算出373570处的代码

00373572 8DB5 581D4000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+401D58] ; 到了这里后开始解压出处理除0异常的代码

00373578 8BFE MOV EDI, ESI

0037357A B9 41000000 MOV ECX, 41

0037357F AC LODS BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

00373580 32C1 XOR AL, CL

00373582 04 63 ADD AL, 63

00373584 AA STOS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI]

00373585 ^ E2 F8 LOOPD SHORT 0037357F

00373587 B8 00010000 MOV EAX, 100

0037358C 33D2 XOR EDX, EDX

0037358E 33DB XOR EBX, EBX

00373590 F7F3 DIV EBX ; DIVIDE BY ZERO,最后一次SEH,恢复一些原始状态

00373592 90 NOP

00373593 64:8F05 0000000>POP DWORD PTR FS:[0] ; 恢复SEH

0037359A 58 POP EAX ; 0012FFE0

;=====此阶段精彩片段结束===================================================================================

;********************************************************************************************************

嗯这里挺过来了就好办,上面这段代码设计的非常不错,操作不当很容易出错的,当然动下脑还是很容易跳过这段代码,我的做法是写个脚本,脚本大概的做法就是把壳原有的

异常都让我的脚本来操作,脚本先把seh时那几个Drx保存起来,然后脚本通知OD去解开代码就成了:-).

继续向下分析:

0037359B 8BFC MOV EDI, ESP ; 用esp来转换解压,有个性的:-)

0037359D 8DA5 9D434000 LEA ESP, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+40439D] ; 从375a81处开始倒着向上解压

003735A3 B9 B3240000 MOV ECX, 24B3

003735A8 8B85 16444000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+404416]

003735AE BB BDD89800 MOV EBX, 98D8BD

003735B3 BE D5260000 MOV ESI, 26D5

003735B8 > 33D2 XOR EDX, EDX ; Loop_Decode_3735cf

003735BA F7E6 MUL ESI ; 循环解出3735cf处的代码

003735BC 05 78563412 ADD EAX, 12345678

003735C1 83D2 00 ADC EDX, 0

003735C4 F7F3 DIV EBX

003735C6 58 POP EAX ; 0012FFE0

003735C7 32C2 XOR AL, DL

003735C9 50 PUSH EAX

003735CA 4C DEC ESP

003735CB 8BC2 MOV EAX, EDX

003735CD ^ E2 E9 LOOPD SHORT <Loop_Decode_3735cf>

上面精彩的过了,这回来了个变本加厉的,下面还有一段关键代码,不过感觉也太浪费时间做这些工作吧:-),解密代码:

003735CF 8BE7 MOV ESP, EDI

003735D1 E8 51000000 CALL <Fuck_Int3_3627> ; 这里还有好玩的东西

003735D6 8B4C24 0C MOV ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+C]

003735DA 8B81 B0000000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+B0] ; regEAX

003735E0 8B51 04 MOV EDX, DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+4]

003735E3 F6D0 NOT AL

003735E5 32C2 XOR AL, DL

003735E7 66:25 FF00 AND AX, 0FF

003735EB 66:03D0 ADD DX, AX

003735EE 66:C1CA 03 ROR DX, 3

003735F2 66:8951 04 MOV WORD PTR DS:[ECX+4], DX ; 运算后改变Dr0的值

003735F6 66:3151 08 XOR WORD PTR DS:[ECX+8], DX

003735FA 66:8B51 08 MOV DX, WORD PTR DS:[ECX+8] ; 再把值和Dr1进行运算

003735FE 66:C1CA 02 ROR DX, 2

00373602 66:0151 0C ADD WORD PTR DS:[ECX+C], DX ; 和Dr2进行运算

00373606 66:8B51 0C MOV DX, WORD PTR DS:[ECX+C]

0037360A 66:F7D2 NOT DX

0037360D 66:2B51 10 SUB DX, WORD PTR DS:[ECX+10] ; 和Dr3进行运算

00373611 66:D1CA ROR DX, 1

00373614 66:3151 04 XOR WORD PTR DS:[ECX+4], DX ; 运算后的值再保存回Dr0

00373618 8981 B0000000 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+B0], EAX ; 写回regEAX

0037361E FF81 B8000000 INC DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+B8] ; inc regEIP

00373624 33C0 XOR EAX, EAX

00373626 C3 RETN

00373627 > 64:FF35 0000000>PUSH DWORD PTR FS:[0] ; Fuck_Int3_3627

0037362E 64:8925 0000000>MOV DWORD PTR FS:[0], ESP

00373635 8DB5 33204000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402033] ; 准备解开373717处的代码

0037363B B9 C6000000 MOV ECX, 0C6 ; 解压大小0c6

00373640 > 8A0431 MOV AL, BYTE PTR DS:[ECX+ESI] ; loop_Decode_373717

00373643 CC INT3

00373644 90 NOP

00373645 880431 MOV BYTE PTR DS:[ECX+ESI], AL ; 同样是倒序解压

00373648 ^ E2 F6 LOOPD SHORT <loop_Decode_373717> ; 可以看出Drx的值是多么重要了吧:-)

0037364A 64:8F05 0000000>POP DWORD PTR FS:[0] ; 恢复现场

00373651 58 POP EAX ; 0012FFE0

00373652 8D05 6B424000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[40426B]

00373658 03C5 ADD EAX, EBP ; 计算出MyGetProcAddress函数的地址

0037365A 8985 9E434000 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<MyGetProcAddress>], EAX

;______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

;

; 下面开始壳获取壳所需的相关API函数,先判断DLL有没有载入,如果没有则Load dll,载入后循环的解出API的名字,再用MyGetProcAddress

; 获取相关API的名字,获取到再检测API第一个字节有没有下CC断点

00373660 8DB5 A1444000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<strDllKernel32>]

00373666 56 PUSH ESI

00373667 8D85 961F4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+401F96]

0037366D 50 PUSH EAX ; 获取Kernel32.dll的句柄

0037366E 8B85 A6434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<GetModhandle>] ; kernel32.GetModuleHandleA

00373674 E9 61130000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00373679 90 NOP

0037367A 8BF0 MOV ESI, EAX

0037367C 8DBD AF444000 LEA EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIVirtualFree>]

00373682 B9 1B000000 MOV ECX, 1B

00373687 > 57 PUSH EDI ; Fill_Packer_API

00373688 8A07 MOV AL, BYTE PTR DS:[EDI]

0037368A EB 05 JMP SHORT 00373691

0037368C F6D0 NOT AL

0037368E AA STOS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI] ; 解压出API名称

0037368F 8A07 MOV AL, BYTE PTR DS:[EDI]

00373691 0AC0 OR AL, AL

00373693 ^ 75 F7 JNZ SHORT 0037368C

00373695 5F POP EDI ; 0012FFE0

00373696 51 PUSH ECX

00373697 57 PUSH EDI

00373698 56 PUSH ESI

00373699 8D85 C81F4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+401FC8]

0037369F 50 PUSH EAX

003736A0 8B85 9E434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<MyGetProcAddress>] ; 获取VirtualFree的地址

003736A6 E9 2F130000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

003736AB 90 NOP

003736AC E8 8D150000 CALL <proc_check_CC> ; 检测是否下了CC断点

003736B1 50 PUSH EAX

003736B2 57 PUSH EDI

003736B3 56 PUSH ESI

003736B4 8D85 E31F4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+401FE3]

003736BA 50 PUSH EAX

003736BB 8B85 9E434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<MyGetProcAddress>]

003736C1 E9 14130000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

003736C6 90 NOP

003736C7 59 POP ECX ; 0012FFE0

003736C8 2BC8 SUB ECX, EAX

003736CA 2BC1 SUB EAX, ECX

003736CC 0FB64F FF MOVZX ECX, BYTE PTR DS:[EDI-1]

003736D0 8907 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI], EAX

003736D2 03F9 ADD EDI, ECX

003736D4 47 INC EDI

003736D5 59 POP ECX ; 0012FFE0

003736D6 ^ E2 AF LOOPD SHORT <Fill_Packer_API> ; 跳回去循环获取KERNEL32.DLL中的相关函数

003736D8 8DB5 1E444000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<strDllUsr32>]

003736DE 56 PUSH ESI

003736DF 8D85 0E204000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+40200E]

003736E5 50 PUSH EAX

003736E6 8B85 A6434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<GetModhandle>] ; kernel32.GetModuleHandleA

003736EC E9 E9120000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

003736F1 90 NOP

003736F2 0BC0 OR EAX, EAX

003736F4 75 15 JNZ SHORT 0037370B

003736F6 56 PUSH ESI

003736F7 8D85 27204000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<strDllUsr32>]

003736FD 50 PUSH EAX

003736FE 8B85 AA434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APILoadLib>] ; kernel32.LoadLibraryA

00373704 E9 D1120000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00373709 90 NOP

0037370A 90 NOP

0037370B 8BF0 MOV ESI, EAX

0037370D 8DBD 2A444000 LEA EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIwsPrintfA>]

00373713 B9 07000000 MOV ECX, 7

00373718 > 57 PUSH EDI ; De_dllusr32_api

00373719 8A07 MOV AL, BYTE PTR DS:[EDI]

0037371B EB 05 JMP SHORT 00373722

0037371D F6D0 NOT AL

0037371F AA STOS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI] ; 解压出api name

00373720 8A07 MOV AL, BYTE PTR DS:[EDI]

00373722 0AC0 OR AL, AL

00373724 ^ 75 F7 JNZ SHORT 0037371D

00373726 5F POP EDI ; 0012FFE0

00373727 51 PUSH ECX

00373728 57 PUSH EDI

00373729 56 PUSH ESI

0037372A 8D85 5A204000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+40205A]

00373730 50 PUSH EAX

00373731 8B85 9E434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<MyGetProcAddress>]

00373737 E9 9E120000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

0037373C 90 NOP

0037373D 90 NOP

0037373E E8 FB140000 CALL <proc_check_CC>

00373743 50 PUSH EAX

00373744 57 PUSH EDI

00373745 56 PUSH ESI

00373746 8D85 75204000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402075]

0037374C 50 PUSH EAX

0037374D 8B85 9E434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<MyGetProcAddress>]

00373753 E9 82120000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00373758 90 NOP

00373759 59 POP ECX ; 0012FFE0

0037375A 2BC8 SUB ECX, EAX

0037375C 2BC1 SUB EAX, ECX

0037375E 0FB64F FF MOVZX ECX, BYTE PTR DS:[EDI-1]

00373762 8907 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI], EAX

00373764 03F9 ADD EDI, ECX

00373766 47 INC EDI

00373767 59 POP ECX ; 0012FFE0

00373768 ^ E2 AE LOOPD SHORT <De_dllusr32_api> ; 循环获取user32.dll的相关函数

0037376A 8DB5 58464000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<strDllws32_32>]

00373770 56 PUSH ESI

00373771 8D85 A0204000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4020A0]

00373777 50 PUSH EAX ; 载入dll

00373778 8B85 A6434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<GetModhandle>] ; kernel32.GetModuleHandleA

0037377E E9 57120000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00373783 90 NOP

00373784 0BC0 OR EAX, EAX

00373786 75 15 JNZ SHORT 0037379D

00373788 56 PUSH ESI

00373789 8D85 B9204000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4020B9]

0037378F 50 PUSH EAX

00373790 8B85 AA434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APILoadLib>] ; kernel32.LoadLibraryA

00373796 E9 3F120000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

0037379B 90 NOP

0037379C 90 NOP

0037379D 8BF0 MOV ESI, EAX

0037379F 8DBD 64464000 LEA EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIwsASend>]

003737A5 B9 04000000 MOV ECX, 4

003737AA > 57 PUSH EDI ; De_ws2_32_apis

003737AB 8A07 MOV AL, BYTE PTR DS:[EDI]

003737AD EB 05 JMP SHORT 003737B4

003737AF F6D0 NOT AL

003737B1 AA STOS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI]

003737B2 8A07 MOV AL, BYTE PTR DS:[EDI]

003737B4 0AC0 OR AL, AL

003737B6 ^ 75 F7 JNZ SHORT 003737AF

003737B8 5F POP EDI ; 0012FFE0

003737B9 51 PUSH ECX

003737BA 57 PUSH EDI

003737BB 56 PUSH ESI

003737BC 8D85 EC204000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4020EC]

003737C2 50 PUSH EAX

003737C3 8B85 9E434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<MyGetProcAddress>]

003737C9 E9 0C120000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

003737CE 90 NOP

003737CF 90 NOP

003737D0 E8 69140000 CALL <proc_check_CC>

003737D5 50 PUSH EAX

003737D6 57 PUSH EDI

003737D7 56 PUSH ESI

003737D8 8D85 07214000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402107]

003737DE 50 PUSH EAX

003737DF 8B85 9E434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<MyGetProcAddress>]

003737E5 E9 F0110000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

003737EA 90 NOP

003737EB 59 POP ECX ; 0012FFE0

003737EC 2BC8 SUB ECX, EAX

003737EE 2BC1 SUB EAX, ECX

003737F0 0FB64F FF MOVZX ECX, BYTE PTR DS:[EDI-1]

003737F4 8907 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI], EAX

003737F6 03F9 ADD EDI, ECX

003737F8 47 INC EDI

003737F9 59 POP ECX ; 0012FFE0

003737FA ^ E2 AE LOOPD SHORT <De_ws2_32_apis> ; 循环处理ws2_32的相关函数

; 获取完毕

;______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

获取完壳的相关API后,壳先对文件进行一次检测,判断文件大小是否被改变了,如果改变了则OVER.

