Microeconomics of Market Failures市场失败的微观经济学
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作者： Bernard Salanie 著
出 版 社：
出版时间： 2000-8-1字数：版次： 1页数： 224印刷时间： 2000/08/01开本： 16开印次： 1纸张： 胶版纸I S B N ： 9780262194433包装： 精装内容简介
In this book Bernard Salanié studies situations where competitive markets fail to achieve a collective optimum and the interventions used to remedy these so-called market failures. He includes discussions of theories of collective decision making, as well as elementary models of public economics and industrial organization. Although public economics is traditionally defined as the positive and normative study of government action over the economy, Salanié confines himself to microeconomic aspects of welfare economics; he considers taxation and the effects of public spending only as potential remedies for market failures. He concludes with a discussion of the theory of general equilibrium in incomplete markets.
作者简介
Bernard Salanié is Research Fellow of LEI (CREST) in Paris, Professor at École Polytechnique, and Managing Editor of the Review of Economic Studies. His books include The Microeconomics of Market Failures (2000) and The Economics of Taxation (2003), both published by The MIT Press.
目录
1Introduction
1.1 The Fundamental Theorems
1.1.1 The Pareto Optimum
1.1.2 General Equilibrium
1.1.3 The Two Fundamental Welfare Theorems
1.2 Return to the Hypotheses
1.3 The Government's Role
Bibliography
Ⅰ Collective Choice
2 The Aggregation of Preferences
2.1 Arrow's Theorem
2.2 Noncomparable Cardinal Preferences
2.3 Comparable Ordinal Preferences
2.4 Comparable Cardinal Preferences
2.5 Conclusion
2.6 Appendix A: Proof of Arrow's Theorem
2.7 Appendix B: Theories of Justice
2.7.1 Utilitarianism
2.7.2 Rawls's Difference Principle
2.7.3 Recent Developments
2.7.4 Nozick's Historical Approach
2.7.5 Conclusion
Bibliography
3 Cost-Benefit Analysis
3.1 Measures of Welfare
3.2 First-Best
3.3 Second-Best
3.3.1 Shadow Prices
3.3.2 Nonmarket Goods
3.3.3 Incomplete Markets
Bibliography
4Implementation
4.1 Dominant Strategy Equilibrium
4.2 Nash Equilibrium
4.3 Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium
4.4 Bayesian Equilibrium
4.5 Appendix A: Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
4.6 Appendix B: Proof of Maskin's Theorem Bibliography
Ⅱ Public Economics
5 Public Goods
5.1 The Optimality Condition
5.2 Implementing the Optimum
5.2.1 The Subscription Equilibrium
5.2.2 Voting Equilibrium
5.2.3 The Lindahl Equilibrium
5.2.4 Personalized Taxation
5.2.5 A Planning Procedure
5.2.6 The Pivot Mechanism
5.3 The Property of Public Goods
5.4 The Importance of the Free-Rider Problem
5.5 Local Public Goods
5.6 Appendix: Characterization of VCG Mechanisms Bibliography
External Effects
6.1 The Pareto Optimum
6.2 Implementing the Optimum
6.2.1 The Competitive Equilibrium
6.2.2 Quotas
6.2.3 Subsidies for Depollution
6.2.4 The Rights to Pollute
……
7 Nonconvexities
ⅢIndustrial Organization
8 General Equilibrirm of Imperfect Conpetition
9 Price and Quantities
10 Product Choice
11 Long-Term Entry and Competition
12 Vertical Relations
Ⅳ Incomplete Markets
13 Elements of the Theory of Incomplete Markets
Index