自然句法:像似性与磨损(西方语言学前沿书系·认知语言学丛书02)
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品牌: 海曼
基本信息·出版社：世界图书出版公司，剑桥大学出版社
·页码：285 页
·出版日期：2009年
·ISBN：7506273004/9787506273008
·条形码：9787506273008
·包装版本：1版
·装帧：平装
·开本：24
·正文语种：英语
·丛书名：西方语言学前沿书系·认知语言学丛书02
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内容简介《自然句法:像似性与磨损》是句法像似性的经典著作之一，其目标是挑战任意性的垄断地位。全书的核心思想是，语言结构如同非语言的图示，它们都以同样的方式和同样的原因偏离像似性。像似性与任意性总是不断竞争。语言中的任意性并非源于人类遗传的天性，而是源于经济性、泛化和联想等比较常见的原则。书中内容涉及条件句、并列结构、使役构式、领属的表达、反身和相互代词、动名词短语等众多具体的语法领域。来自116种没有谱系关系的语言里的大量例证显示了不同语言在像似性方面的类型差异。《自然句法:像似性与磨损》对兴趣在语言与语言交际、语言共性、对比语言学等理论问题以及上述具体的语法领域的研究者来说，是一部重要的参考书。
作者简介John Haiman，是一位具有国际声誉的认知语言学家，尤以语言像似性的研究而著称于世。现为美国马卡莱斯特学院（Macalester College）语言学课程（Linguistics Program）的教授、主任，研究领域包括日耳曼语的句法演变、瓦语（Hua，巴布亚新几内亚）语法、句法像似性、高棉语以及瑞士和意大利的雷蒂亚罗曼语。主要著作除本书外，还有《目标和句法演变》（Targets and Syntactic Change，1974）、《说空话不费力：讽刺、疏远和语言的演化》（Talk is Cheap：Sarcasm，Alienation，and Evolution of Language；1998）等。
编辑推荐《自然句法:像似性与磨损》由剑桥大学出版社出版。
目录
《自然句法——像似性与磨损》前言
《自然句法——像似性与磨损》前言中译文
原书目录
致谢
缩略表
导言
语言共性的两种研究方法
图示的一些特征
第I部分 语言的像似性
1 同构
1.1 同义形式与同音形式
1.2 多义形式
1.3 联想
2 动因
2.1 对称
2.2 概念距离
2.3 形态“块头”的更多用法
第Ⅱ部分 经济性与像似性的磨损
3 经济性动因
3.1 “普遍语法”的像似性
3.2 反身形式和相互形式的弱化
3.3 动词变形的产生
3.4 一致关系、本质主义和冗余
3.5 冗余的语法范畴
3.6 小结
4 像似性与经济性：以小句合并为例
4.1 句子(1)和(2)的(近)同义关系
4.2 -ing类小句的特点
4.3.ing小句和完全小句的概念紧密度
4.4 “从属”小句的某些特征
4.5 弱化小句的某些“真正的”从属特征
4.6 小结
5 词汇细化的个案研究
5.1 词汇量与像似性之间的逆向关联
5.2 缩略词：以Nukespeak为例
6 媒介的局限性：动因竞争
结论：论物理学和语法学
参考文献
语言索引
姓名索引
主题索引
……[看更多目录]
序言The iconic notion that the forms of language may imitate theirmeanings goes back （ at least in the Western tradition） to Plato's Cratylus.Like all subsequent scholars,Plato rejected imitative iconicity as adescriptive account of the structure of most words.But words occur inlarger morphosyntactic-structures.
The earliest idea that may count as an ancestor of iconicity in syntaxis the na'~ve and extremely widespread view of 17th and 18 centurygrammarians, debunked in Chomsky （1965:6-8 ） , that the sequence ofwords in a sentence "follows a natural order which conforms to the naturalexpression of our thoughts". This is of course equivalent to the notion thatthere is nothing specifically linguistic about syntax, and there is thereforeno need for grammarians to bother with it. Chomsky's ridicule made thisview notorious, and the vast majority of modern linguists have followed himin rejecting it completely,and espousing thediametrically opposedhypothesis of the "autonomy of grammar". In its extreme form, articulatedmost forcefully in Chomsky 1957, the autonomy hypothesis asserts that syntactic structure has nothing to do with （and certainly does not emerge from） any extralinguistic factors, including meaning （Chomsky 1957: chapter 9）, communicative intent （ Chomsky 1980 : 239）, or frequency （ Chomsky 1957 : 15）.
文摘插图：
Trace theory cannot explain this fact: ergo, trace theory is not eveninterested in it. Presumably, the semantic contrast between （123a） and（123b） is simply dismissed as idiomatic. Idioms are a pervasive fact of life,and there is nothing implausible about dismissing any fact as an arbitraryone. Nevertheless, the formal unity of the phenomenon of contraction inEnglish is so striking, and the semantic parallelism between these two casesis so neat, that one might wish for a unified analysis of （121） and （123）.The understood subject of any imperative in English is you. In the firstinterpretation of （123a）, us is inclusive, and therefore the subjects of let andgo are non-distinct, both including you. Therefore, a same-subject （reduced,contracted） form let's is possible. In the second interpretation of （123a）, onthe other hand, us is exclusive, and it follows that the subjects of let and gomust be entirely distinct. Therefore the same-subject form let's is imposs-ible.This analysis may seem suspect in treating non-distinctness of you andyou and me as identity （both non-distinctness and identity motivating thesame-subject form）. In fact, however, there is a fair body of comparativeevidence that suggests the correctness of precisely this approach. That is, inlanguages which mark switch-reference as a clearly defined grammaticalcategory, cases of overlap or inclusion between subjects are typicallytreated as "borderline" cases where often both same-subject and different-subject forms are possible （cf. Longacre 1972, Langdon & Munro 1979,Haiman 1980, Austin 1981, Comrie 1983, Franklin 1983）. The ambiguity of（123a） is exactly parallel inasmuch as the non-distinct interpretation,（124a）, may be rendered by either let us, as in （123a） （the different-subjectform） or let's as in （123b） （the same-subject form）.