003737FC 8B85 B2434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

00373802 0340 3C ADD EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+3C] ; pe header

00373805 8B40 50 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+50] ; 取出SizofImage

00373808 3385 C6434000 XOR EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<xorsizeimg_Key>] ; 取出的SizeofImage和key01a334f8异或

0037380E 8B8D A2434000 MOV ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<xorkeyimag>]

00373814 3BC1 CMP EAX, ECX ; 很简单的判断,sizeimg xor 01a334f8=01A6CC88就ok 了

00373816 0F85 222A0000 JNZ <Game_Over> ; 如果文件大小改变了就over了

;★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★检测调试器★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★

利用CreateFileA进行ANTI检测 \.NTICE\.SICE\.TWX2002 \.filemon\.regmon\.FILEVXD \.REGVXD\.ICEDUMP\.BW2K

这些检测对OD没有作用的:-)

0037381C 8DB5 9C474000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<Anti_str>]

00373822 46 INC ESI

00373823 B9 09000000 MOV ECX, 9

00373828 EB 58 JMP SHORT 00373882

0037382A > 51 PUSH ECX ; Loop_Check_DBG

0037382B 56 PUSH ESI

0037382C AC LODS BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

0037382D EB 06 JMP SHORT 00373835

0037382F > F6D0 NOT AL ; De_Str

00373831 8846 FF MOV BYTE PTR DS:[ESI-1], AL ; 解密出\.xxxx

00373834 AC LODS BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

00373835 0AC0 OR AL, AL

00373837 ^ 75 F6 JNZ SHORT <De_Str>

00373839 5E POP ESI ; 0012FFE0

0037383A 6A 00 PUSH 0

0037383C 68 80000000 PUSH 80

00373841 6A 03 PUSH 3

00373843 6A 00 PUSH 0

00373845 6A 03 PUSH 3

00373847 68 000000C0 PUSH C0000000

0037384C 56 PUSH ESI

0037384D 8D85 7C214000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+40217C]

00373853 50 PUSH EAX

00373854 8B85 BC444000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APICreateFileA>] ; kernel32.CreateFileA

0037385A E9 7B110000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

0037385F 90 NOP

00373860 83F8 FF CMP EAX, -1

00373863 74 05 JE SHORT <No_DBG>

00373865 E9 D4290000 JMP <Game_Over> ; 检测到调试器就over了

0037386A > 56 PUSH ESI ; No_DBG

0037386B AC LODS BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

0037386C EB 06 JMP SHORT 00373874

0037386E > F6D0 NOT AL ; Crypt_Str

00373870 8846 FF MOV BYTE PTR DS:[ESI-1], AL

00373873 AC LODS BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

00373874 0AC0 OR AL, AL

00373876 ^ 75 F6 JNZ SHORT <Crypt_Str>

00373878 5E POP ESI ; 0012FFE0

00373879 59 POP ECX ; 0012FFE0

0037387A 0FB646 FF MOVZX EAX, BYTE PTR DS:[ESI-1]

0037387E 03F0 ADD ESI, EAX

00373880 46 INC ESI

00373881 49 DEC ECX

00373882 0BC9 OR ECX, ECX

00373884 ^ 75 A4 JNZ SHORT <Loop_Check_DBG>

;★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★结束检测★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★

00373886 83BD EA434000 0>CMP DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<flg_Hook9xDump>], 1 ; 判断是否选择了Hook_Win9x_DUMP

0037388D 0F85 60010000 JNZ <no_Hook_DUMP>

00373893 8CC9 MOV CX, CS

00373895 32C9 XOR CL, CL

00373897 0BC9 OR ECX, ECX ; 检测OS版本

00373899 0F84 A4000000 JE <isWinNT> ; 如果是WinNT则跳

0037389F 6A 40 PUSH 40 ; 这里一段不明代码:-(

003738A1 68 00100008 PUSH 8001000 ; 因为我没有Win9x,所以这里没有办法测试:-(

003738A6 68 81000000 PUSH 81

003738AB 6A 00 PUSH 0

003738AD FF95 AE434000 CALL DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIVirtualAlloc>] ; kernel32.VirtualAlloc

003738B3 8985 F9494000 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4049F9], EAX

003738B9 8BF8 MOV EDI, EAX

003738BB 8DB5 8E224000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+40228E]

003738C1 B9 81000000 MOV ECX, 81

003738C6 F3:A4 REP MOVS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI], BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

003738C8 8BD8 MOV EBX, EAX

003738CA 55 PUSH EBP

003738CB 8F83 79000000 POP DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+79] ; 0012FFE0

003738D1 FFB5 D6444000 PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4044D6] ; kernel32.ExitProcess

003738D7 8F83 7D000000 POP DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+7D] ; 0012FFE0

003738DD 8B85 46464000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+404646] ; kernel32.ReadProcessMemory

003738E3 83C0 05 ADD EAX, 5

003738E6 8983 6B000000 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+6B], EAX

003738EC 8DBB 65000000 LEA EDI, DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+65]

003738F2 8BB5 46464000 MOV ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+404646] ; kernel32.ReadProcessMemory

003738F8 803E E9 CMP BYTE PTR DS:[ESI], 0E9

003738FB 74 09 JE SHORT 00373906

003738FD B9 05000000 MOV ECX, 5

00373902 F3:A4 REP MOVS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI], BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

00373904 EB 0D JMP SHORT 00373913

00373906 8B46 01 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+1]

00373909 03C6 ADD EAX, ESI

0037390B 2BC7 SUB EAX, EDI

0037390D 8947 01 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+1], EAX

00373910 C607 E9 MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EDI], 0E9

00373913 50 PUSH EAX

00373914 0F014C24 FE SIDT FWORD PTR SS:[ESP-2]

00373919 5F POP EDI ; 0012FFE0

0037391A 83C7 20 ADD EDI, 20

0037391D 8B4F 04 MOV ECX, DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+4]

00373920 66:8B0F MOV CX, WORD PTR DS:[EDI]

00373923 FA CLI

00373924 8DB5 64224000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402264]

0037392A 66:8937 MOV WORD PTR DS:[EDI], SI

0037392D C1EE 10 SHR ESI, 10

00373930 66:8977 06 MOV WORD PTR DS:[EDI+6], SI

00373934 FB STI

00373935 CD 04 INT 4

00373937 FA CLI

00373938 66:890F MOV WORD PTR DS:[EDI], CX

0037393B C1E9 10 SHR ECX, 10

0037393E 66:894F 06 MOV WORD PTR DS:[EDI+6], CX

00373942 FB STI

00373943 > E9 AB000000 JMP <no_Hook_DUMP> ; isWinNT

00373948 60 PUSHAD

00373949 E8 00000000 CALL 0037394E

0037394E 5D POP EBP ; 0012FFE0

0037394F 81ED 6A224000 SUB EBP, 40226A

00373955 8B85 F9494000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4049F9]

0037395B 2B85 46464000 SUB EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+404646] ; kernel32.ReadProcessMemory

00373961 83E8 05 SUB EAX, 5

00373964 8B8D 46464000 MOV ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+404646] ; kernel32.ReadProcessMemory

0037396A C601 E9 MOV BYTE PTR DS:[ECX], 0E9

0037396D 8941 01 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+1], EAX

00373970 61 POPAD

00373971 CF IRETD

00373972 9C PUSHFD

00373973 60 PUSHAD

00373974 E8 00000000 CALL 00373979

00373979 5D POP EBP ; 0012FFE0

0037397A 81ED 95224000 SUB EBP, 402295

00373980 8B7424 28 MOV ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+28] ; kernel32.7C816D4F

00373984 8D85 03234000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402303]

0037398A 50 PUSH EAX

0037398B 6A 04 PUSH 4

0037398D 8D85 FF224000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4022FF]

00373993 50 PUSH EAX

00373994 B8 57484000 MOV EAX, 404857

00373999 0385 07234000 ADD EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402307]

0037399F 50 PUSH EAX

003739A0 56 PUSH ESI

003739A1 E8 31000000 CALL 003739D7

003739A6 0BC0 OR EAX, EAX

003739A8 74 2B JE SHORT 003739D5

003739AA B8 2635B204 MOV EAX, 4B23526

003739AF 3985 FF224000 CMP DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4022FF], EAX

003739B5 75 1E JNZ SHORT 003739D5

003739B7 8B7C24 30 MOV EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+30]

003739BB 8B4C24 34 MOV ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+34]

003739BF 33C0 XOR EAX, EAX

003739C1 F3:AA REP STOS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI]

003739C3 8B4424 34 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+34]

003739C7 8B4C24 38 MOV ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+38]

003739CB 8901 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ECX], EAX

003739CD 61 POPAD

003739CE 9D POPFD

003739CF 33C0 XOR EAX, EAX

003739D1 40 INC EAX

003739D2 C2 1400 RETN 14

003739D5 61 POPAD

003739D6 9D POPFD

003739D7 55 PUSH EBP

003739D8 8BEC MOV EBP, ESP

003739DA 56 PUSH ESI

003739DB 57 PUSH EDI

003739DC B8 00000000 MOV EAX, 0

003739E1 FFE0 JMP EAX

003739E3 0000 ADD BYTE PTR DS:[EAX], AL

003739E5 0000 ADD BYTE PTR DS:[EAX], AL

003739E7 0000 ADD BYTE PTR DS:[EAX], AL

003739E9 0000 ADD BYTE PTR DS:[EAX], AL

003739EB 0000 ADD BYTE PTR DS:[EAX], AL

003739ED 0000 ADD BYTE PTR DS:[EAX], AL

003739EF 0000 ADD BYTE PTR DS:[EAX], AL

003739F1 0000 ADD BYTE PTR DS:[EAX], AL

跳过上面一段对WIN9X_hook_anti_dump的处理后来到这里,准备对文件进行解密操作.

003739F3 > 8D1D 65494000 LEA EBX, DWORD PTR DS:[404965] ; no_Hook_DUMP

003739F9 > 833C2B 00 CMP DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+EBP], 0 ; Loop_De_Code

003739FD 0F84 7B010000 JE <Unpacked_Section_DONE> ; 判断节的大小是否为0,是否解压完相关的段

00373A03 8D042B LEA EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+EBP]

00373A06 8B48 08 MOV ECX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+8]

00373A09 8B70 04 MOV ESI, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+4]

00373A0C 03B5 B2434000 ADD ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

00373A12 8BFE MOV EDI, ESI

00373A14 BA 2635B204 MOV EDX, 4B23526

00373A19 EB 1F JMP SHORT 00373A3A

00373A1B AC LODS BYTE PTR DS:[ESI] ; 比较简单的第一次解压出代码

00373A1C D2C8 ROR AL, CL

00373A1E 32C1 XOR AL, CL

00373A20 04 66 ADD AL, 66

00373A22 32C5 XOR AL, CH

00373A24 02C6 ADD AL, DH

00373A26 2AC2 SUB AL, DL

00373A28 02C1 ADD AL, CL

00373A2A 2AC5 SUB AL, CH

00373A2C 32C2 XOR AL, DL

00373A2E 04 23 ADD AL, 23

00373A30 32C6 XOR AL, DH

00373A32 F6D0 NOT AL

00373A34 D2C8 ROR AL, CL

00373A36 D3CA ROR EDX, CL

00373A38 AA STOS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI]

00373A39 49 DEC ECX

00373A3A 0BC9 OR ECX, ECX

00373A3C ^ 75 DD JNZ SHORT 00373A1B

00373A3E 53 PUSH EBX

00373A3F 6A 04 PUSH 4

00373A41 68 00100000 PUSH 1000

00373A46 FF342B PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+EBP]

00373A49 6A 00 PUSH 0

00373A4B 8D85 42244000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402442]

00373A51 50 PUSH EAX

00373A52 8B85 AE434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIVirtualAlloc>] ; kernel32.VirtualAlloc

00373A58 E9 7D0F0000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00373A5D 90 NOP

这里有有一个远的返回地址了,不再向前面的那样返回地址就在3行代码之内.

;☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆跳去OEP的代码☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆

我是直接按壳的代码一直COPY,然后再做标记的,那样对全面分析可能会更好看些吧,当然这样看了也就会有点乱,

00373A5E 8B85 0E444000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<OEP(RVA)>] ; 处理完输入表和加密块后经过8个异常后来到这里

00373A64 0385 B2434000 ADD EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 准备跳去oep的处理

00373A6A 90 NOP

......

00373A71 894424 EC MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP-14], EAX

00373A75 90 NOP

00373A76 90 NOP

00373A77 90 NOP

00373A78 90 NOP

00373A79 90 NOP

00373A7A 90 NOP

00373A7B 90 NOP

00373A7C 90 NOP

00373A7D 90 NOP

00373A7E 90 NOP

00373A7F 90 NOP

00373A80 896C24 E8 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP-18], EBP

00373A84 90 NOP

00373A85 90 NOP

00373A86 90 NOP

00373A87 90 NOP

00373A88 FF85 C2434000 INC DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4043C2]

00373A8E 90 NOP

00373A8F 90 NOP

00373A90 90 NOP

00373A91 90 NOP

00373A92 90 NOP

00373A93 90 NOP

00373A94 90 NOP

00373A95 90 NOP

00373A96 90 NOP

00373A97 90 NOP

00373A98 90 NOP

00373A99 8B9D EE434000 MOV EBX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4043EE]

00373A9F 90 NOP

00373AA0 90 NOP

00373AA1 90 NOP

00373AA2 90 NOP

00373AA3 90 NOP

00373AA4 83FB 01 CMP EBX, 1 ; EBX=1表示是push ebp, mov ebp,esp的方式

00373AA7 75 33 JNZ SHORT <isVBOEP_MODE?>

00373AA9 61 POPAD ; is Push ebp mode

00373AAA 90 NOP

00373AAB 90 NOP

00373AAC 90 NOP

00373AAD 90 NOP

00373AAE 90 NOP

00373AAF 8B4424 CC MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP-34]

00373AB3 90 NOP

00373AB4 90 NOP

00373AB5 90 NOP

00373AB6 90 NOP

00373AB7 90 NOP

00373AB8 90 NOP

00373AB9 90 NOP

00373ABA 90 NOP

00373ABB 90 NOP

00373ABC 90 NOP

00373ABD 90 NOP

00373ABE 8D78 02 LEA EDI, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+2]

00373AC1 90 NOP

00373AC2 90 NOP

00373AC3 90 NOP

00373AC4 90 NOP

00373AC5 90 NOP

00373AC6 55 PUSH EBP

00373AC7 90 NOP

00373AC8 90 NOP

00373AC9 90 NOP

00373ACA 90 NOP

00373ACB 90 NOP

00373ACC 8BEC MOV EBP, ESP

00373ACE 90 NOP

00373ACF 90 NOP

00373AD0 90 NOP

00373AD1 90 NOP

00373AD2 90 NOP

00373AD3 90 NOP

00373AD4 90 NOP

00373AD5 90 NOP

00373AD6 90 NOP

00373AD7 90 NOP

00373AD8 90 NOP

00373AD9 50 PUSH EAX

00373ADA EB 45 JMP SHORT 00373B21

00373ADC > 83FB 02 CMP EBX, 2 ; isVBOEP_MODE?

