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　　分類: 图书,进口原版书,经管与理财 Business & Investing ,

作者： Kyle Bagwell 著

出 版 社：

出版时间： 2004-9-1字数：版次： 1页数： 224印刷时间： 2004/09/01开本： 32开印次： 1纸张： 胶版纸I S B N ： 9780262524346包装： 平装内容简介

World trade is governed by the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The WTO sets rules of conduct for the international trade of goods and services and for intellectual property rights, provides a forum for multinational negotiations to resolve trade problems, and has a formal mechanism for dispute settlement. It is the primary institution working, through rule-based bargaining, at freeing trade.

In this book, Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger provide an economic analysis and justification for the purpose and design of the GATT/WTO. They summarize their own research, discuss the major features of the GATT agreement, and survey the literature on trade agreements. Their focus on the terms-of-trade externality is particularly original and ties the book together. Topics include the theory of trade agreements, the origin and design of the GATT and the WTO, the principles of reciprocity, the most favored nation principle, terms-of-trade theory, enforcement, preferential trade agreements, labor and environmental standards, competition policy, and agricultural export subsidies.

作者简介：

Kyle Bagwell is Kelvin J. Lancaster Professor of Economic Theory at Columbia University and Professor of Finance and Economics at Columbia's School of Business. He is also Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research.

目录

reface xi

1 Introduction

2 The Theory of Trade Agreements

2．1 The Purpose of Trade Agreements

2．1．1 The General Equilibrium Model

2．1．2 The Traditional Economic Approach

2．1．3 The Political-Economy Approach

2．1．4 The Commitment Approach

2．1．5 Comparison of Approaches

2．2 Rules versus Power

2．3 Enforcement

3 The History and Design of GATT and the WT0

3．1 The Origin of GATT and the WT0

3．2 The Rules of GATT

3．2．1 Substantive Obligations

3．2．2 Exceptions

3．2．3 Dispute Settlement Procedures

3．3 Reciprocity,Nondiscrimination，and Enforcement under GATT

4 Reciprocity

4．1 Reciprocity in GATT

4．2 Reciprocity and Trade Negotiations

4．3 Reciprocity and Renegotiation

4．4 Reciprocity and Participation：Rules versus Power

References

Index

5 MFN

5．1 MFN in GATT

5．2 The Multicountry Model

5．2．I The Generaf Equilibrium Modef

5．2．2 Government Preferences

5．3 MFN．Reciprocity,and Trade Negotiations

5．3．1 significance

5．3．2 MFN and Reciprocitv

5．3．3 Nonviofation Nullification-or-Impairment Complaints

5．3．4 The Free-Rider Problem

5．4 MHN．Reciprocity and Renegotiation

5．5 MFN and the Terms．of-Trade Theory：A Summary

5．6 MFN and Political Externalities

6 Enforcement

6．1 GATT Enforcement and the Theory of Repeated Games

6．2 Predictions

6．2．1 Rebalancing the Agreement：孤e GA玎Escape Clause

6．2．2 Gradualism：Rounds of Trade Liberalization

6．3 The Exchange and Aggregation of Enforcement Power

7 Preferential Trading Agreements Ⅲ

7．1 Preferential Trading Agreements in GATT Ⅲ

7．2 Preferential Trading Agreements and Reciprocity

7．2．1 PTAs and Trade Neyiotiations

7．2．2 PTAs and Rene20tiation

7．3 Preferential Trading Agreements and Multilateral Enforcement

7．4 0ther Approaches

8 Labor and Environmental Standards

8．1 Labor and Environmental Standards in GATT

8．2 The Model with Domestic Standards

8．2．1 The Generaf Equilibrium Modef

8．2．2 Government Preferences

8．3 The Purpose of a Trade Agreement

8．3．1 Efficient Policies

8．3．2 Noncooperative Policies

8．3．3 Identifying the Inefficiency

References

Index

 

 

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