Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico 投票赞成独裁：墨西哥独霸党制的生存与让位

作者： Beatriz Magaloni著

出 版 社：

出版时间： 2006-9-1字数：版次：页数： 282印刷时间： 2006/09/01开本： 16开印次：纸张： 胶版纸I S B N ： 9780521862479包装： 精装内容简介

This book provides a theory of the logic of survival of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), one of the most resilient autocratic regimes in the twentieth century. An autocratic regime hid behind the facade of elections that were held with clockwise precision. Although their outcome was totally predictable, elections were not hollow rituals. The PRI made millions of ordinary citizens vest their interests in the survival of the autocratic regime. Voters could not simply throw the 'rascals out of office' because their choices were constrained by a series of strategic dilemmas that compelled them to support the autocrats. The book also explores the factors that led to the demise of the PRI. The theory sheds light on the logic of 'electoral autocracies', among the most common type of autocracy and is the only systematic treatment in the literature today dealing with this form of autocracy.

作者简介：

Beatriz Magaloni is an assistant professor of political science at Stanford University. She is also affiliated with the Center for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law and the Latin American Center. She received her M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from Duke University as well as a law degree from ITAM. Her dissertation won the Gabriel Almond Award for best dissertation in comparative politics granted by the American Political Science Association. Magaloni has received Fulbright, Ford Foundation, SSRC, and Institute for the Study of World Politics grants. Articles she has written have appeared in the Journal of Theoretical Politics, Política y Gobierno and in edited volumes.

目录

INTRODUCTION

1 EQUILIBRIUM PARTY HEGEMONY

2 STRUCTURAL DETERMINANTS OF MASS SUPPORT FOR THE PRI

3 BUDGET CYCLES UNDER PRI HEGEMONY

4 THE POLITICS OF VOTE BUYING

5 JUDGING ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN HARD TIMES

6 IDEOLOGICAL DIVISIONS IN THE OPPOSITION CAMP

7 HOW VOTERS CHOOSE AND MASS COORDINATION DILEMMAS

8 ELECTORAL FRAUD AND THE GAME OF ELECTORAL TRANSITIONS

9 CONCLUSION

References

Index