00373ADF 75 2E JNZ SHORT 00373B0F ; EBX==2表示是VB的程序 push address

00373AE1 61 POPAD

00373AE2 90 NOP

00373AE3 90 NOP

00373AE4 90 NOP

00373AE5 90 NOP

00373AE6 90 NOP

00373AE7 90 NOP

00373AE8 90 NOP

00373AE9 8B4424 C8 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP-38]

00373AED 90 NOP

00373AEE 90 NOP

00373AEF 90 NOP

00373AF0 90 NOP

00373AF1 FFB0 F2434000 PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+4043F2]

00373AF7 90 NOP

00373AF8 90 NOP

00373AF9 90 NOP

00373AFA 90 NOP

00373AFB 90 NOP

00373AFC 8B4424 D0 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP-30] ; ntdll.7C930551

00373B00 90 NOP

00373B01 90 NOP

00373B02 90 NOP

00373B03 90 NOP

00373B04 90 NOP

00373B05 50 PUSH EAX

00373B06 90 NOP

00373B07 90 NOP

00373B08 90 NOP

00373B09 90 NOP

00373B0A 8D78 02 LEA EDI, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+2]

00373B0D EB 12 JMP SHORT 00373B21

00373B0F 61 POPAD ; 如果不是push ebp mov ebp,esp的方式

00373B10 90 NOP ; 也不是push address call address的方式则直接跳去oep

00373B11 90 NOP

00373B12 90 NOP

00373B13 90 NOP

00373B14 90 NOP

00373B15 90 NOP

00373B16 90 NOP

00373B17 8B4424 CC MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP-34]

00373B1B 90 NOP

00373B1C 90 NOP

00373B1D 90 NOP

00373B1E 90 NOP

00373B1F 90 NOP

00373B20 50 PUSH EAX

00373B21 90 NOP

00373B22 90 NOP

00373B23 90 NOP

00373B24 90 NOP

00373B25 C3 RETN ; 返回到程序OEP

;☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆跳去OEP代码结束☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆

上面申请空间后直接返回到这里,继续分析下去:

00373B26 5B POP EBX ; 0012FFE0

00373B27 8BF0 MOV ESI, EAX

00373B29 8BC3 MOV EAX, EBX

00373B2B 03C5 ADD EAX, EBP

00373B2D 8B78 04 MOV EDI, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+4]

00373B30 03BD B2434000 ADD EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

00373B36 56 PUSH ESI

00373B37 57 PUSH EDI

00373B38 8D85 64244000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402464]

00373B3E 50 PUSH EAX

00373B3F 8B85 12444000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+404412] ; <aplib_Unpack>

00373B45 FFE0 JMP EAX ; 跳去aplib解压代码

00373B48 8B0C2B MOV ECX, DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+EBP] ; 解压大小59000

00373B4B 56 PUSH ESI

00373B4C 51 PUSH ECX

00373B4D C1E9 02 SHR ECX, 2

00373B50 F3:A5 REP MOVS DWORD PTR ES:[EDI], DWORD PTR DS:[ESI] ; 解压代码到相关位置

00373B52 59 POP ECX ; 0012FFE0

00373B53 83E1 03 AND ECX, 3

00373B56 F3:A4 REP MOVS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI], BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

00373B58 5E POP ESI ; 0012FFE0

00373B59 53 PUSH EBX

00373B5A 68 00800000 PUSH 8000

00373B5F 6A 00 PUSH 0

00373B61 56 PUSH ESI

00373B62 8D85 91244000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402491]

00373B68 50 PUSH EAX

00373B69 8B85 AF444000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIVirtualFree>] ; kernel32.VirtualFree

00373B6F E9 660E0000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00373B74 90 NOP

00373B75 5B POP EBX ; 0012FFE0

00373B76 83C3 0C ADD EBX, 0C

00373B79 ^ E9 7BFEFFFF JMP <Loop_De_Code> ; 循环解压出相关代码

;══════════════════════还原CALL和相关跳转═════════════════════════

00373B7E > 8BB5 DD484000 MOV ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4048DD] ; Unpacked_Section_DONE

00373B84 03B5 B2434000 ADD ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

00373B8A 8B8D E1484000 MOV ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4048E1]

00373B90 83E9 05 SUB ECX, 5

00373B93 EB 5B JMP SHORT 00373BF0

00373B95 > 66:8B06 MOV AX, WORD PTR DS:[ESI] ; De_JMP_CALL

00373B98 3C E8 CMP AL, 0E8 ; jmp address

00373B9A 75 16 JNZ SHORT 00373BB2 ; 和远程跳转

00373B9C 8BC6 MOV EAX, ESI

00373B9E 2B85 B2434000 SUB EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

00373BA4 83C0 05 ADD EAX, 5

00373BA7 2946 01 SUB DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+1], EAX

00373BAA 83C6 04 ADD ESI, 4

00373BAD 83E9 04 SUB ECX, 4

00373BB0 EB 3C JMP SHORT 00373BEE

00373BB2 3C E9 CMP AL, 0E9

00373BB4 75 16 JNZ SHORT 00373BCC

00373BB6 8BC6 MOV EAX, ESI

00373BB8 2B85 B2434000 SUB EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

00373BBE 83C0 05 ADD EAX, 5

00373BC1 2946 01 SUB DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+1], EAX

00373BC4 83C6 04 ADD ESI, 4

00373BC7 83E9 04 SUB ECX, 4

00373BCA EB 22 JMP SHORT 00373BEE

00373BCC 3C 0F CMP AL, 0F

00373BCE 75 1E JNZ SHORT 00373BEE

00373BD0 80FC 7F CMP AH, 7F

00373BD3 76 19 JBE SHORT 00373BEE

00373BD5 80FC 90 CMP AH, 90

00373BD8 73 14 JNB SHORT 00373BEE

00373BDA 8BC6 MOV EAX, ESI

00373BDC 2B85 B2434000 SUB EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

00373BE2 83C0 06 ADD EAX, 6

00373BE5 2946 02 SUB DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+2], EAX

00373BE8 83C6 05 ADD ESI, 5

00373BEB 83E9 05 SUB ECX, 5

00373BEE 46 INC ESI

00373BEF 49 DEC ECX

00373BF0 81F9 00000080 CMP ECX, 80000000

00373BF6 ^ 72 9D JB SHORT <De_JMP_CALL>

;══════════════════════END══════════════════════

......

00373BF8 8DB5 4E254000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<Next_Decode_addr>] ; 开始解出下一段代码

00373BFE 87E6 XCHG ESI, ESP

00373C00 B9 930B0000 MOV ECX, 0B93 ; 解压大小0b93

00373C05 58 POP EAX ; 0012FFE0

00373C06 F6D0 NOT AL

00373C08 50 PUSH EAX

00373C09 44 INC ESP

00373C0A ^ E2 F9 LOOPD SHORT 00373C05

00373C0C 87E6 XCHG ESI, ESP

;⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕输入表处理⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕

解压出代码后开始处理输入表部分了,输入表部分是复杂了点.总体是这样子,simonzh2k和Window已经标的很明白,我直接搬了过来:

加密后的 IAT 在内存里如下存放(搬了simonzh2k的)

; 1. FF FF FF FF ----------- 00 00 00 00 表示 所有 DLL 结束

; 2. xx ----- DLL Name长度(不算 null)

; 3. DLL 名字, null 结尾 ( 明文 )

; 4. 80 yy yy yy ---------- yy yy yy 表示API 个数 , 80 表示需要重定向

; 5. zz ---------- ZZ<>0 表示 API Name长度(不算 null), ZZ==0, 后 4 byte 函数序号, 1 byte NULL

; 6. API Name, null 结尾 ( 密文, 解密代码见 12FF68 )

; 7. 重复 5, 6 结束 一个 DLL

; 重复 1,..,7 处理 所有 DLL

; 经过壳的iat处理,形成了下面的一个调用过程, ( 引用 window 的表示)

;

; iat中地址 --> Hook_proc:

; Hook_proc:

; |PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[Hook_proc+1C]

; |XOR DWORD PTR SS:[ESP], key

; |ret; -> |Stub_proc:

; |api_start_code

|api_some_code

|push api_next_code_addr

|ret

00373C0E 6A 04 PUSH 4

00373C10 68 00100000 PUSH 1000

00373C15 68 00200000 PUSH 2000

00373C1A 6A 00 PUSH 0

00373C1C FF95 AE434000 CALL DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIVirtualAlloc>] ; kernel32.VirtualAlloc

00373C22 8985 E9494000 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<hvMEM>], EAX

00373C28 C785 ED494000 0>MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<shellFunAddress>], 0

00373C32 8B85 DE434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<flgCrypt_Improt>] ; (initial cpu selection)

00373C38 0BC0 OR EAX, EAX

00373C3A 0F85 BD000000 JNZ <IAT_isCrypted> ; 如果输入表加密了则跳

00373C40 8BBD 02444000 MOV EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IAT_RVA>] ; 如果没有加密则这里是输入表的rva,加密了就不是了

00373C46 03BD B2434000 ADD EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

00373C4C > 8B77 0C MOV ESI, DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+C] ; dis_Dlls

00373C4F 0BF6 OR ESI, ESI

00373C51 75 05 JNZ SHORT <dis_iat> ; 如果没有处理完输入表则跳

00373C53 E9 A0000000 JMP <not_crypt_IAT_dis_Done>

00373C58 > 03B5 B2434000 ADD ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; dis_iat

00373C5E 56 PUSH ESI

00373C5F 8D85 8F254000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+40258F]

00373C65 50 PUSH EAX

00373C66 8B85 A6434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<GetModhandle>] ; kernel32.GetModuleHandleA

00373C6C E9 690D0000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN> ; 判断DLL是否已经载入

00373C71 90 NOP

00373C72 90 NOP

00373C73 0BC0 OR EAX, EAX

00373C75 75 1E JNZ SHORT <dll_isLoaded>

00373C77 56 PUSH ESI

00373C78 8D85 A8254000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4025A8]

00373C7E 50 PUSH EAX

00373C7F 8B85 AA434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APILoadLib>] ; kernel32.LoadLibraryA

00373C85 E9 500D0000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00373C8A 90 NOP

00373C8B 90 NOP

00373C8C 0BC0 OR EAX, EAX

00373C8E 75 05 JNZ SHORT <dll_isLoaded>

00373C90 E9 5A0F0000 JMP <proc_Loaddll_failed> ; 载入DLL失败显示失败信息

00373C95 > 8BF0 MOV ESI, EAX ; dll_isLoaded

00373C97 8B17 MOV EDX, DWORD PTR DS:[EDI]

00373C99 0BD2 OR EDX, EDX

00373C9B 75 03 JNZ SHORT 00373CA0

00373C9D 8B57 10 MOV EDX, DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+10] ; 004480AC

00373CA0 0395 B2434000 ADD EDX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

00373CA6 8B5F 10 MOV EBX, DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+10] ; 004480AC

00373CA9 039D B2434000 ADD EBX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

00373CAF > 8B02 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EDX] ; dis_current_DLLs_api

00373CB1 0BC0 OR EAX, EAX

00373CB3 75 02 JNZ SHORT 00373CB7

00373CB5 EB 39 JMP SHORT 00373CF0

00373CB7 53 PUSH EBX

00373CB8 52 PUSH EDX

00373CB9 99 CDQ

00373CBA 0BD2 OR EDX, EDX

00373CBC 75 0B JNZ SHORT <is_number1> ; 是序号还是API名字

00373CBE 83C0 02 ADD EAX, 2

00373CC1 0385 B2434000 ADD EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

00373CC7 EB 05 JMP SHORT 00373CCE

00373CC9 > 25 FFFFFF7F AND EAX, 7FFFFFFF ; is_number1

00373CCE 50 PUSH EAX

00373CCF 56 PUSH ESI

00373CD0 8D85 00264000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402600]

00373CD6 50 PUSH EAX

00373CD7 8B85 9E434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<MyGetProcAddress>]

00373CDD E9 F80C0000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00373CE2 90 NOP

00373CE3 90 NOP

00373CE4 8903 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EBX], EAX ; 填充输入表

00373CE6 5A POP EDX ; 0012FFE0

00373CE7 5B POP EBX ; 0012FFE0

00373CE8 83C2 04 ADD EDX, 4

00373CEB 83C3 04 ADD EBX, 4

00373CEE ^ EB BF JMP SHORT <dis_current_DLLs_api>

00373CF0 83C7 14 ADD EDI, 14

00373CF3 ^ E9 54FFFFFF JMP <dis_Dlls> ; 循环填充输入表

00373CF8 > E9 C6050000 JMP <Disposal_IAT_Done> ; not_crypt_IAT_dis_Done

00373CFD > 8D95 A01A4000 LEA EDX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<Crc_Start_addr>] ; IAT_isCrypted

00373D03 0395 02444000 ADD EDX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IAT_RVA>]

00373D09 > 8B3A MOV EDI, DWORD PTR DS:[EDX] ; loop_De_Crypted_iat

00373D0B 0BFF OR EDI, EDI

00373D0D 75 05 JNZ SHORT <DIS_NEXT_1> ; 如果没有处理完IAT则跳

00373D0F E9 AF050000 JMP <Disposal_IAT_Done>

00373D14 > 03BD B2434000 ADD EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; DIS_NEXT_1

00373D1A 83C2 05 ADD EDX, 5

00373D1D 8BF2 MOV ESI, EDX

00373D1F 56 PUSH ESI

00373D20 8D85 50264000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402650]

00373D26 50 PUSH EAX

00373D27 8B85 A6434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<GetModhandle>] ; kernel32.GetModuleHandleA

00373D2D E9 A80C0000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00373D32 90 NOP

00373D33 90 NOP

00373D34 0BC0 OR EAX, EAX

00373D36 75 1E JNZ SHORT 00373D56

00373D38 56 PUSH ESI

00373D39 8D85 69264000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402669]

00373D3F 50 PUSH EAX

00373D40 8B85 AA434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APILoadLib>] ; kernel32.LoadLibraryA

00373D46 E9 8F0C0000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00373D4B 90 NOP

00373D4C 90 NOP

00373D4D 0BC0 OR EAX, EAX

00373D4F 75 05 JNZ SHORT 00373D56

00373D51 E9 990E0000 JMP <proc_Loaddll_failed>

00373D56 0FB64E FF MOVZX ECX, BYTE PTR DS:[ESI-1] ; MODULE NAME长度

00373D5A 03F1 ADD ESI, ECX

00373D5C 8BD6 MOV EDX, ESI

00373D5E 8BF0 MOV ESI, EAX

00373D60 42 INC EDX

00373D61 8B0A MOV ECX, DWORD PTR DS:[EDX] ; 本DLL需引入函数的数

00373D63 81E1 00000080 AND ECX, 80000000

00373D69 0BC9 OR ECX, ECX

00373D6B 0F85 87000000 JNZ <Reloc_FUN> ; 判断DLL中的API是否需要重定位处理,如果需要则跳

00373D71 8B0A MOV ECX, DWORD PTR DS:[EDX] ; 不需要特殊处理的API则跳这里

00373D73 83C2 04 ADD EDX, 4

00373D76 > 51 PUSH ECX ; loop_not_relocs_api

00373D77 0FB602 MOVZX EAX, BYTE PTR DS:[EDX]

