Lawlessness and economics : alternative modes of governance违法与经济学
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作者： Avinash K. Dixit著
出 版 社：
出版时间： 2007-4-1字数：版次： 1页数： 167印刷时间： 2007/04/01开本： 16开印次： 1纸张： 胶版纸I S B N ： 9780691130347包装： 平装编辑推荐
作者介绍：Avinash K. Dixit
Avinash K. Dixit is John J. F. Sherrerd '52 University Professor of Economics at Princeton University. He is the author or coauthor of nine books, including "Investment under Uncertainty" (Princeton), "Thinking Strategically" (Norton), "Games of Strategy" (Norton), and "The Making of Economic Policy" (MIT).
内容简介
How can property rights be protected and contracts be enforced in countries where the rule of law is ineffective or absent? How can firms from advanced market economies do business in such circumstances? In Lawlessness and Economics, Avinash Dixit examines the theory of private institutions that transcend or supplement weak economic governance from the state.
In much of the world and through much of history, private mechanisms--such as long-term relationships, arbitration, social networks to disseminate information and norms to impose sanctions, and for-profit enforcement services--have grown up in place of formal, state-governed institutions. Even in countries with strong legal systems, many of these mechanisms continue under the shadow of the law. Numerous case studies and empirical investigations have demonstrated the variety, importance, and merits, and drawbacks of such institutions.
This book builds on these studies and constructs a toolkit of theoretical models to analyze them. The models shed new conceptual light on the different modes of governance, and deepen our understanding of the interaction of the alternative institutions with each other and with the government's law. For example, one model explains the limit on the size of social networks and illuminates problems in the transition to more formal legal systems as economies grow beyond this limit. Other models explain why for-profit enforcement is inefficient. The models also help us understand why state law dovetails with some non-state institutions and collides with others. This can help less-developed countries and transition economies devise better processes for the introduction or reform of their formal legal systems.
目录
Preface
1 Economics With and Without the Law
1.1The Need for Economic Governance
1.2 Economics Taking the Law for Granted
1.3"Lawlessness and Economics" in Context
1.4 Law and Economics
1.5 Economics in the Shadow of the Law
1.6 Other Institutions of Economic Governance
1.7Some Basic Analytical Apparatus
1.8 Approach of the Book
2 Private Ordering in the Shadow of the Law
2.1Issues and Empirical Research
2.2 Bargaining When the Law is a Backstop
2.3 Relational and Formal Contracts
2.4 Arbitration and Information
2.5 Assessment and Prospects
2.6 Mathematical Appendix
3 Relation-Based Contract Enforcement
3.1 Issues and Empirical Research
3.2 Relation-Based and Rule-Based Governance
3.3 Limits of Relation-Based Governance
3.4 Related Theoretical Models
3.5 Assessment and Prospects
3.6 Mathematical Appendix
4 Profit-Motivated Contract Enforcement
4.1 Issues and Empirical Research
4.2 The Structure of the Model
4.3 Information Intermediaries
4.4 Enforcement Intermediaries
4.5 Assessment and Prospects
4.6 Mathematical Appendix
5Private Protection of Property Rights
5.1Issues and Empirical Research
5.2Production and Protection under Anarchy
5.3For-Profit Private Protection
5.4 A Predatory State and Its Citizens
5.5Assessment and Prospects
5.6 Mathematical Appendix
6Conclusion
6.1Implications for Institutions and Policies
6.2Implications for Future Research
References
Index