00373D7A 0BC0 OR EAX, EAX

00373D7C 75 27 JNZ SHORT <not_reloc_Ord_by_name>

00373D7E 42 INC EDX ; 以序号方式填充

00373D7F 52 PUSH EDX

00373D80 8B02 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EDX]

00373D82 50 PUSH EAX

00373D83 56 PUSH ESI

00373D84 8D85 B4264000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4026B4]

00373D8A 50 PUSH EAX

00373D8B 8B85 9E434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<MyGetProcAddress>]

00373D91 E9 440C0000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00373D96 90 NOP

00373D97 36:E8 A10E0000 CALL <proc_check_CC> ; Superfluous prefix

00373D9D 8907 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI], EAX ; 填充IAT

00373D9F 5A POP EDX ; 0012FFE0

00373DA0 83C2 04 ADD EDX, 4

00373DA3 EB 47 JMP SHORT 00373DEC

00373DA5 > 42 INC EDX ; not_reloc_Ord_by_name

00373DA6 52 PUSH EDX

00373DA7 60 PUSHAD

00373DA8 8BF2 MOV ESI, EDX

00373DAA 8DBD 74484000 LEA EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<strAPIName>] ; 循环解压出API名称

00373DB0 33C0 XOR EAX, EAX

00373DB2 AC LODS BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

00373DB3 EB 07 JMP SHORT 00373DBC

00373DB5 C0C0 03 ROL AL, 3

00373DB8 F6D0 NOT AL

00373DBA AA STOS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI]

00373DBB AC LODS BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

00373DBC 0BC0 OR EAX, EAX

00373DBE ^ 75 F5 JNZ SHORT 00373DB5

00373DC0 AA STOS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI]

00373DC1 61 POPAD

00373DC2 8D95 74484000 LEA EDX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<strAPIName>]

00373DC8 52 PUSH EDX

00373DC9 56 PUSH ESI

00373DCA 8D85 FA264000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4026FA]

00373DD0 50 PUSH EAX

00373DD1 8B85 9E434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<MyGetProcAddress>]

00373DD7 E9 FE0B0000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00373DDC 90 NOP

00373DDD 90 NOP

00373DDE E8 5B0E0000 CALL <proc_check_CC>

00373DE3 8907 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI], EAX ; 填充IAT

00373DE5 5A POP EDX ; 0012FFE0

00373DE6 0FB642 FF MOVZX EAX, BYTE PTR DS:[EDX-1]

00373DEA 03D0 ADD EDX, EAX

00373DEC 42 INC EDX

00373DED 83C7 04 ADD EDI, 4

00373DF0 59 POP ECX ; 0012FFE0

00373DF1 ^ E2 83 LOOPD SHORT <loop_not_relocs_api>

00373DF3 E9 C6040000 JMP <jmp_loop_de_iat>

00373DF8 > 8B0A MOV ECX, DWORD PTR DS:[EDX] ; Reloc_FUN

00373DFA 81E1 FFFFFF7F AND ECX, 7FFFFFFF

00373E00 51 PUSH ECX

00373E01 52 PUSH EDX

00373E02 C1E1 05 SHL ECX, 5

00373E05 6A 04 PUSH 4

00373E07 68 00100000 PUSH 1000

00373E0C 51 PUSH ECX

00373E0D 6A 00 PUSH 0

00373E0F 8D85 3E274000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+40273E]

00373E15 50 PUSH EAX

00373E16 8B85 AE434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIVirtualAlloc>] ; kernel32.VirtualAlloc

00373E1C E9 B90B0000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00373E21 90 NOP

00373E22 8985 FE434000 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<hMEM_IAT_RELOC_1>], EAX

00373E28 5A POP EDX ; 0012FFE0

00373E29 59 POP ECX ; 0012FFE0

00373E2A 50 PUSH EAX

00373E2B 51 PUSH ECX

00373E2C 2BBD B2434000 SUB EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

00373E32 83FF FF CMP EDI, -1

00373E35 74 15 JE SHORT 00373E4C

00373E37 03BD B2434000 ADD EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

00373E3D EB 09 JMP SHORT 00373E48

00373E3F 8907 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI], EAX ; 循环填充第一层加密地址

00373E41 83C0 20 ADD EAX, 20 ; 每次+20

00373E44 83C7 04 ADD EDI, 4

00373E47 49 DEC ECX

00373E48 0BC9 OR ECX, ECX

00373E4A ^ 75 F3 JNZ SHORT 00373E3F

00373E4C 59 POP ECX ; 0012FFE0

00373E4D 58 POP EAX ; 0012FFE0

00373E4E 8BF8 MOV EDI, EAX

00373E50 57 PUSH EDI

00373E51 51 PUSH ECX

00373E52 EB 2D JMP SHORT 00373E81

00373E54 > 8D47 1C LEA EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+1C] ; Fill_1_address

00373E57 66:C707 FF35 MOV WORD PTR DS:[EDI], 35FF ; 填充为push [addr]

00373E5C C747 06 8134240>MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+6], 243481 ; xor [esp],rndkey

00373E63 8947 02 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+2], EAX ; ret

00373E66 C647 0D C3 MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EDI+D], 0C3

00373E6A 52 PUSH EDX

00373E6B 0F31 RDTSC

00373E6D 32E0 XOR AH, AL

00373E6F C1C8 08 ROR EAX, 8

00373E72 02E0 ADD AH, AL

00373E74 C1C8 08 ROR EAX, 8

00373E77 32E0 XOR AH, AL

00373E79 8947 09 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+9], EAX

00373E7C 5A POP EDX ; 0012FFE0

00373E7D 83C7 20 ADD EDI, 20

00373E80 49 DEC ECX

00373E81 0BC9 OR ECX, ECX

00373E83 ^ 75 CF JNZ SHORT <Fill_1_address>

00373E85 59 POP ECX ; 0012FFE0

00373E86 5F POP EDI ; 0012FFE0

00373E87 83C2 04 ADD EDX, 4

00373E8A > 51 PUSH ECX ; loop_Current_DLL

00373E8B 0FB602 MOVZX EAX, BYTE PTR DS:[EDX]

00373E8E 0BC0 OR EAX, EAX

00373E90 0F85 85000000 JNZ <By_Name> ; 判断是名称方式还是序号方式

00373E96 42 INC EDX ; API是序号方式则这里开始处理

00373E97 52 PUSH EDX

00373E98 8B02 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EDX]

00373E9A 50 PUSH EAX

00373E9B 56 PUSH ESI

00373E9C 8D85 CB274000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4027CB]

00373EA2 50 PUSH EAX

00373EA3 8B85 9E434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<MyGetProcAddress>]

00373EA9 E9 2C0B0000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00373EAE 90 NOP

00373EAF 8B9D E9494000 MOV EBX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<hvMEM>]

00373EB5 039D ED494000 ADD EBX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<shellFunAddress>]

00373EBB 53 PUSH EBX

00373EBC 50 PUSH EAX

00373EBD 53 PUSH EBX

00373EBE E8 2C0B0000 CALL <steal code>

00373EC3 2B85 E9494000 SUB EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<hvMEM>]

00373EC9 8985 ED494000 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<shellFunAddress>], EAX

00373ECF 60 PUSHAD

00373ED0 3D C01F0000 CMP EAX, 1FC0

00373ED5 76 31 JBE SHORT 00373F08 ; 判断是否够空间

00373ED7 6A 04 PUSH 4 ; 存放空间不够则再申请空间

00373ED9 68 00100000 PUSH 1000

00373EDE 68 00200000 PUSH 2000

00373EE3 6A 00 PUSH 0

00373EE5 8D85 14284000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402814]

00373EEB 50 PUSH EAX

00373EEC 8B85 AE434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIVirtualAlloc>] ; kernel32.VirtualAlloc

00373EF2 E9 E30A0000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00373EF7 90 NOP

00373EF8 8985 E9494000 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<hvMEM>], EAX

00373EFE C785 ED494000 0>MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<shellFunAddress>], 0

00373F08 61 POPAD

00373F09 5B POP EBX ; 0012FFE0

00373F0A 8BC3 MOV EAX, EBX

00373F0C 3347 09 XOR EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+9]

00373F0F 8947 1C MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+1C], EAX

00373F12 5A POP EDX ; 0012FFE0

00373F13 83C2 04 ADD EDX, 4

00373F16 E9 97030000 JMP 003742B2

00373F1B > 42 INC EDX ; By_Name

00373F1C 52 PUSH EDX

00373F1D > 60 PUSHAD ; Decrypt_API_name

00373F1E 8BF2 MOV ESI, EDX

00373F20 8DBD 74484000 LEA EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<strAPIName>]

00373F26 33C0 XOR EAX, EAX

00373F28 0FB64E FF MOVZX ECX, BYTE PTR DS:[ESI-1]

00373F2C EB 0E JMP SHORT 00373F3C

00373F2E AC LODS BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

00373F2F 34 79 XOR AL, 79

00373F31 2C 55 SUB AL, 55

00373F33 C0C0 03 ROL AL, 3

00373F36 F6D0 NOT AL

00373F38 AA STOS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI]

00373F39 49 DEC ECX

00373F3A 33C0 XOR EAX, EAX

00373F3C 0BC9 OR ECX, ECX

00373F3E ^ 75 EE JNZ SHORT 00373F2E

00373F40 AA STOS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI]

00373F41 61 POPAD

00373F42 8D95 74484000 LEA EDX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<strAPIName>]

00373F48 52 PUSH EDX

00373F49 52 PUSH EDX

00373F4A 8D85 C9464000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<strLoadLib>]

00373F50 50 PUSH EAX

00373F51 8D85 80284000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402880]

00373F57 50 PUSH EAX

00373F58 8B85 E3444000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIlstrcmpA>] ; kernel32.lstrcmpA

00373F5E E9 770A0000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN> ; 判断是否为特殊处理的API

00373F63 90 NOP

00373F64 5A POP EDX ; 0012FFE0

00373F65 85C0 TEST EAX, EAX

00373F67 75 0B JNZ SHORT 00373F74

00373F69 8D85 89394000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<SDKLoadLib>]

00373F6F E9 31030000 JMP <Fill_IAT_RELOC_2>

00373F74 52 PUSH EDX

00373F75 52 PUSH EDX

00373F76 8D85 BA464000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<strGetProcaddress>]

00373F7C 50 PUSH EAX

00373F7D 8D85 AC284000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4028AC]

00373F83 50 PUSH EAX

00373F84 8B85 E3444000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIlstrcmpA>] ; kernel32.lstrcmpA

00373F8A E9 4B0A0000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00373F8F 90 NOP

00373F90 5A POP EDX ; 0012FFE0

00373F91 85C0 TEST EAX, EAX

00373F93 75 0B JNZ SHORT 00373FA0

00373F95 8D85 9A394000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<SDKGetProcAddr>]

00373F9B E9 05030000 JMP <Fill_IAT_RELOC_2>

00373FA0 52 PUSH EDX

00373FA1 52 PUSH EDX

00373FA2 8D85 D6464000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<strGetVersion>]

00373FA8 50 PUSH EAX

00373FA9 8D85 D8284000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4028D8]

00373FAF 50 PUSH EAX

00373FB0 8B85 E3444000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIlstrcmpA>] ; kernel32.lstrcmpA

00373FB6 E9 1F0A0000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00373FBB 90 NOP

00373FBC 5A POP EDX ; 0012FFE0

00373FBD 85C0 TEST EAX, EAX

00373FBF 75 0B JNZ SHORT 00373FCC

00373FC1 8D85 AF394000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<SDKGetVersion>]

00373FC7 E9 D9020000 JMP <Fill_IAT_RELOC_2>

00373FCC 52 PUSH EDX

00373FCD 52 PUSH EDX

00373FCE 8D85 E1464000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<strGetModlehnd>]

00373FD4 50 PUSH EAX

00373FD5 8D85 04294000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402904]

00373FDB 50 PUSH EAX

00373FDC 8B85 E3444000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIlstrcmpA>] ; kernel32.lstrcmpA

00373FE2 E9 F3090000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00373FE7 90 NOP

00373FE8 5A POP EDX ; 0012FFE0

00373FE9 85C0 TEST EAX, EAX

00373FEB 75 0B JNZ SHORT 00373FF8

00373FED 8D85 E4394000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<SDKGetModlehnd>]

00373FF3 E9 AD020000 JMP <Fill_IAT_RELOC_2>

00373FF8 52 PUSH EDX

00373FF9 52 PUSH EDX

00373FFA 8D85 F2464000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<strGetCurrProcess>]

00374000 50 PUSH EAX

00374001 8D85 30294000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402930]

00374007 50 PUSH EAX

00374008 8B85 E3444000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIlstrcmpA>] ; kernel32.lstrcmpA

0037400E E9 C7090000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00374013 90 NOP

00374014 5A POP EDX ; 0012FFE0

00374015 85C0 TEST EAX, EAX

00374017 75 0B JNZ SHORT 00374024

00374019 8D85 F5394000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<SDKGetCurProcess>]

0037401F E9 81020000 JMP <Fill_IAT_RELOC_2>

00374024 52 PUSH EDX

00374025 52 PUSH EDX

00374026 8D85 04474000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<strGetCurprocID>]

0037402C 50 PUSH EAX

0037402D 8D85 5C294000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+40295C]

00374033 50 PUSH EAX

00374034 8B85 E3444000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIlstrcmpA>] ; kernel32.lstrcmpA

0037403A E9 9B090000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

0037403F 90 NOP

00374040 5A POP EDX ; 0012FFE0

00374041 85C0 TEST EAX, EAX

00374043 75 0B JNZ SHORT 00374050

00374045 8D85 323A4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<SDKGetcurProcID>]

0037404B E9 55020000 JMP <Fill_IAT_RELOC_2>

00374050 52 PUSH EDX

00374051 52 PUSH EDX

00374052 8D85 18474000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<strGetcmdline>]

00374058 50 PUSH EAX

00374059 8D85 88294000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402988]

0037405F 50 PUSH EAX

00374060 8B85 E3444000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIlstrcmpA>] ; kernel32.lstrcmpA

00374066 E9 6F090000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

0037406B 90 NOP

0037406C 5A POP EDX ; 0012FFE0

0037406D 85C0 TEST EAX, EAX

0037406F 75 0B JNZ SHORT 0037407C

00374071 8D85 5F3A4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<SDKGetCMDline>]

00374077 E9 29020000 JMP <Fill_IAT_RELOC_2>

0037407C 52 PUSH EDX

0037407D 52 PUSH EDX

0037407E 8D85 41474000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<strLockRes>]

00374084 50 PUSH EAX

00374085 8D85 B4294000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4029B4]

0037408B 50 PUSH EAX

0037408C 8B85 E3444000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIlstrcmpA>] ; kernel32.lstrcmpA

00374092 E9 43090000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00374097 90 NOP

00374098 5A POP EDX ; 0012FFE0

00374099 85C0 TEST EAX, EAX

0037409B 75 0B JNZ SHORT 003740A8

0037409D 8D85 023B4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<SDKLockRes>]

003740A3 E9 FD010000 JMP <Fill_IAT_RELOC_2>

003740A8 52 PUSH EDX

003740A9 52 PUSH EDX

003740AA 8D85 4E474000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<strFreeRes>]

003740B0 50 PUSH EAX

003740B1 8D85 E0294000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4029E0]

003740B7 50 PUSH EAX

003740B8 8B85 E3444000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIlstrcmpA>] ; kernel32.lstrcmpA

003740BE E9 17090000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

003740C3 90 NOP

003740C4 5A POP EDX ; 0012FFE0

003740C5 85C0 TEST EAX, EAX

003740C7 75 0B JNZ SHORT 003740D4

003740C9 8D85 023B4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<SDKLockRes>]

003740CF E9 D1010000 JMP <Fill_IAT_RELOC_2>

003740D4 52 PUSH EDX

003740D5 52 PUSH EDX

003740D6 8D85 28474000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<strExitProc>]

003740DC 50 PUSH EAX

003740DD 8D85 0C2A4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402A0C]

003740E3 50 PUSH EAX

003740E4 8B85 E3444000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIlstrcmpA>] ; kernel32.lstrcmpA

003740EA E9 EB080000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

003740EF 90 NOP

003740F0 5A POP EDX ; 0012FFE0

003740F1 85C0 TEST EAX, EAX

003740F3 75 0B JNZ SHORT 00374100

003740F5 8D85 7C3A4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<SDKExitProc>]

003740FB E9 A5010000 JMP <Fill_IAT_RELOC_2>

00374100 52 PUSH EDX

00374101 52 PUSH EDX

00374102 8D85 5B474000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<strDLGBoxParamA>]

00374108 50 PUSH EAX

00374109 8D85 852A4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402A85]

0037410F 50 PUSH EAX

00374110 8B85 E3444000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIlstrcmpA>] ; kernel32.lstrcmpA

00374116 E9 BF080000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

0037411B 90 NOP

0037411C 8BC5 MOV EAX, EBP

0037411E 8DB5 014A4000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+404A01] ; 过完全部的异常后把最后异常的那些地址再加密回去

00374124 2946 04 SUB DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+4], EAX

00374127 2946 08 SUB DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+8], EAX

0037412A 83C6 20 ADD ESI, 20

0037412D 2946 04 SUB DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+4], EAX

00374130 83C6 20 ADD ESI, 20

00374133 2946 04 SUB DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+4], EAX

00374136 2946 08 SUB DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+8], EAX

00374139 83C6 20 ADD ESI, 20

0037413C 2946 04 SUB DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+4], EAX

0037413F 83C6 20 ADD ESI, 20

00374142 2946 04 SUB DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+4], EAX

00374145 83C6 20 ADD ESI, 20

00374148 2946 04 SUB DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+4], EAX

0037414B 83C6 20 ADD ESI, 20

0037414E 2946 04 SUB DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+4], EAX

00374151 83C6 20 ADD ESI, 20

00374154 2946 04 SUB DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+4], EAX

00374157 8DB5 FD494000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4049FD]

0037415D B8 014A4000 MOV EAX, 404A01

00374162 8906 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ESI], EAX

00374164 ^ E9 F5F8FFFF JMP 00373A5E ; 跳去处理OEP的代码

00374169 5A POP EDX ; 0012FFE0

0037416A 85C0 TEST EAX, EAX

0037416C 75 0B JNZ SHORT 00374179 ; 如果不是特殊函数则跳

0037416E 8D85 8B3A4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<SDKDLGBoxParamA>]

00374174 E9 2C010000 JMP <Fill_IAT_RELOC_2>

00374179 52 PUSH EDX

0037417A 52 PUSH EDX

0037417B 8D85 6B474000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<strCreateDLGParamA>]

00374181 50 PUSH EAX

00374182 8D85 B12A4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402AB1]

00374188 50 PUSH EAX

00374189 8B85 E3444000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIlstrcmpA>] ; kernel32.lstrcmpA

0037418F E9 46080000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00374194 90 NOP

00374195 5A POP EDX ; 0012FFE0

00374196 85C0 TEST EAX, EAX

00374198 75 0B JNZ SHORT 003741A5

0037419A 8D85 C83A4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<SDKCreateDLGParamA>]

003741A0 E9 00010000 JMP <Fill_IAT_RELOC_2>

003741A5 52 PUSH EDX

003741A6 52 PUSH EDX

003741A7 8D85 34474000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<strSndMsg>]

003741AD 50 PUSH EAX

003741AE 8D85 DD2A4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402ADD]

003741B4 50 PUSH EAX

003741B5 8B85 E3444000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIlstrcmpA>] ; kernel32.lstrcmpA

003741BB E9 1A080000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

003741C0 90 NOP

003741C1 5A POP EDX ; 0012FFE0

003741C2 85C0 TEST EAX, EAX

003741C4 75 0B JNZ SHORT 003741D1

003741C6 8D85 2E3B4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<SDKSndMsg>]

003741CC E9 D4000000 JMP <Fill_IAT_RELOC_2>

003741D1 52 PUSH EDX

003741D2 52 PUSH EDX

003741D3 8D85 7E474000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<strsend>]

003741D9 50 PUSH EAX

003741DA 8D85 092B4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402B09]

003741E0 50 PUSH EAX

003741E1 8B85 E3444000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIlstrcmpA>] ; kernel32.lstrcmpA

003741E7 E9 EE070000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

003741EC 90 NOP

003741ED 5A POP EDX ; 0012FFE0

003741EE 85C0 TEST EAX, EAX

003741F0 75 0B JNZ SHORT 003741FD

003741F2 8D85 323B4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<SDKsend>]

003741F8 E9 A8000000 JMP <Fill_IAT_RELOC_2>

003741FD 52 PUSH EDX

003741FE 52 PUSH EDX

003741FF 8D85 83474000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<strrecv>]

00374205 50 PUSH EAX

00374206 8D85 352B4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402B35]

0037420C 50 PUSH EAX

0037420D 8B85 E3444000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIlstrcmpA>] ; kernel32.lstrcmpA

00374213 E9 C2070000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00374218 90 NOP

00374219 5A POP EDX ; 0012FFE0

0037421A 85C0 TEST EAX, EAX

0037421C 75 08 JNZ SHORT 00374226

0037421E 8D85 363B4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<SDKrecv>]

00374224 EB 7F JMP SHORT <Fill_IAT_RELOC_2>

00374226 52 PUSH EDX

00374227 56 PUSH ESI

00374228 8D85 572B4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402B57]

0037422E 50 PUSH EAX

0037422F 8B85 9E434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<MyGetProcAddress>] ; GetProcAddress获取API的地址

00374235 E9 A0070000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

0037423A 90 NOP

0037423B 8B9D E9494000 MOV EBX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<hvMEM>]

00374241 039D ED494000 ADD EBX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<shellFunAddress>]

00374247 53 PUSH EBX

00374248 50 PUSH EAX

00374249 53 PUSH EBX

0037424A E8 A0070000 CALL <steal code>

0037424F 2B85 E9494000 SUB EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<hvMEM>]

00374255 8985 ED494000 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<shellFunAddress>], EAX

0037425B 60 PUSHAD

0037425C 3D C01F0000 CMP EAX, 1FC0 ; 判断是否够空间

00374261 76 3E JBE SHORT 003742A1 ; 如果空间够用则跳

00374263 6A 04 PUSH 4

00374265 68 00100000 PUSH 1000

0037426A 68 00200000 PUSH 2000

0037426F 6A 00 PUSH 0

00374271 8D85 AD2B4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402BAD]

00374277 50 PUSH EAX ; 空间不够用则跳

00374278 8B85 AE434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIVirtualAlloc>] ; kernel32.VirtualAlloc

0037427E E9 57070000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

......

00374284 64:8F05 0000000>POP DWORD PTR FS:[0] ; 最后一个恢复SEH到这里

0037428B 58 POP EAX ; 0012FFE0

0037428C ^ E9 8BFEFFFF JMP 0037411C

00374291 8985 E9494000 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<hvMEM>], EAX

00374297 C785 ED494000 0>MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<shellFunAddress>], 0

003742A1 61 POPAD

003742A2 5B POP EBX ; 0012FFE0

003742A3 8BC3 MOV EAX, EBX

003742A5 > 3347 09 XOR EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+9] ; Fill_IAT_RELOC_2

003742A8 8947 1C MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+1C], EAX ; 填充地址

003742AB 5A POP EDX ; 0012FFE0

003742AC 0FB642 FF MOVZX EAX, BYTE PTR DS:[EDX-1]

003742B0 03D0 ADD EDX, EAX

003742B2 42 INC EDX

003742B3 83C7 20 ADD EDI, 20

003742B6 59 POP ECX ; 0012FFE0

003742B7 49 DEC ECX

003742B8 ^ 0F85 CCFBFFFF JNZ <loop_Current_DLL>

003742BE >^ E9 46FAFFFF JMP <loop_De_Crypted_iat> ; jmp_loop_de_iat

003742C3 > B9 00010000 MOV ECX, 100 ; Disposal_IAT_Done

看起来都有够复杂了,还好脱的时候不会这么复杂

;⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕END⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕

;♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀文件CRC检测♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀

003742C8 2BE1 SUB ESP, ECX

003742CA 8BF4 MOV ESI, ESP

003742CC 8BFC MOV EDI, ESP

003742CE C1E9 02 SHR ECX, 2

003742D1 33C0 XOR EAX, EAX

003742D3 F3:AB REP STOS DWORD PTR ES:[EDI]

003742D5 68 00010000 PUSH 100

003742DA 56 PUSH ESI

003742DB 8B85 B2434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

003742E1 50 PUSH EAX

003742E2 8D85 112C4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402C11]

003742E8 50 PUSH EAX

003742E9 8B85 0B454000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIGetModuleFileName>] ; kernel32.GetModuleFileNameA

003742EF E9 E6060000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN> ; 获取模块名

003742F4 90 NOP

003742F5 6A 00 PUSH 0

003742F7 68 80000000 PUSH 80

003742FC 6A 03 PUSH 3

003742FE 6A 00 PUSH 0

00374300 6A 03 PUSH 3

00374302 68 00000080 PUSH 80000000

00374307 56 PUSH ESI

00374308 8D85 3F2C4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402C3F]

0037430E 50 PUSH EAX

0037430F 8B85 BC444000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APICreateFileA>] ; kernel32.CreateFileA

00374315 E9 C0060000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

0037431A 90 NOP

0037431B 6285 F1494000 BOUND EAX, QWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4049F1] ; 最后一次异常跳这里

00374321 ^ EB F8 JMP SHORT 0037431B

00374323 8BD8 MOV EBX, EAX

00374325 81C4 00010000 ADD ESP, 100

0037432B 6A 00 PUSH 0

0037432D 53 PUSH EBX

0037432E 8D85 5D2C4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402C5D]

00374334 50 PUSH EAX

00374335 8B85 C9444000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIGetFileSize>] ; kernel32.GetFileSize

0037433B E9 9A060000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00374340 90 NOP

00374341 8985 B6434000 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<_dwFileSize>], EAX

00374347 6A 00 PUSH 0

00374349 FFB5 B6434000 PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<_dwFileSize>]

0037434F 6A 00 PUSH 0

00374351 6A 02 PUSH 2

00374353 6A 00 PUSH 0

00374355 53 PUSH EBX

00374356 8D85 852C4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402C85]

0037435C 50 PUSH EAX

0037435D 8B85 75454000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<CreateFileMapA>] ; kernel32.CreateFileMappingA

00374363 E9 72060000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00374368 90 NOP

00374369 8985 BA434000 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<hMap>], EAX

0037436F 6A 00 PUSH 0

00374371 6A 00 PUSH 0

00374373 6A 00 PUSH 0

00374375 6A 04 PUSH 4

00374377 FFB5 BA434000 PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<hMap>]

0037437D 8D85 B32C4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402CB3]

00374383 50 PUSH EAX

00374384 8B85 89454000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIMapViewofFile>] ; kernel32.MapViewOfFile

0037438A E9 4B060000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

0037438F 90 NOP

00374390 90 NOP

00374391 40 INC EAX

00374392 D1C8 ROR EAX, 1

00374394 CE INTO

00374395 ^ EB FA JMP SHORT 00374391

00374397 8985 BE434000 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<hvmapmem>], EAX

0037439D 53 PUSH EBX

0037439E 8B40 3C MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+3C]

003743A1 8B8D B6434000 MOV ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<_dwFileSize>]

003743A7 2BC8 SUB ECX, EAX

003743A9 8BB5 BE434000 MOV ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<hvmapmem>]

003743AF 03F0 ADD ESI, EAX

003743B1 E8 A5080000 CALL <Calculate_CRC> ; 计算CRC值

003743B6 5B POP EBX ; 0012FFE0

003743B7 3385 C6434000 XOR EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<xorsizeimg_Key>]

003743BD C1C8 03 ROR EAX, 3

003743C0 8BF0 MOV ESI, EAX

003743C2 8B85 BE434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<hvmapmem>]

003743C8 0340 3C ADD EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+3C]

003743CB 8B78 FC MOV EDI, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX-4] ; 取出文件的CRC值

003743CE FFB5 BE434000 PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<hvmapmem>]

003743D4 8D85 032D4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402D03]

003743DA 50 PUSH EAX

003743DB 8B85 98454000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIUnmapviewofFile>] ; kernel32.UnmapViewOfFile

003743E1 E9 F4050000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

003743E6 90 NOP

003743E7 FFB5 BA434000 PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<hMap>]

003743ED 8D85 1C2D4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402D1C]

003743F3 50 PUSH EAX

003743F4 8B85 A9454000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APICloaseHandel>] ; kernel32.CloseHandle

003743FA E9 DB050000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

003743FF 90 NOP

00374400 53 PUSH EBX

00374401 8D85 302D4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402D30]

00374407 50 PUSH EAX

00374408 8B85 A9454000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APICloaseHandel>] ; kernel32.CloseHandle

0037440E E9 C7050000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00374413 90 NOP

00374414 8B85 E6434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<flg_CRC_Check>]

0037441A 83F8 01 CMP EAX, 1

0037441D 75 08 JNZ SHORT <not_Check_crc> ; 判断是否需要进行CRC效验

0037441F 3BF7 CMP ESI, EDI ; 如果要检测,不相等的话就OVER了

00374421 0F85 171E0000 JNZ <Game_Over>

;♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀END♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀♀

00374427 > 8D85 5F2D4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402D5F] ; not_Check_crc

0037442D 50 PUSH EAX

0037442E 8B85 ED444000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIGetVersion>] ; kernel32.GetVersion

00374434 E9 A1050000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00374439 90 NOP

0037443A 33C0 XOR EAX, EAX

0037443C F7F0 DIV EAX ; 除 0异常

0037443E E9 FB1D0000 JMP <Game_Over>

00374443 8985 88474000 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<save_VerInfo>], EAX

00374449 8D85 782D4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402D78]

0037444F 50 PUSH EAX

00374450 8B85 1F454000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIGetCurProcess>] ; kernel32.GetCurrentProcess

00374456 E9 7F050000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

0037445B 90 NOP

0037445C 8985 90474000 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<_dwCurProc>], EAX

00374462 8D85 912D4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402D91]

00374468 50 PUSH EAX

00374469 8B85 32454000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIGetCurProcId>] ; kernel32.GetCurrentProcessId

0037446F E9 66050000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00374474 90 NOP

00374475 8985 94474000 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<_dwCurProcId>], EAX

0037447B 8D85 B52D4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402DB5]

00374481 50 PUSH EAX

00374482 8B85 47454000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIGetCmdLine>] ; kernel32.GetCommandLineA

00374488 E9 4D050000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

0037448D 90 NOP

0037448E 9C PUSHFD

0037448F 9C PUSHFD

00374490 58 POP EAX ; 0012FFE0

00374491 80CC 01 OR AH, 1 ; 这里也是最后八个异常里的

00374494 50 PUSH EAX

00374495 9D POPFD

00374496 9D POPFD

00374497 ^ EB F5 JMP SHORT 0037448E

00374499 8985 98474000 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<ptrGetCmdLine>], EAX

0037449F 6A 00 PUSH 0

003744A1 8D85 D02D4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402DD0]

003744A7 50 PUSH EAX

003744A8 8B85 F9444000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIGetModulehndA>] ; kernel32.GetModuleHandleA

003744AE E9 27050000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

003744B3 90 NOP

003744B4 8985 8C474000 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<_dwHandle>], EAX

003744BA FFB5 64464000 PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIwsASend>] ; 对WSASend特别处理

003744C0 8D85 E5484000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4048E5]

003744C6 50 PUSH EAX

003744C7 E8 23050000 CALL <steal code>

003744CC FFB5 6D464000 PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIWSARecv>] ; WS2_32.WSARecv

003744D2 8D85 25494000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+404925]

003744D8 50 PUSH EAX

003744D9 E8 11050000 CALL <steal code>

003744DE 8D85 AC484000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<strShellTmpMap>]

003744E4 50 PUSH EAX

003744E5 68 00010000 PUSH 100

003744EA 6A 00 PUSH 0

003744EC 6A 04 PUSH 4

003744EE 6A 00 PUSH 0

003744F0 6A FF PUSH -1

003744F2 8D85 212E4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402E21]

003744F8 50 PUSH EAX

003744F9 8B85 75454000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<CreateFileMapA>] ; kernel32.CreateFileMappingA

003744FF E9 D6040000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00374504 90 NOP

00374505 83F8 00 CMP EAX, 0

00374508 0F84 301D0000 JE <Game_Over>

0037450E 8985 B8484000 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<hMAP1>], EAX

00374514 68 00010000 PUSH 100

00374519 6A 00 PUSH 0

0037451B 6A 00 PUSH 0

0037451D 6A 06 PUSH 6

0037451F 50 PUSH EAX

00374520 8D85 4F2E4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+402E4F]

00374526 50 PUSH EAX

00374527 8B85 89454000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIMapViewofFile>] ; kernel32.MapViewOfFile

0037452D E9 A8040000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00374532 90 NOP

00374533 8985 BC484000 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<hMapview1>], EAX

00374539 8BF8 MOV EDI, EAX

0037453B 8DB5 C0484000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4048C0]

00374541 B9 0A000000 MOV ECX, 0A

00374546 F3:A4 REP MOVS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI], BYTE PTR DS:[ESI] ; 把ShellMap字符串复制到990000处

00374548 8B85 88474000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<save_VerInfo>]

0037454E 3D 00000080 CMP EAX, 80000000

00374553 73 16 JNB SHORT <OSisWin9x> ; 判断系统是否为WinNT或以上系统

00374555 64:FF35 3000000>PUSH DWORD PTR FS:[30] ; 如果是NT系统则检测IsDebuggerPresent

0037455C 58 POP EAX ; 检测Ring3级调试器

0037455D 0FB658 02 MOVZX EBX, BYTE PTR DS:[EAX+2]

00374561 0ADB OR BL, BL

00374563 0F85 D51C0000 JNZ <Game_Over>

00374569 EB 2A JMP SHORT 00374595

0037456B > 50 PUSH EAX ; OSisWin9x

0037456C 0F014C24 FE SIDT FWORD PTR SS:[ESP-2]

00374571 5B POP EBX ; 0012FFE0

00374572 83C3 18 ADD EBX, 18

00374575 8B4B 04 MOV ECX, DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+4]

00374578 66:8B0B MOV CX, WORD PTR DS:[EBX]

0037457B 8B53 0C MOV EDX, DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+C]

0037457E 66:8B53 08 MOV DX, WORD PTR DS:[EBX+8]

00374582 8B43 14 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+14]

00374585 66:8B43 10 MOV AX, WORD PTR DS:[EBX+10]

00374589 2BC2 SUB EAX, EDX

0037458B 2BD1 SUB EDX, ECX

0037458D 2BC2 SUB EAX, EDX

0037458F 0F85 A91C0000 JNZ <Game_Over>

;◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎重定位表处理◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎

如果是DLL的话,这里填充重定位表,修复重定位表时要注意一点,如果加密时选择了加密输入和特殊代码加密的话,是不能直接通过

修改这里来获取到全部的重定位表.

00374595 8BB5 D6434000 MOV ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<Reloc_RVA(DLL)>] ; 判断是否有重定位表,一般的EXE这里为0

0037459B 0BF6 OR ESI, ESI

0037459D 74 4C JE SHORT <no_Reloc_Tab> ; 如果没有重定位表则跳

0037459F 03B5 B2434000 ADD ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

003745A5 8BBD B2434000 MOV EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

003745AB 8BDF MOV EBX, EDI

003745AD 2BBD D2434000 SUB EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<Reloc_BASE>] ; 重定位后的实际基址

003745B3 0FB606 MOVZX EAX, BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

003745B6 EB 2F JMP SHORT 003745E7

003745B8 > 3C 01 CMP AL, 1 ; Loop_Fill_Reloc_Tab

003745BA 75 15 JNZ SHORT 003745D1

003745BC 46 INC ESI

003745BD 0FB606 MOVZX EAX, BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

003745C0 3C 02 CMP AL, 2

003745C2 75 08 JNZ SHORT 003745CC

003745C4 46 INC ESI

003745C5 031E ADD EBX, DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]

003745C7 83C6 04 ADD ESI, 4

003745CA EB 18 JMP SHORT 003745E4

003745CC 46 INC ESI

003745CD 03D8 ADD EBX, EAX

003745CF EB 13 JMP SHORT 003745E4

003745D1 3C 02 CMP AL, 2

003745D3 75 0A JNZ SHORT 003745DF

003745D5 46 INC ESI

003745D6 031E ADD EBX, DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]

003745D8 013B ADD DWORD PTR DS:[EBX], EDI ; 填充重定位表

003745DA 83C6 04 ADD ESI, 4

003745DD EB 05 JMP SHORT 003745E4

003745DF 46 INC ESI

003745E0 03D8 ADD EBX, EAX

003745E2 013B ADD DWORD PTR DS:[EBX], EDI ; 填充重定位表

003745E4 0FB606 MOVZX EAX, BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

003745E7 0AC0 OR AL, AL

003745E9 ^ 75 CD JNZ SHORT <Loop_Fill_Reloc_Tab>

;◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎重定位表处理完毕◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎◎

003745EB > 8CC9 MOV CX, CS ; no_Reloc_Tab

003745ED 32C9 XOR CL, CL

003745EF 0BC9 OR ECX, ECX ; 判断操作系统

003745F1 74 32 JE SHORT <Os_isWinNT>

003745F3 50 PUSH EAX

003745F4 0F014C24 FE SIDT FWORD PTR SS:[ESP-2]

003745F9 5F POP EDI ; 0012FFE0

003745FA 83C7 20 ADD EDI, 20

003745FD 8B4F 04 MOV ECX, DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+4]

00374600 66:8B0F MOV CX, WORD PTR DS:[EDI]

00374603 FA CLI

00374604 8DB5 434B4000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+404B43]

0037460A 66:8937 MOV WORD PTR DS:[EDI], SI

0037460D C1EE 10 SHR ESI, 10

00374610 66:8977 06 MOV WORD PTR DS:[EDI+6], SI

00374614 FB STI

00374615 CD 04 INT 4

00374617 FA CLI

00374618 66:890F MOV WORD PTR DS:[EDI], CX

0037461B C1E9 10 SHR ECX, 10

0037461E 66:894F 06 MOV WORD PTR DS:[EDI+6], CX

00374622 FB STI

00374623 EB 37 JMP SHORT 0037465C

00374625 > E8 0E000000 CALL <Check_Debug> ; Os_isWinNT

0037462A 8B4C24 0C MOV ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+C]

0037462E 8381 B8000000 0>ADD DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+B8], 2 ; 异常地址+2

00374635 33C0 XOR EAX, EAX

00374637 C3 RETN

00374638 > 64:FF35 0000000>PUSH DWORD PTR FS:[0] ; Check_Debug

0037463F 64:8925 0000000>MOV DWORD PTR FS:[0], ESP

00374646 33C0 XOR EAX, EAX

00374648 CD 01 INT 1

0037464A 40 INC EAX

0037464B 40 INC EAX

0037464C 0BC0 OR EAX, EAX

0037464E 64:8F05 0000000>POP DWORD PTR FS:[0] ; 0012FFE0

00374655 58 POP EAX ; 0012FFE0

00374656 0F84 E21B0000 JE <Game_Over> ; 如果是sice这里就要处理了

0037465C 8BB5 FA434000 MOV ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4043FA] ; 修正JMP IAT 到HOOKtable

00374662 0BF6 OR ESI, ESI ; 可惜我这个程序没有

00374664 74 27 JE SHORT 0037468D

00374666 03B5 B2434000 ADD ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

0037466C EB 18 JMP SHORT 00374686

0037466E 8B46 02 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+2]

00374671 C1E0 05 SHL EAX, 5

00374674 0385 FE434000 ADD EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<hMEM_IAT_RELOC_1>]

0037467A 2BC6 SUB EAX, ESI

0037467C 48 DEC EAX

0037467D 83E8 05 SUB EAX, 5

00374680 8946 02 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+2], EAX

00374683 83C6 06 ADD ESI, 6

00374686 66:813E 90E9 CMP WORD PTR DS:[ESI], 0E990

0037468B ^ 74 E1 JE SHORT 0037466E

;++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++对DELPHI程序的特别处理++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

如果是delphi的程序,加密时选择了DELPHI++选项,壳就会把mainform的部分数据搬到壳里去了,脱壳的话就得把它找回来.

0037468D 8B85 0A444000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<flgDelphi++>] ; 这里是对DELPHI的MAINFORM的特别处理

00374693 0BC0 OR EAX, EAX

00374695 74 3F JE SHORT 003746D6 ; 如果不是delphi的程序或没有选择Delphi++选项就会跳过这里了:-)

00374697 8DB5 A01A4000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<Crc_Start_addr>]

0037469D 03F0 ADD ESI, EAX

0037469F 8B1E MOV EBX, DWORD PTR DS:[ESI] ; MAINFORM的原始参考RVA

003746A1 039D B2434000 ADD EBX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

003746A7 C706 00000000 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ESI], 0

003746AD 83C6 04 ADD ESI, 4

003746B0 8933 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EBX], ESI ; [esi]就是抽取mainform的数据保存处

003746B2 0FB70E MOVZX ECX, WORD PTR DS:[ESI] ; ebx中查找和[esi]对应的第一个字节空处就是了

003746B5 83C6 02 ADD ESI, 2

003746B8 8B9D B2434000 MOV EBX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

003746BE 8B95 D2434000 MOV EDX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<Reloc_BASE>] ; 00400000

003746C4 EB 0C JMP SHORT 003746D2

003746C6 2956 02 SUB DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+2], EDX ; 对重定位的处理

003746C9 015E 02 ADD DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+2], EBX ; exe文件一般不用去管的

003746CC 0FB706 MOVZX EAX, WORD PTR DS:[ESI]

003746CF 03F0 ADD ESI, EAX

003746D1 49 DEC ECX

003746D2 0BC9 OR ECX, ECX

003746D4 ^ 75 F0 JNZ SHORT 003746C6

;++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++特殊处理结束++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

;█████████████████████████ Anti Dump █████████████████████████

003746D6 6A 04 PUSH 4

003746D8 68 00100000 PUSH 1000

003746DD 68 00100000 PUSH 1000

003746E2 6A 00 PUSH 0

003746E4 8D85 13304000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+403013]

003746EA 50 PUSH EAX

003746EB 8B85 AE434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIVirtualAlloc>] ; kernel32.VirtualAlloc

003746F1 E9 E4020000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

003746F7 8985 1A444000 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<hMEM46f7>], EAX

003746FD 8185 1A444000 0>ADD DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<hMEM46f7>], 1000 ; 修改VirtualSize??

00374707 64:FF35 3000000>PUSH DWORD PTR FS:[30]

0037470E 58 POP EAX ; 0012FFE0

0037470F 85C0 TEST EAX, EAX

00374711 78 0F JS SHORT 00374722 ; ??检测操作系统??,判断是否可以Anti_dump

00374713 8B40 0C MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+C]

00374716 8B40 0C MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+C]

00374719 C740 20 0010000>MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+20], 1000 ; anti_dump

00374720 EB 39 JMP SHORT 0037475B

00374722 6A 00 PUSH 0

00374724 8D85 53304000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+403053]

0037472A 50 PUSH EAX

0037472B 8B85 A6434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<GetModhandle>] ; kernel32.GetModuleHandleA

00374731 E9 A4020000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00374736 90 NOP

00374737 85D2 TEST EDX, EDX

00374739 79 20 JNS SHORT 0037475B

0037473B 837A 08 FF CMP DWORD PTR DS:[EDX+8], -1

0037473F 75 1A JNZ SHORT 0037475B

00374741 8B52 04 MOV EDX, DWORD PTR DS:[EDX+4]

00374744 C742 50 0010000>MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDX+50], 1000

0037474B 64:FF35 2000000>PUSH DWORD PTR FS:[20]

00374752 58 POP EAX ; 0012FFE0

00374753 85C0 TEST EAX, EAX

00374755 0F85 E31A0000 JNZ <Game_Over>

0037475B 50 PUSH EAX

0037475C 8BC4 MOV EAX, ESP

0037475E 50 PUSH EAX

0037475F 6A 04 PUSH 4

00374761 68 00100000 PUSH 1000

00374766 FFB5 B2434000 PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

0037476C 8D85 9B304000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+40309B]

00374772 50 PUSH EAX

00374773 8B85 28464000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIVirtualProtect>] ; kernel32.VirtualProtect

00374779 E9 5C020000 JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

0037477E 90 NOP

0037477F 83C4 04 ADD ESP, 4

00374782 0BC0 OR EAX, EAX

00374784 74 0F JE SHORT 00374795 ; 修改PE文件头为可写

00374786 8B95 B2434000 MOV EDX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

0037478C 0352 3C ADD EDX, DWORD PTR DS:[EDX+3C]

0037478F 8B42 30 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EDX+30]

00374792 8942 2C MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDX+2C], EAX ; 修改BaseOfCode为1000

;█████████████████████████ End █████████████████████████

00374795 8DB5 07484000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<Author's TIP>]

0037479B 8BFE MOV EDI, ESI

0037479D B9 4F000000 MOV ECX, 4F

003747A2 EB 05 JMP SHORT 003747A9 ; 显示I am xxxx

003747A4 AC LODS BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

003747A5 2C 80 SUB AL, 80

003747A7 AA STOS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI]

003747A8 49 DEC ECX

003747A9 0BC9 OR ECX, ECX

003747AB ^ 75 F7 JNZ SHORT 003747A4

003747AD 8DB5 07484000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<Author's TIP>]

003747B3 8BFE MOV EDI, ESI

003747B5 B9 4F000000 MOV ECX, 4F

003747BA EB 05 JMP SHORT 003747C1

003747BC AC LODS BYTE PTR DS:[ESI] ; 显示完再清除掉

003747BD 04 80 ADD AL, 80

003747BF AA STOS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI]

003747C0 49 DEC ECX

003747C1 0BC9 OR ECX, ECX

003747C3 ^ 75 F7 JNZ SHORT 003747BC

;◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇Calculate UnLock Key◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇

解出关键KEY,这个非常重要,KEY由内存代码效验值和Drx的值计算得来,这个程序最终KEY为:299A8442.

003747C5 8B85 0E444000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<OEP(RVA)>]

003747CB 0385 B2434000 ADD EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 计算出OEP的VA

003747D1 894424 EC MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP-14], EAX ; OEP保存到ESP-14中

003747D5 896C24 E8 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP-18], EBP ; 保存EBP

003747D9 C785 F6434000 0>MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<UnLock_Important_Key>], 0 ; 初始化关键KEY,这里的KEY是整个壳的关键

003747E3 33C0 XOR EAX, EAX ; 没有KEY后面就会出错的

003747E5 8DB5 A01A4000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<Crc_Start_addr>] ; 从内存00373184处开始计算出关键KEY

003747EB B9 FE280000 MOV ECX, 28FE ; 内存代码检测大小28fe

003747F0 C1E9 02 SHR ECX, 2

003747F3 EB 08 JMP SHORT 003747FD

003747F5 AD LODS DWORD PTR DS:[ESI] ; 如果内存代码修改过,这个KEY就肯定会不正确

003747F6 3185 F6434000 XOR DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<UnLock_Important_Key>], EAX ;这里关键一定要记下正确的值否则后面解码会出错

003747FC 49 DEC ECX

003747FD 0BC9 OR ECX, ECX

003747FF ^ 75 F4 JNZ SHORT 003747F5

00374801 8B4424 EC MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP-14]

00374805 2B85 B2434000 SUB EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

0037480B 8985 0E444000 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<OEP(RVA)>], EAX

00374811 8B6C24 E8 MOV EBP, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP-18]

00374815 8B85 F6434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<UnLock_Important_Key>]

0037481B E8 3F000000 CALL <Fuck_Int3>

00374820 8B4C24 0C MOV ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+C]

00374824 FF81 B8000000 INC DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+B8] ; 异常地址+1

0037482A 33C0 XOR EAX, EAX

0037482C 3341 04 XOR EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+4] ; 取出Dr0 参与运算

0037482F 0341 08 ADD EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+8] ; 取出Dr1 参与运算

00374832 3341 0C XOR EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+C] ; 取出Dr2 参与运算

00374835 0341 10 ADD EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+10] ; 取出Dr3 参与运算

00374838 0181 B0000000 ADD DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+B0], EAX ; 算出的值保存回regEAX,壳的关键陷阱

0037483E 60 PUSHAD ; 如果Dr0被我们跟踪时破坏了则后面肯定出错

0037483F 8D71 04 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+4]

00374842 8BA9 B4000000 MOV EBP, DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+B4]

00374848 8DBD 014A4000 LEA EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+404A01]

0037484E 81C7 E8000000 ADD EDI, 0E8

00374854 B9 06000000 MOV ECX, 6

00374859 F3:A5 REP MOVS DWORD PTR ES:[EDI], DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]

0037485B 61 POPAD

0037485C 33C0 XOR EAX, EAX

0037485E C3 RETN

0037485F > 64:FF35 0000000>PUSH DWORD PTR FS:[0] ; Fuck_Int3

00374866 64:8925 0000000>MOV DWORD PTR FS:[0], ESP

0037486D CC INT3

0037486E 90 NOP

0037486F 64:8F05 0000000>POP DWORD PTR FS:[0] ; 0012FFE0

00374876 83C4 04 ADD ESP, 4

00374879 8985 F6434000 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<UnLock_Important_Key>], EAX ; 看到了吧,如果Drx被破坏或内存代码被修改过

0037487F 33C0 XOR EAX, EAX ; 那个关键kEy就肯定不对了,那样程序就会异常退出

;◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇END◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇

:________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

最后一个部分特殊代码加密

这部分也是关键的,如果上面的KEY不正确这里处理的时候就会产生异常,特殊代码加密也就是把原程序中的call [address]和jmp [address]

改成:

NOP

CALL HOOKED_ADDRESS

或者

NOP

JMP HOOK_ADDRESS

00374881 8B8D E2434000 MOV ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<flg_specific_Code_Encrypt>] ; 特殊代码加密标志

00374887 83F9 01 CMP ECX, 1

0037488A 0F85 AE000000 JNZ <Disposal_Hook_code_done> ; 如果没有选择特殊代码加密这里会跳过

00374890 8DBD A01A4000 LEA EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<Crc_Start_addr>]

00374896 03BD 06444000 ADD EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+404406]

0037489C 8DB5 5E344000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+40345E]

003748A2 > 8B0F MOV ECX, DWORD PTR DS:[EDI] ; Loop_Hook_Encrypt_code

003748A4 0BC9 OR ECX, ECX

003748A6 75 05 JNZ SHORT 003748AD

003748A8 E9 91000000 JMP <Disposal_Hook_code_done>

003748AD 83F8 01 CMP EAX, 1

003748B0 75 21 JNZ SHORT 003748D3

003748B2 81E1 FFFFFF7F AND ECX, 7FFFFFFF

003748B8 038D B2434000 ADD ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

003748BE 2B8D D2434000 SUB ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<Reloc_BASE>] ; 00400000

003748C4 8BDE MOV EBX, ESI ; 这里不会直接计算出地址,还要用call运行时解压出来

003748C6 2BD9 SUB EBX, ECX

003748C8 8959 FC MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ECX-4], EBX ; 填充hook后的地址

003748CB 66:C741 FA 90E8 MOV WORD PTR DS:[ECX-6], 0E890 ; 填充为call hookadd

003748D1 EB 60 JMP SHORT 00374933

003748D3 8BD1 MOV EDX, ECX

003748D5 81E1 FFFFFF7F AND ECX, 7FFFFFFF

003748DB 038D B2434000 ADD ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

003748E1 2B8D D2434000 SUB ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<Reloc_BASE>] ; 00400000

003748E7 81E2 00000080 AND EDX, 80000000 ; 如果是call address,则值为80xxxxxx

003748ED 0BD2 OR EDX, EDX ; 如果edx=0表示是jmp addr

003748EF 75 08 JNZ SHORT <is_long_jmp> ; 不是jmp address就是25xxxxxx

003748F1 66:C741 FA 90E8 MOV WORD PTR DS:[ECX-6], 0E890 ; 如果是非0则call address

003748F7 EB 06 JMP SHORT 003748FF

003748F9 > 66:C741 FA 90E9 MOV WORD PTR DS:[ECX-6], 0E990 ; is_long_jmp

003748FF 8B57 04 MOV EDX, DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+4]

00374902 0395 F6434000 ADD EDX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<UnLock_Important_Key>] ; 这里也是阴险之处,如果关键KEY不正确这里就会异常

00374908 50 PUSH EAX

00374909 8B07 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EDI]

0037490B 25 FFFFFF7F AND EAX, 7FFFFFFF

00374910 2BD0 SUB EDX, EAX

00374912 F7D2 NOT EDX

00374914 C1C2 10 ROL EDX, 10

00374917 0395 B2434000 ADD EDX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

0037491D 2B95 D2434000 SUB EDX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<Reloc_BASE>] ; 这里计算出正确jmp [address]中的address,sub后edx=address

00374923 8B12 MOV EDX, DWORD PTR DS:[EDX]

00374925 2BD1 SUB EDX, ECX

00374927 8951 FC MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ECX-4], EDX ; 写入加密后的地址

0037492A 33C0 XOR EAX, EAX

0037492C 48 DEC EAX

0037492D 8907 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI], EAX ; 一填充完就把相关地址填-1

0037492F 8947 04 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+4], EAX ; 地址+4处也填-1

00374932 58 POP EAX ; 0012FFE0

00374933 83C7 08 ADD EDI, 8

00374936 83F0 01 XOR EAX, 1

00374939 ^ E9 64FFFFFF JMP <Loop_Hook_Encrypt_code>

:________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

0037493E > 8B85 C2434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4043C2] ; Disposal_Hook_code_done

00374944 0BC0 OR EAX, EAX

00374946 75 14 JNZ SHORT 0037495C

00374948 8B85 C9484000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4048C9]

0037494E 0BC0 OR EAX, EAX

00374950 74 0A JE SHORT 0037495C

00374952 0385 B2434000 ADD EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

00374958 60 PUSHAD

00374959 FFD0 CALL EAX

0037495B 61 POPAD

0037495C 8BB5 DD484000 MOV ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4048DD] ; 准备从401000处开始计算内存中原程序的CRC值

00374962 03B5 B2434000 ADD ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

00374968 8B8D E1484000 MOV ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4048E1] ; 计算大小48000

0037496E E8 E8020000 CALL <Calculate_CRC>

00374973 8985 CA434000 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<save_Mem_CRC_Key>], EAX ; 保存计算后的crc值,不知道有什么用:-(

00374979 8BC5 MOV EAX, EBP

0037497B 8DB5 014A4000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+404A01]

00374981 0146 04 ADD DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+4], EAX ; 这里准备进入八个异常了.

00374984 0146 08 ADD DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+8], EAX

00374987 83C6 20 ADD ESI, 20

0037498A 0146 04 ADD DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+4], EAX

0037498D 83C6 20 ADD ESI, 20

00374990 0146 04 ADD DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+4], EAX

00374993 0146 08 ADD DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+8], EAX

00374996 83C6 20 ADD ESI, 20

00374999 0146 04 ADD DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+4], EAX

0037499C 83C6 20 ADD ESI, 20

0037499F 0146 04 ADD DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+4], EAX

003749A2 83C6 20 ADD ESI, 20

003749A5 0146 04 ADD DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+4], EAX

003749A8 83C6 20 ADD ESI, 20

003749AB 0146 04 ADD DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+4], EAX

003749AE 83C6 20 ADD ESI, 20

003749B1 0146 04 ADD DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+4], EAX

003749B4 8DB5 FD494000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4049FD]

003749BA 0106 ADD DWORD PTR DS:[ESI], EAX

003749BC 8D85 014B4000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<Last_SEHS_Disposal>]

003749C2 50 PUSH EAX

003749C3 64:FF35 0000000>PUSH DWORD PTR FS:[0]

003749CA 64:8925 0000000>MOV DWORD PTR FS:[0], ESP

003749D1 33C0 XOR EAX, EAX

003749D3 8B00 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX]

003749D5 90 NOP

003749D6 90 NOP

003749D7 CC INT3

003749D8 ^ EB FB JMP SHORT 003749D5 ; 到这里看到这里也就预告即将到入口了

到了这里,因为后面也没有什么重要的东西,我是直接在00373A5E处下断,然后过两个异常直接到OEP处了.

全部分析完后得到两个重要的信息:

Dr的全部值

DR0 0FFF90CA

DR1 0FFFCF7F

DR2 0FFF73B0

DR3 0FFFCDEF

DR6 FFFF0FF0

DR7 00000555

关键KEY:299A8442

当然其实有了关键KEY的话,就可以不用管Drx了.

;&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&以下是各模块代码:&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&

proc_Run_FUN:

003749DA > 50 PUSH EAX ; proc_Run_FUN

003749DB 8B85 E5494000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<hMEM334d>] ; 因为这后面是各个过程来的

003749E1 50 PUSH EAX

003749E2 E8 08000000 CALL <steal code>

003749E7 8B85 E5494000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<hMEM334d>]

003749ED FFE0 JMP EAX

003749EF > 60 PUSHAD ; steal code

003749F0 8B7C24 24 MOV EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+24] ; 0045F0A1

003749F4 8B7424 28 MOV ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+28] ; ESI=FUNCTION

003749F8 > 66:8B06 MOV AX, WORD PTR DS:[ESI] ; Loop_chek_code

003749FB 3C 50 CMP AL, 50 ; 判断是否在为push eax push edi

003749FD 72 0A JB SHORT 00374A09

003749FF 3C 57 CMP AL, 57

00374A01 77 06 JA SHORT 00374A09

00374A03 8807 MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EDI], AL ; 如果是则直接抽取一字节

00374A05 46 INC ESI

00374A06 47 INC EDI

00374A07 ^ EB EF JMP SHORT <Loop_chek_code>

00374A09 3C 6A CMP AL, 6A ; 如果是 push 0的方式则直接获取2个字节

00374A0B 75 09 JNZ SHORT 00374A16

00374A0D 66:8907 MOV WORD PTR DS:[EDI], AX

00374A10 46 INC ESI

00374A11 46 INC ESI

00374A12 47 INC EDI

00374A13 47 INC EDI

00374A14 ^ EB E2 JMP SHORT <Loop_chek_code>

00374A16 3C 68 CMP AL, 68 ; 判断是否为push address的方式

00374A18 75 09 JNZ SHORT 00374A23

00374A1A B9 05000000 MOV ECX, 5

00374A1F F3:A4 REP MOVS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI], BYTE PTR DS:[ESI] ; 如果是则抽取5个字节

00374A21 ^ EB D5 JMP SHORT <Loop_chek_code>

00374A23 3C A1 CMP AL, 0A1 ; 判断是否为Mov eax,[address]

00374A25 75 09 JNZ SHORT 00374A30

00374A27 B9 05000000 MOV ECX, 5

00374A2C F3:A4 REP MOVS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI], BYTE PTR DS:[ESI] ; 如果是则抽取5个字节

00374A2E ^ EB C8 JMP SHORT <Loop_chek_code>

00374A30 66:3D 2BD2 CMP AX, 0D22B ; 判断是否为sub edx,edx

00374A34 75 2D JNZ SHORT 00374A63

00374A36 66:8907 MOV WORD PTR DS:[EDI], AX ; 如果是则抽取两个字节

00374A39 46 INC ESI

00374A3A 46 INC ESI

00374A3B 47 INC EDI

00374A3C 47 INC EDI

00374A3D 8BDE MOV EBX, ESI

00374A3F AC LODS BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

00374A40 EB 01 JMP SHORT 00374A43

00374A42 AC LODS BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

00374A43 3C C3 CMP AL, 0C3

00374A45 ^ 75 FB JNZ SHORT 00374A42 ; 循环找到ret处

00374A47 4E DEC ESI

00374A48 C607 68 MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EDI], 68 ; 改变成push address

00374A4B 8D47 0B LEA EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+B] ; ret

00374A4E 8947 01 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+1], EAX

00374A51 C647 05 68 MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EDI+5], 68

00374A55 8977 06 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+6], ESI

00374A58 C647 0A C3 MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EDI+A], 0C3

00374A5C 83C7 0B ADD EDI, 0B

00374A5F 8BF3 MOV ESI, EBX

00374A61 ^ EB 95 JMP SHORT <Loop_chek_code>

00374A63 66:3D FF74 CMP AX, 74FF ; 判断是否为push dword [reg]

00374A67 75 09 JNZ SHORT 00374A72

00374A69 B9 04000000 MOV ECX, 4 ; 如果是则抽取4个字节

00374A6E F3:A4 REP MOVS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI], BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

00374A70 ^ EB 86 JMP SHORT <Loop_chek_code>

00374A72 66:3D 8BEC CMP AX, 0EC8B ; 判断是否为mov ebp,esp

00374A76 75 0C JNZ SHORT 00374A84

00374A78 B9 02000000 MOV ECX, 2 ; 如果是抽取2个字节

00374A7D F3:A4 REP MOVS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI], BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

00374A7F ^ E9 74FFFFFF JMP <Loop_chek_code>

00374A84 3C E8 CMP AL, 0E8 ; 判断是否为call address

00374A86 75 25 JNZ SHORT 00374AAD

00374A88 8D47 0B LEA EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+B]

00374A8B C607 68 MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EDI], 68 ; 如果是则改变为push address

00374A8E 8947 01 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+1], EAX ; ret

00374A91 8D46 05 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+5]

00374A94 0346 01 ADD EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+1]

00374A97 C647 05 68 MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EDI+5], 68

00374A9B 8947 06 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+6], EAX

00374A9E C647 0A C3 MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EDI+A], 0C3

00374AA2 83C6 05 ADD ESI, 5

00374AA5 83C7 0B ADD EDI, 0B

00374AA8 ^ E9 4BFFFFFF JMP <Loop_chek_code>

00374AAD 66:3D 64FF CMP AX, 0FF64

00374AB1 75 25 JNZ SHORT 00374AD8

00374AB3 807E 02 32 CMP BYTE PTR DS:[ESI+2], 32 ; 判断是否为push [edx]

00374AB7 75 09 JNZ SHORT 00374AC2

00374AB9 B9 03000000 MOV ECX, 3 ; 如果是则抽取3字节

00374ABE F3:A4 REP MOVS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI], BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

00374AC0 EB 11 JMP SHORT 00374AD3

00374AC2 807E 02 35 CMP BYTE PTR DS:[ESI+2], 35 ; 判断是否为puhs [address],带前缀的

00374AC6 75 09 JNZ SHORT 00374AD1

00374AC8 B9 07000000 MOV ECX, 7 ; 如果是则抽取7字节

00374ACD F3:A4 REP MOVS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI], BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

00374ACF EB 02 JMP SHORT 00374AD3

00374AD1 EB 4B JMP SHORT 00374B1E

00374AD3 ^ E9 20FFFFFF JMP <Loop_chek_code>

00374AD8 66:3D 6489 CMP AX, 8964

00374ADC 75 25 JNZ SHORT 00374B03

00374ADE 807E 02 22 CMP BYTE PTR DS:[ESI+2], 22 ; 判断是否为mov [reg],reg

00374AE2 75 09 JNZ SHORT 00374AED

00374AE4 B9 03000000 MOV ECX, 3 ; 如果是则抽取前三位,带前缀

00374AE9 F3:A4 REP MOVS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI], BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

00374AEB EB 11 JMP SHORT 00374AFE

00374AED 807E 02 25 CMP BYTE PTR DS:[ESI+2], 25 ; 判断是否为mov [addr],reg

00374AF1 75 09 JNZ SHORT 00374AFC

00374AF3 B9 07000000 MOV ECX, 7 ; 如果是则抽取七位

00374AF8 F3:A4 REP MOVS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI], BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

00374AFA EB 02 JMP SHORT 00374AFE

00374AFC EB 20 JMP SHORT 00374B1E

00374AFE ^ E9 F5FEFFFF JMP <Loop_chek_code>

00374B03 66:3D 83EC CMP AX, 0EC83 ; 判断是否为sub esp,val

00374B07 75 0C JNZ SHORT 00374B15

00374B09 B9 03000000 MOV ECX, 3 ; 如果是则抽取3字节

00374B0E F3:A4 REP MOVS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI], BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

00374B10 ^ E9 E3FEFFFF JMP <Loop_chek_code>

00374B15 3C CC CMP AL, 0CC

00374B17 75 05 JNZ SHORT 00374B1E ; 判断指令的第一个字节是否为cc,如果是则over了

00374B19 E9 20170000 JMP <Game_Over>

00374B1E 66:3D CD03 CMP AX, 3CD

00374B22 75 05 JNZ SHORT 00374B29 ; 同样判断是否为int 3(CD 03)

00374B24 E9 15170000 JMP <Game_Over>

00374B29 C607 68 MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EDI], 68 ; 如果都不是的话改变为push address

00374B2C 8977 01 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+1], ESI ; ret

00374B2F C647 05 C3 MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EDI+5], 0C3

00374B33 83C7 06 ADD EDI, 6

00374B36 897C24 FC MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP-4], EDI

00374B3A 61 POPAD

00374B3B 8B4424 DC MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP-24] ; ntdll.RtlFreeHeap

00374B3F C2 0800 RETN 8

00374B42 50 PUSH EAX ; HookJmp

00374B43 60 PUSHAD

00374B44 E8 00000000 CALL 00374B49

00374B49 5D POP EBP ; 0012FFE0

00374B4A 81ED 65344000 SUB EBP, 403465 ; 计算出EBP的值

00374B50 8B7C24 24 MOV EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+24] ; 取出call的来源+5

00374B54 8DB5 A01A4000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<Crc_Start_addr>]

00374B5A 03B5 06444000 ADD ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+404406]

00374B60 8B06 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]

00374B62 33D2 XOR EDX, EDX

00374B64 B9 02000000 MOV ECX, 2

00374B69 F7E1 MUL ECX

00374B6B D1E8 SHR EAX, 1

00374B6D 0385 B2434000 ADD EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

00374B73 2B85 D2434000 SUB EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<Reloc_BASE>] ; 00400000

00374B79 3BF8 CMP EDI, EAX

00374B7B 75 0A JNZ SHORT 00374B87

00374B7D 0AD2 OR DL, DL

00374B7F 75 04 JNZ SHORT 00374B85

00374B81 EB 09 JMP SHORT 00374B8C

00374B83 EB 02 JMP SHORT 00374B87

00374B85 EB 35 JMP SHORT 00374BBC

00374B87 83C6 08 ADD ESI, 8

00374B8A ^ EB D4 JMP SHORT 00374B60

00374B8C 8B46 04 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+4] ; 这里对call [address]的处理

00374B8F 0385 F6434000 ADD EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<UnLock_Important_Key>]

00374B95 03BD D2434000 ADD EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<Reloc_BASE>] ; 00400000

00374B9B 2BBD B2434000 SUB EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

00374BA1 2BC7 SUB EAX, EDI

00374BA3 F7D0 NOT EAX

00374BA5 C1C0 10 ROL EAX, 10

00374BA8 0385 B2434000 ADD EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

00374BAE 2B85 D2434000 SUB EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<Reloc_BASE>] ; 相减之后eax就是原iat的地址

00374BB4 8B00 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX] ; 取出IAT中第一层的加密地址

00374BB6 894424 20 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+20], EAX

00374BBA 61 POPAD

00374BBB C3 RETN

00374BBC 8B46 04 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+4] ; 这里对jmp [address]的处理

00374BBF 0385 F6434000 ADD EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<UnLock_Important_Key>]

00374BC5 03BD D2434000 ADD EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<Reloc_BASE>] ; 00400000

00374BCB 2BBD B2434000 SUB EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

00374BD1 2BC7 SUB EAX, EDI

00374BD3 F7D0 NOT EAX

00374BD5 C1C0 10 ROL EAX, 10

00374BD8 0385 B2434000 ADD EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<IMGBASE>] ; 00400000

00374BDE 2B85 D2434000 SUB EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<Reloc_BASE>] ; 减了之后算出jmp [address]中address的地址

00374BE4 8B00 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX] ; 取出IAT中第一层的加密地址

00374BE6 894424 24 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+24], EAX

00374BEA 61 POPAD

00374BEB 83C4 04 ADD ESP, 4 ; 因为是jmp [address]所以这里要add esp,4

00374BEE C3 RETN

proc_Loaddll_failed:

00374BEF > 56 PUSH ESI ; proc_Loaddll_failed

00374BF0 8D85 5B484000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+40485B] ; ASCII "can not found %s"

00374BF6 50 PUSH EAX

00374BF7 8D85 74484000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<strAPIName>] ; ASCII "RtlSetLastWin32Error"

00374BFD 50 PUSH EAX

00374BFE 8D85 2D354000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+40352D]

00374C04 50 PUSH EAX

00374C05 8B85 2A444000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIwsPrintfA>] ; USER32.wsprintfA

00374C0B ^ E9 CAFDFFFF JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00374C10 90 NOP

00374C11 83C4 0C ADD ESP, 0C

00374C14 6A 00 PUSH 0

00374C16 8D85 A4484000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4048A4] ; ASCII "warning"

00374C1C 50 PUSH EAX

00374C1D 8D85 74484000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<strAPIName>]

00374C23 50 PUSH EAX

00374C24 6A 00 PUSH 0

00374C26 8D85 55354000 LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+403555]

00374C2C 50 PUSH EAX

00374C2D 8B85 35444000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<APIMsgBox>] ; USER32.MessageBoxA

00374C33 ^ E9 A2FDFFFF JMP <proc_Run_FUN>

00374C38 90 NOP

00374C39 E9 00160000 JMP <Game_Over>

proc_check_CC:

00374C3E > 56 PUSH ESI ; proc_check_CC

00374C3F 51 PUSH ECX ; 检测API是否下了cc断点

00374C40 50 PUSH EAX

00374C41 8BF0 MOV ESI, EAX

00374C43 B9 01000000 MOV ECX, 1

00374C48 AC LODS BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

00374C49 3C CC CMP AL, 0CC

00374C4B 75 08 JNZ SHORT 00374C55

00374C4D 58 POP EAX ; 0012FFE0

00374C4E 59 POP ECX ; 0012FFE0

00374C4F 5E POP ESI ; 0012FFE0

00374C50 E9 E9150000 JMP <Game_Over>

00374C55 ^ E2 F1 LOOPD SHORT 00374C48

00374C57 58 POP EAX ; 0012FFE0

00374C58 59 POP ECX ; 0012FFE0

00374C59 5E POP ESI ; 0012FFE0

00374C5A C3 RETN

Calculate_CRC:

00374C5B > 83CA FF OR EDX, FFFFFFFF ; Calculate_CRC

00374C5E 51 PUSH ECX

00374C5F AC LODS BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]

00374C60 32C2 XOR AL, DL

00374C62 6A 08 PUSH 8

00374C64 59 POP ECX ; 0012FFE0

00374C65 0FB6D8 MOVZX EBX, AL

00374C68 D1EB SHR EBX, 1

00374C6A 73 06 JNB SHORT 00374C72

00374C6C 81F3 2083B8ED XOR EBX, EDB88320

00374C72 ^ E2 F4 LOOPD SHORT 00374C68

00374C74 C1EA 08 SHR EDX, 8

00374C77 33D3 XOR EDX, EBX

00374C79 59 POP ECX ; 0012FFE0

00374C7A ^ E2 E2 LOOPD SHORT 00374C5E

00374C7C F7D2 NOT EDX

00374C7E 92 XCHG EAX, EDX

00374C7F C3 RETN

Game_Over:

0037623E 8B85 CE434000 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4043CE] ; Game_Over

00376244 85C0 TEST EAX, EAX

00376246 74 07 JE SHORT 0037624F

0376248 61 POPAD

00376249 B8 00000000 MOV EAX, 0

0037624E C3 RETN

0037624F 6A 00 PUSH 0

00376251 6A 00 PUSH 0

00376253 FFB5 D6444000 PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<727.APIExitProcess>] ; kernel32.ExitProcess

00376259 8D8D 834B4000 LEA ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+404B83]

0037625F 8DBD A01A4000 LEA EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+<727.Crc_Start_addr>]

00376265 2BCF SUB ECX, EDI

00376267 33C0 XOR EAX, EAX

00376269 F3:AA REP STOS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI]

0037626B AB STOS DWORD PTR ES:[EDI]

0037626C C3 RETN

Greetz:

Fly.Jingulong,yock,tDasm.David.hexer,hmimys,ahao.UFO(brother).alan(sister).all of my

friends and you!

By loveboom[DFCG][FCG][US]

http://blog.csdn.net/bmd2chen

Email:loveboom#163.com

 
 
 
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